formed through relationships we did not choose,
Within our developing relational philosophy (cf. Reality & Cosmology, and Reality & Metaphysics), relation is ontologically primitive. This means that human beings do not first exist as independent, completed substances who subsequently enter into relationships. But that they emerge through relationships that precede their conscious awareness and continue shaping their development throughout life. One might therefore ask, How? Through biological inheritance, evolutionary history, prenatal conditions, family relationships, cultural environments, social institutions, ecological circumstances, and individual experiences which all contribute to the becoming of persons. Human existence is therefore neither self-originating nor independently constituted. It is embodied, conditioned, responsive, and continually developing within an interconnected reality.
This also cannot mean that human beings are born as entirely blank slates. We inherit biological capacities and evolutionary dispositions that influence how we experience and respond to the world. Our capacities for attachment, fear, self-preservation, cooperation, competition, aggression, empathy, and creativity are neither inherently sinful nor uniformly beneficial. They represent possibilities that acquire particular meanings and consequences through their expression within changing circumstances. Fear may encourage caution or become destructive suspicion. Self-preservation may sustain life or develop into exploitative behavior. Cooperation may strengthen communities or reinforce unjust institutions. The moral significance of such capacities emerges through their actual relational consequences, not from an assumed defect within their original existence.
Consequently, human beings therefore enter a world of possibilities - but not an inherited condition of moral condemnation which earlier Christian communities described as "original sin."
Yet these "possibilities" are never equally available to human beings as humans do not begin their lives under identical conditions. Some are born into environments of affection, security, and opportunity. Others encounter deprivation, violence, instability, prejudice, or institutional arrangements that restrict their development before they possess the capacity to understand or resist them. These circumstances matter because human becoming is consequential. Relationships do not merely influence an otherwise independent person; rather, relationships-of-all-kinds participate in the formation of that person's developing identity, expectations, emotional responses, and capacities for agency.
The same relational processes through which persons develop may also generate enduring patterns of goodness or harm, sanctity or horror, thrival, decline, or stagnation. Violence can become normalized within families, communities, and institutions. Fear can become prejudice. Privilege can become exploitation. Religious conviction can become justification for cruelty. Communities may inherit destructive arrangements whose origins are forgotten even as their consequences continue shaping subsequent generations. Such conditions do not require that every participant be malicious, nor do they eliminate the responsibility of those who knowingly sustain them. Yet they reveal that human wrongdoing cannot be adequately understood through isolated individual decisions alone. That what is done affects all around itself.
Our preceding two essays concerning God, sin, and evil brought us to this question from another direction. We examined the difficulty of attributing evil to God while also recognizing humanity's repeated tendency to justify-and-sanctify its own destructive behavior. Religious communities have sometimes interpreted domination, exclusion, punishment, and violence as expressions of divine holiness or justice, transforming human judgments into supposedly sacred obligations. These practices invite a deeper examination of the theological assumptions through which people come to understand themselves, their wrongdoing, and God's relationship to their lives.
If human beings are understood as fundamentally sinful, then theological explanations of divine wrath, judgment, atonement, salvation, and eternal punishment may become organized around the biblical presumption that humanity's deepest problem is its own corrupted existence. Within certain inherited Christian systems, the central religious question then becomes how an offended or judgmental God may rescue humanity from a condition of guilt that humanity did not individually originate.
But what happens when we reconsider the starting point?
What if humanity's fundamental condition is not sinfulness but generative relational becoming? What if destructive behavior is neither the inevitable expression of a fallen essence nor evidence of an originally corrupted creation, but one possibility within the complex development of embodied relational existence?
These questions do not eliminate morality or the need for accountability. Indeed, they may require more exacting moral reflection. Harm remains harm whether or not we describe it as sin. Victims do not suffer less because wrongdoing is explained through inherited social conditions. Human beings remain responsible for their participation in destructive relationships according to their developing capacities for awareness, choice, and action. Our responsibility is to understand how such harm emerges, how it becomes reinforced, and how its continuing transmission might be interrupted.
II
Here we find an important conversation partner in process theologian Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, whose process-relational theology offers a substantial reconstruction of the Christian doctrine of original sin. Suchocki recognized that human destructiveness cannot be adequately explained through individual guilt alone. Her work emphasizes the inherited relationships, institutional patterns, and collective conditions through which human beings participate in forms of violence and injustice that exceed their isolated intentions. She therefore sought to recover what she regarded as the enduring truth within the Christian doctrine of original sin while reconstructing its meaning through relational existence.
Our present proposal shares much of her concern but differs in its philosophical starting point. We do not begin with original sin as a doctrine requiring preservation or reinterpretation. Rather, we begin with the independent philosophical investigation of relational reality and ask how constructive and destructive possibilities emerge within this form of reality. Only afterwards do we consider whether Christianity's inherited language of sin, judgment, salvation, and redemption adequately expresses what we have discovered.
Thus our opening statement: Sin is not ontologically primitive. Relation is. The reality of destructive behavior does not require an original metaphysical condition of sinfulness, nor does the need for healing require humanity to have fallen from a primordial state of moral perfection.
This distinction also transforms our Christian understanding of God. Within our developing relational and panentheistic theology, God is relational love in God's own Self. Divine love is neither an additional quality possessed by an independently self-contained deity nor a temporary attitude adopted toward a morally defective creation. Rather, God's own life is understood as fundamentally relational, genuinely responsive to creation, and continually participating in the world's unfolding possibilities through persuasive rather than coercive love.
Consequently, Christian salvation need not begin with divine condemnation. It may begin with God's loving participation in creation and the possibilities for healing, transformation, justice, reconciliation, and renewed becoming that arise within relational existence. Jesus Christ may then be confessed as the incarnational disclosure of divine love without requiring that the incarnation be explained principally as God's response to an inherited human defect, but rather as a participant in generative relational becoming.
This is the constructive responsibility of our present study.
We will briefly examine then Christianity's inherited understandings of sin and salvation, then consider Suchocki's relational reconstruction as an important transitional contribution. However, the greater part of our inquiry will develop our own relational account of human nature, destructive becoming, moral responsibility, and Christian salvation through the philosophical ontological framework of Embodied Relational Reality (ERR) and the metaphysical structure of Generative Relational Realism (GRR).
Our purpose is not merely to rename inherited doctrines.
It is to ask what kind of Christian theology becomes possible when:
1 - Humanity is understood as relational rather than fundamentally sinful.
2 - Evil is understood through destructive becoming rather than original corruption.
3 - God's love is the governing theological Christian confession rather than humanity's impugned condemnation.
Christianity did not originate the human experience of wrongdoing itself, nor was it the first religious tradition to associate moral behavior with divine expectations, communal responsibilities, judgment, or the restoration of disturbed relationships. Long, long, long before Christianity emerged, ancient communities and early societies developed religious and moral explanations for violence, injustice, human suffering, disorder, and the obligations governing communal life. Their explanations differed considerably, reflecting the cultural environments, historical circumstances, and religious traditions through which human beings interpreted their existence.
For instance, within the ancient Near East, wrongdoing could be understood through violations of sacred obligations, failures of justice, breaches of communal responsibility, ritual impurity, disobedience to divine commands, or disruptions of an established social and cosmic order. These interpretations were not uniform, nor did they necessarily assume that humanity possessed an inherently corrupted nature. Rather, they expressed differing understandings of how human behavior affected relationships among persons, communities, rulers, deities, and the world they inhabited.
Ancient Israelite religion likewise developed multiple explanations of human wrongdoing. Biblical traditions describe covenantal unfaithfulness, oppression of the vulnerable, exploitation of the poor, violence, idolatry, injustice, and failures of communal responsibility. The prophets repeatedly condemned destructive conduct, particularly when religious observance concealed the mistreatment of others. Biblical expressions of repentance and restoration therefore frequently concerned concrete behavior and its consequences within communal life.
These traditions also developed theological explanations for the persistence of wrongdoing, the vulnerability of human existence, and the relationship between divine judgment and mercy. The Genesis narratives concerning Adam and Eve became especially influential within later Christian interpretation. Yet their significance did not remain unchanged across Jewish and Christian history. Different communities interpreted their accounts of human disobedience, mortality, knowledge, vulnerability, and estrangement through differing theological concerns.
The doctrine of inherited original sin, as it became influential within Western Christianity, was a later theological construction rather than a fully developed doctrine simply stated in the Genesis narrative itself.
Early Christianity inherited Jewish understandings of creation, covenant, wrongdoing, repentance, forgiveness, and divine restoration while developing its own interpretations through the life, death, and proclaimed resurrection of Jesus Christ. The writings of Paul, especially his comparison of Adam and Christ in Romans 5 (ESV), became important resources for later theological reflection. However, the precise relationship between Adam's transgression, human mortality, personal responsibility, and the universal condition of humanity remained subject to interpretation.
Within the Latin Christian tradition, Augustine of Hippo played a decisive role in developing the doctrine of original sin. In response to controversies concerning human freedom, divine grace, and the consequences of Adam's disobedience, Augustine argued that humanity inherited a condition of sin through its solidarity with the first human transgression. His account connected the human predicament with inherited guilt, disordered desire, mortality, and the necessity of divine grace.
This construction became particularly influential in Western Christianity, although subsequent traditions interpreted its implications differently. Medieval Catholic theology developed increasingly detailed explanations of original sin, grace, human freedom, and salvation. Protestant reformers later emphasized the depth of human moral incapacity and the dependence of salvation upon divine grace, while differing among themselves concerning freedom, election, justification, and sanctification.
In comparison, Eastern Christian traditions often placed greater emphasis upon mortality, corruption, healing, and humanity's participation in divine life rather than upon inherited personal guilt. Such differences remind us that Christianity never possessed a single, historically uniform account of humanity's sinful condition.
Nevertheless, certain Western Christian interpretations gradually established a powerful theological sequence: i) humanity was created for goodness, ii) humanity fell through an original transgression, iii) subsequent generations inherited a damaged condition, and iv) salvation became necessary because human beings could not restore themselves to their intended relationship with God.
This sequence acquired considerable explanatory significance because its doctrines were coherently interpreted in relation to one another.
- Original sin provided an account of the human predicament.
- Divine judgment explained the seriousness of sin.
- Grace addressed humanity's inability to overcome its condition independently.
- Atonement and salvation described the work of Christ in overcoming humanity's estrangement from God.
- Final judgment and eternal destiny established the ultimate consequences of acceptance, rejection, reconciliation, or condemnation.
Within some evangelical traditions, these relationships were expressed through especially strong affirmations of inherited human sinfulness, divine wrath, substitutionary atonement, and the eternal punishment of those not redeemed through Christ. Such explanations could produce a comprehensive religious worldview in which humanity's fundamentally sinful condition served as the indispensable premise for understanding God's saving action.
The coherence of a theological system does not establish the historical or metaphysical truth of its underlying assumptions.
The traditional sequence depends upon several questions that cannot simply be resolved by appealing to the authority of inherited doctrine. Here are a few samples:
Did humanity ever exist in an original condition of moral perfection?
Was there a historical human couple whose transgression transformed the moral nature of all subsequent generations?
Can guilt be inherited independently of personal agency?
Does evolutionary history support the existence of an original humanity from which our species subsequently declined into a fundamentally corrupted condition?
Our earlier investigations within the Prehistory of the Bible series asked whether human evolution, biblical prehistory, religious development, and the historical formation of Christian doctrine had already provided substantial reasons to reconsider these sample assumptions. In that series we observed that humanity emerged through a long evolutionary history rather than through a sudden transition from an originally perfected human condition into a corrupted one. That mortality, competition, vulnerability, aggression, and suffering were features of biological existence long before recognizable human moral agency or the development of religious understandings of sin.
None of this establishes that human wrongdoing is insignificant. Nor does evolutionary history demonstrate that God does not exist, that Christianity has no legitimate theological insights, or that moral responsibility is an illusion. It does, however, challenge the assumption that human destructiveness must originate in a primordial moral catastrophe.
There is another distinction that deserves particular attention too. The inherited theological description of humanity as sinful has sometimes blurred the difference between what human beings are and what human beings do. If sinfulness is understood as an essential condition of human existence, then the capacity for wrongdoing may be interpreted as evidence of an already corrupted nature. The person becomes morally defective before the person's developing actions, intentions, circumstances, and responsibilities have been considered.
This distinction becomes especially consequential when applied to infants and children. A newborn child possesses no developed capacity to understand moral obligations, deliberately violate the well-being of others, or assume responsibility for inherited social arrangements. Yet within some theological systems, that child is nevertheless understood as entering existence already marked by original sin.
The problem here is not simply one of religious terminology and the harmful consequences of that attitude. It also concerns the metaphysical description of human nature itself.
Does humanity's moral condition precede its relational development as an inherited defect, or do moral possibilities and responsibilities emerge within the developing conditions of embodied relational existence?
Our constructive proposal adopts the latter starting point.
We need not deny that human beings inherit biological tendencies, social constraints, cultural expectations, and destructive institutions. Indeed, such inheritances are indispensable to understanding the persistence of wrongdoing. But inherited conditions are not equivalent to inherited guilt, and vulnerability to destructive behavior is not evidence of an intrinsically sinful essence.
Similarly, our recognition that human beings repeatedly cause harm does not require that wrongdoing be explained through the existence of i) an independent evil power, an originally perfect creation, or ii) a divinely imposed condition of moral condemnation. Destructive conduct can be investigated through the actual biological, psychological, relational, and institutional circumstances in which it arises.
This reconsideration also has consequences for the inherited understanding of salvation.
If humanity's fundamental problem is not original sinfulness, then salvation need not be organized principally around humanity's rescue from an inherited state of divine condemnation. The Christian language of forgiveness, repentance, judgment, redemption, reconciliation, and restoration may remain meaningful, but its significance must be reconsidered in relation to what human beings actually experience and what genuine transformation requires.
Moreover, if God is understood as relational love in God's own being, then the traditional association of divine holiness with punitive wrath cannot simply be assumed to provide the necessary foundation for salvation. Divine love may instead be understood as genuinely responsive to human suffering, resistant to destructive possibilities, and continually inviting creation toward healing and transformed participation.
Here our concern is not to dismiss the religious achievements of earlier Christian thinkers. Their doctrines frequently sought to account for real experiences of guilt, violence, estrangement, moral failure, and the persistent difficulty of sustaining just and compassionate relationships. The more important question is whether those realities require the theological explanation they historically received.
We may acknowledge the persistence of human destructiveness without concluding that humanity is inherently sinful.
We may recognize the necessity of moral accountability without assuming that divine judgment originates in offended sovereignty.
We may affirm the importance of forgiveness without requiring that God first demand satisfaction for an inherited offense.
And we may confess Jesus Christ as the incarnational expression of divine love without making Christ's significance dependent upon humanity's supposed original corruption.
Such reconsideration does not make Christian salvation unnecessary. Rather, it invites us to understand salvation differently when not based upon doctrines of original sin:
Human beings need healing because injuries are real.
They need liberation because destructive relationships and institutions constrain human possibility.
They need forgiveness because wrongdoing has consequences that cannot always be repaired through restitution alone.
They need justice because suffering and exploitation cannot be dismissed as matters of individual spiritual disposition.
And they need renewed possibilities because the conditions inherited from the past need not exhaust the possibilities of the future.
None of these needs requires that humanity be born sinful. All of them arise within the realities of relational existence.
This brings us to Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, whose process-relational reconstruction of original sin offers an important transitional response to the inherited Christian problem. Suchocki recognized that sin could not be adequately understood as a collection of isolated moral failures. Her work sought to account for the destructive conditions that human beings inherit, reproduce, and sometimes transform through their participation in families, communities, institutions, and the wider world.
Her contribution is especially valuable because she takes seriously the historical concern behind the doctrine of original sin while reconsidering the metaphysical assumptions through which that concern was traditionally expressed.
Yet our subsequent investigation will also ask whether the doctrine of original sin itself must be retained.
For relational Christian theology, the fundamental question is not how humanity became sinful, but how human beings, born into relational existence, develop capacities for both destructive and generative becoming, and how divine love participates in humanity's continuing possibilities for transformation.
It is to Suchocki's reconstruction of this inherited theological problem that we now turn to first.
Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki offers an important transition between Christianity's inherited doctrine of original sin and a more comprehensive relational understanding of human existence. Her contribution is not simply to reject the doctrine's traditional explanations, but to ask whether it identifies a genuine human predicament that deserves to be preserved and reconsidered. If human beings are not born guilty of an ancient transgression, why do destructive patterns persist across generations, shaping individuals and communities before they possess the freedom or understanding necessary to resist them?
Suchocki approaches this question through process-relational theology. In her essay Original Sin Revisited (1991), and subsequently in The Fall to Violence: Original Sin in Relational Theology (1994), she argues that traditional Christian discussions of sin have often concentrated too narrowly upon personal wrongdoing. Although individual actions remain important, they cannot adequately explain the destructive conditions into which people are born or the institutional arrangements through which violence and injustice become enduring features of communal life.
Her central insight is that human beings inherit relationships before they inherit responsibility for those relationships. Every person enters a world already organized through families, communities, cultures, institutions, and established patterns of expectation. These arrangements carry forward the consequences of earlier human activity. They shape what later generations regard as normal, acceptable, desirable, or morally justified. Consequently, individuals may participate in destructive circumstances long before recognizing their significance or possessing sufficient freedom to challenge them.
Suchocki develops this argument through three interconnected dimensions: human capacities for aggression, the solidarity and interdependence of human existence, and the social inheritance through which destructive arrangements are transmitted across generations.
The first concerns humanity's evolutionary and embodied capacities. Human beings possess tendencies toward self-preservation, competition, fear, and aggression. Such capacities are not automatically equivalent to moral wrongdoing, since they may contribute to survival and protection. Nevertheless, they can become destructive when directed toward domination, exploitation, exclusion, and violence. Suchocki's concern is not to identify biological existence itself as evil, but to examine how inherited human capacities become involved in patterns that damage the well-being of creation.
The second dimension concerns human solidarity. Individuals do not act within sealed personal worlds. Their decisions affect others, while the actions of others contribute to the circumstances in which they themselves must live. Human existence is therefore marked by a degree of shared participation that cannot be reduced to individual intention. The consequences of wrongdoing may continue long after its original perpetrators have disappeared, influencing persons who neither initiated nor approved the circumstances they inherited.
The third dimension, social inheritance, brings Suchocki's reconstruction into sharper focus. Institutions do more than coordinate the activities of independently existing individuals. Through repeated participation, institutions develop recognizable purposes, expectations, habits, and structures of authority. These patterns influence how subsequent participants interpret their responsibilities and exercise their freedom. Suchocki uses the concept of intersubjectivity to explain how individual consciousness and collectively organized experience participate in shaping one another.
A religious institution, for example, may inherit assumptions concerning authority, gender, social status, or the treatment of outsiders. Its members may regard these assumptions as natural or divinely authorized because they have been incorporated into the institution's ordinary practices. Over time, those practices can form the consciousness of new participants, who subsequently reinforce the very arrangements through which they were formed.
Such institutional inheritance helps explain how destructiveness may persist without requiring every participant to possess consciously malicious intentions. It also explains why individual repentance, although potentially important, may be insufficient when the relationships and structures producing harm remain unchanged.
Suchocki therefore shifts the moral emphasis from an inherited offense against divine authority toward the concrete well-being or ill-being of creation and its inhabitants. What matters is not merely whether an action violates a religious prohibition, but whether its actual consequences sustain or damage the conditions necessary for flourishing. Harmful relationships are significant because they wound persons, communities, and the wider created world.
Her understanding also changes how responsibility is evaluated. Individuals may inherit destructive arrangements without having chosen them, but their developing awareness and capacity for action may introduce possibilities for resistance and transformation. Responsibility is therefore neither uniformly distributed nor entirely absent. It varies according to participation, knowledge, available freedom, and the consequences of one's conduct.
Yet Suchocki does not abandon the language of original sin. She reconstructs it as a way of naming the inherited, pervasive, and collectively reinforced character of destructive existence. In her account, the doctrine's enduring significance lies not in demonstrating humanity's original corruption, but in recognizing that human beings become participants in historically established conditions of harm before they can fully understand or control those conditions.
This reconstruction also opens toward forgiveness and transformation. If sin is understood through violence and damaged well-being, then redemption cannot be reduced to the cancellation of guilt. It must address the relationships, practices, and institutions through which suffering continues. Forgiveness becomes associated with willing the well-being of those harmed and those responsible, without denying the reality of injury or the necessity of accountability.
Suchocki's contribution is especially valuable because she preserves the seriousness of evil without requiring a literal historical fall to explain its persistence. Her account recognizes the formative power of inherited circumstances while retaining possibilities for moral responsibility and social transformation.
Nevertheless, our own proposal differs at a foundational point.
Suchocki reconstructs original sin as a meaningful Christian theological category. Our independent ERR/GRR philosophy does not begin by assuming that the category of sin is necessary to explain destructive existence. We begin instead with relational constitution, inherited conditions, developing agency, and the generative or destructive possibilities arising within existence itself. These realities can be investigated without presuming either an originally fallen humanity or a specifically Christian interpretation of their significance.
We therefore receive Suchocki's insights concerning interdependence, social inheritance, institutional participation, and responsibility without requiring her continued use of original sin as our own governing theological explanation.
Her work provides an important bridge. It helps us recognize what inherited Christian theology was attempting to address while allowing us to ask a further question:
What understanding of human nature emerges when we begin not with humanity's supposed sinful condition, but with the relational reality through which human beings exist and become?
That question brings us to our own constructive account.
What, then, is a human being when we no longer begin with the theological premise of an inherited sinful nature?
Our relational philosophy proposes that human existence is neither an independently completed substance nor the expression of a predetermined moral essence. Human beings are embodied, developing participants within a reality whose fundamental character is relational. Personal identity emerges through the continuing organization of relationships, experiences, biological processes, environmental conditions, and possibilities that together constitute a living person.
This understanding requires us to reconsider what we mean by human nature. Traditionally, human nature has often been discussed as though humanity possesses a fixed collection of essential characteristics from which its conduct can subsequently be explained. Relational philosophy does not deny the biological continuities, species-specific capacities, or enduring patterns through which human beings may be constitutionally recognized. Rather, it questions whether these characteristics can adequately explain human existence apart from the developmental relationships through which they emerge and acquire expression.
Human nature is therefore neither fixed moral goodness nor fixed moral corruption. It is the embodied possibility of becoming within relational conditions.Embodied Development and the Emergence of Personhood
Human beings develop through the continuing interaction of biological inheritance, neurological organization, sensory experience, emotional attachment, social participation, and environmental circumstances. These influences do not operate as wholly independent causes subsequently assembled into a completed individual. They interact across multiple levels, contributing to the organization and reorganization of an emerging person.
The developing human brain provides a particularly important illustration. Neural systems are neither fully organized at birth nor independent of the experiences through which they develop. Perception, memory, emotional regulation, language, self-awareness, and social understanding emerge through ongoing biological maturation and interaction with surrounding environments.
Within our philosophical vocabulary, this development illustrates relational constitution rather than the unfolding of an already completed identity. The child becomes through processes in which inherited capacities and experienced relationships continually participate in one another. What subsequently appears as an individual's personality, understanding, emotional disposition, or capacity for agency reflects a developing history rather than an isolated constitutional essence.
This does not mean that persons are merely passive products of their surroundings. Living systems possess organized capacities for responding to circumstances, maintaining continuity, and developing new patterns of activity. What Christian theology might call agency. As these capacities become increasingly differentiated, persons acquire greater possibilities for interpreting experience and participating intentionally in their own development.
Identity, Continuity, and the Possibility of ChangeA relational understanding of personhood must account for both continuity and transformation. Human beings retain recognizable identities across time, yet their experiences, understandings, relationships, and capacities continue changing up or down, forwards or backwards, sideways and so forth. The person who exists today is neither entirely identical with, nor wholly disconnected from, the person who existed years earlier.
Within Generative Relational Realism, continuity may be understood through the coherence of an evolving relational organization. Earlier experiences contribute to present conditions, while present activity becomes part of the inheritance through which future possibilities emerge. Personal identity is therefore neither an unchanging interior substance nor a succession of disconnected moments. It is an enduring but revisable organization of embodied relational becoming.
This distinction is important for understanding moral development. If personal identity were entirely fixed, meaningful transformation would become difficult to explain. If identity lacked continuity, responsibility for earlier actions would become equally difficult to sustain. Relational existence accommodates both: we remain consequentially connected to our histories without being entirely exhausted by them.
Our histories are real. They cannot simply be erased. Nevertheless, their meanings, influences, and subsequent consequences may be altered through further relationships, new understanding, changed circumstances, and developing agency.
Generative Possibilities Without Predetermined Moral OutcomesRelationship is ontologically primitive, but this does not mean that relational existence is necessarily harmonious, benevolent, or morally good. Relations may sustain life, generate cooperation, and support flourishing. They may also constrain development, reproduce suffering, or participate in destructive patterns.
Relationality describes the fundamental constitution of existence; it does not automatically establish the moral worth of everything that emerges within it.
This distinction prevents us from replacing an inherited theology of universal sinfulness with an equally inadequate assumption of universal goodness. Human beings possess capacities for affection and aggression, generosity and exploitation, creativity and destruction. Their expression depends upon interacting conditions that include bodily development, emotional experience, social expectations, available resources, learned behavior, and developing capacities for reflection.
Nor does the recognition of relational conditioning eliminate moral judgment. It requires that moral evaluation attend carefully to the actual conditions, consequences, and possibilities surrounding conduct.
What becomes especially important is the direction and consequence of relational participation.
Does a developing pattern support the well-being, freedom, and flourishing of those affected?
Does it create additional possibilities for responsible participation?
Or does it diminish agency, reinforce suffering, and restrict the becoming of others?
Such questions allow us to investigate human behavior without first assigning an inherited moral condition to every person.
From Relational Philosophy Toward Relational Theological InterpretationThese considerations provide the beginnings of a broader relational anthropology that does not depend upon any particular religious tradition. Human dignity, vulnerability, interdependence, responsibility, and the possibility of transformation can be examined through the actual conditions of embodied existence.
A relational theological interpretation may subsequently ask what ultimate significance these conditions possess. It may consider whether the openness of generative becoming, the possibility of creative transformation, and the responsibilities arising through shared existence disclose something about the deepest character of reality.
Such questions represent a further interpretive undertaking. Relational philosophy describes and investigates the conditions of existence; relational theology explores their possible ultimate meaning. The latter must remain accountable to the former without claiming that philosophical investigation has independently established a divine explanation.
Within our developing RELATIONAL Christian interpretation, this distinction becomes especially significant. We confess that the divine reality is relational love, and that human life participates within an encompassing relationship with God. Yet this confession does not require that human beings be originally perfect, subsequently corrupted, or born under divine condemnation.
Instead, human existence may be understood as an unfinished becoming in which love invites responsible participation, creative transformation, and the widening possibilities of flourishing. The value of persons does not depend upon their first overcoming an inherited sinful essence; their worth belongs to the living reality of persons whose becoming is relationally consequential.
We have therefore arrived at a different understanding of humanity's fundamental condition. Human beings are neither morally incomplete at birth nor destined to enact a predetermined existence of corruption. They are embodied, relationally constituted participants in an open world whose possibilities include both flourishing and harm.
But this understanding also raises an unavoidable question. If destructiveness does not originate in an inherited sinful nature, how do harmful relationships emerge, become organized, acquire enduring power, and reproduce themselves across generations?
To answer that question, we must examine the emergence and perpetuation of destructive relational becoming.
I
Our development of relational Christian theology has expressly stated in earlier essays that it works within a natural reality rather than a supernatural reality. This means that God works within our naturally occurring world rather than breaking into it supernaturally to affect its causes and outcomes. We do not envision two separate realities, one natural and the other supernatural, in which God occasionally crosses the boundary between them to intervene in earthly affairs. Rather, there is one relational reality within which all existence, including our theological understanding of God's own presence and participation, must be considered.
Within our Christian panentheistic (sic, pan-en-theistic, NOT pan-theistic) interpretation, God is not an external agent standing apart from creation, waiting to intervene when circumstances require divine attention. God is relational in God's own Self, and divine participation within the cosmos / creation is understood as continuous, intrinsic, and persuasive rather than occasional, external, or coercive. God does not suspend the processes through which reality becomes what it is. Instead, God's loving presence is understood as participating within the relationships, conditions, freedoms, and emerging possibilities through which creation continually develops.
This understanding neither identifies God with the natural world (pantheism) nor reduces divine reality to the sum of its physical processes (pantheism again). Rather, it understands the natural world as existing within an encompassing divine relationality (panentheism). Nor does it presume that God's presence can be independently demonstrated through scientific investigation. Our philosophy investigates how relational reality operates; our Christian theology interprets that reality through its confession of God's continuing, noncoercive love.
Consequently, when we investigate suffering, wrongdoing, and evil, we need not appeal to supernatural disruptions, demonic interventions, or a primordial metaphysical corruption to explain their existence. We may examine how constructive and destructive possibilities arise within the actual conditions of biological, psychological, social, ecological, and institutional becoming.
Moreover, Divine love does not require that every event be divinely caused, intended, or permitted for some hidden purpose.
Nor does the occurrence of suffering demonstrate that God has withdrawn from creation. Instead, God's loving participation remains present within an open world whose outcomes are neither predetermined nor unilaterally controlled by God.
This then provides the natural and relational setting for our present investigation....
II
If relationship constitutes relational reality, then both flourishing and destruction must be understood through the conditions of relational becoming. Harm does not require an independently existing evil substance, a supernatural source of corruption, or an original moral catastrophe. It emerges when actual relationships produce injury, diminish the possibilities of others, or establish conditions through which suffering becomes recurrent.
Destructive becoming is not simply the absence of relationality. It is relational activity whose organization and consequences damage the conditions of life. An exploitative relationship is still a relationship. An oppressive institution remains an organized relational reality. Their destructiveness lies not in their failure to be relational, but in the ways their relationships constrain, deform, and diminish the lives participating within them.
How Destructive Patterns Develop
Our GRR framework provides a useful explanatory progression. Relationships generate patterns of interaction. Repeated patterns establish expectations and constraints. As those arrangements acquire coherence, they can become self-reinforcing, influencing the possibilities available to subsequent participants.
Consider a community confronting prolonged scarcity. Initially, competition for limited resources may arise from understandable concerns for survival. But when certain members acquire disproportionate control, their advantages may become institutionalized through ownership, authority, social status, or exclusionary rules. What began as a response to particular conditions may eventually develop into an enduring, self-perpetuating system of inequality.
The resulting injustice is neither an inevitable expression of human nature nor merely the sum of isolated selfish decisions. It is a relationally organized historical achievement, however destructive, sustained through continued relationships reproducing its unequal consequences.
The same generative capacities that make cooperation, education, and communal flourishing possible can also produce organized exploitation, institutional violence, and ideological domination. Thus, relational creativity does not guarantee benevolent outcomes. Novelty may be destructive as well as constructive.
When Harm Becomes Self-Perpetuating
Destructive arrangements acquire particular power when they shape how participants understand reality itself. Repeated practices can become accepted customs; customs may acquire institutional authority; and institutional authority may eventually appear natural, inevitable, or morally necessary.
Here the problem becomes more than harmful behavior.
Destructive relational becoming can generate the very assumptions through which its participants justify its continuation.
This is especially troubling when religious communities identify historically developed practices with divine authority. Exclusion, coercion, humiliation, or punishment may be presented as obedience to God rather than examined according to their actual consequences. Such practices can become what our earlier essays described as sanctified human wrongdoing: human judgments are invested with sacred legitimacy, making their reconsideration appear equivalent to resisting God.
Our relational approach reverses that evaluation. Neither religious authority nor an inherited moral vocabulary can determine the goodness of an action independently of its consequences for living relationships. Claims of holiness must remain accountable to the suffering they may cause, the lives they may diminish, and the possibilities they may close.
Evil as Destructive Relational Actuality
Within this framework, evil is not a second metaphysical principle competing with goodness. Nor is every experience of suffering necessarily evil. Illness, natural disaster, mortality, and evolutionary vulnerability require explanations that distinguish natural processes from morally responsible wrongdoing.
Moral evil concerns destructive participation for which agents bear responsibility; suffering more broadly includes harms that may arise without moral intention or culpability. Both deserve serious attention, but they should not be collapsed into a single explanation.
Relational reality provides the conditions through which harm becomes possible without making harm necessary or desirable. Once harmful possibilities become actual, their consequences enter the continuing history of the world. Some damage can be repaired. Other losses cannot be reversed, although new possibilities may still emerge.
The important conclusion is that destructiveness is historically produced, relationally sustained, and sometimes transformable. Its persistence does not demonstrate an originally corrupted creation. It reveals how consequential relationships can generate enduring conditions that resist change.
And because these conditions are sustained through participation, we must next ask how responsibility arises among persons whose freedom, knowledge, and opportunities are themselves relationally conditioned.
If human beings are not born guilty, and if their conduct emerges within conditions they did not independently create, on what grounds may they be held morally responsible?
Relational philosophy does not eliminate responsibility by recognizing that persons are historically conditioned. Rather, responsibility arises through developing capacities to recognize, evaluate, and respond to the consequences of one's participation in the world. Human beings do not exercise freedom from outside their relationships. They exercise it within the changing possibilities and limitations those relationships thereby provide.
Freedom is neither absolute independence nor complete determination by inherited circumstances. It is the developing capacity of a living participant to respond among possibilities that are genuinely available, although never unlimited.
A person's opportunities for responsible action depend partly upon knowledge, psychological development, social power, material circumstances, and the ability to recognize alternatives. These conditions vary considerably. A child cannot be evaluated according to the capacities of a mature adult. A person acting under coercion does not possess the same freedom as someone exercising substantial institutional authority.
Responsibility must be proportionate to actual agency - not assigned through a presumed inherited condition of moral guilt.
This does not imply that harmful conduct becomes acceptable whenever its causes can be explained. Understanding why someone acts destructively is different from declaring the action morally justified. Explanation concerns how conduct emerged; moral evaluation concerns its consequences and the responsibility of those who participated.
Because human actions are relationally consequential, moral responsibility cannot be confined to isolated personal intentions. Individuals may contribute to institutional practices whose harmful consequences exceed what any one participant intended.
Nevertheless, participation alone does not establish equal culpability. Those who design, authorize, profit from, resist, or unknowingly reproduce a destructive arrangement occupy different positions of moral responsibility within its continuing development.
Our relational approach therefore distinguishes causal involvement, moral culpability, and responsibility for repair. A person may contribute to harm without understanding its full consequences. Another may knowingly exploit the same arrangement. Both may have opportunities to interrupt its continuation, but their culpability is not equivalent.
Furthermore, individuals may bear some responsibility for remedying inherited harm even when they did not cause its origin. Such responsibility need not mean accepting guilt per se for the actions of previous generations. It may instead arise from present participation, available capacity, and the recognition that others continue suffering within conditions we can help transform.
Accountability must take wrongdoing seriously without defining the wrongdoer as an essentially corrupt person. A harmful action becomes part of an individual's history, and its consequences cannot be erased through denial, remorse, or religious absolution alone.
Yet the person responsible for wrongdoing is not reducible to the wrongdoing committed. Because identity is relationally continuous without being metaphysically fixed, people may develop new understandings, acknowledge injury, change destructive practices, and participate in forms of repair.
Accountability may therefore require truthful acknowledgment, restitution where possible, changed behavior, protective boundaries, and institutional reform. Depending upon the harm, it may also require restraint or exclusion from positions where further injury could occur. These responses need not be understood as retribution. Their ethical justification rests upon protecting those harmed, preventing renewed violence, and making responsible transformation possible.
A broader relational theology irrespective of religious community may interpret responsibility as participation in the possibilities for sustaining and renewing life. Rather than beginning with humanity's presumed offense against divine authority, it may ask what forms of conduct nurture or destroy the well-being of those with whom we share existence.
Within our specifically Christian interpretation, this responsibility receives a further meaning. If God is love that exists in God's own Self, then divine concern for wrongdoing cannot arise from wounded pride, offended sovereignty, or a desire for vengeance. God's opposition to destructive behavior must arise from the same love through which God affirms the worth of those harmed and those responsible.
Hence, what we our saying is that there is no room in God for personal wrath or injurious judgment or eternal punishment. Not if that God is a loving God. Hence, a relational Christian theology understands God as loving through-and-through-and-through.
This does not diminish moral seriousness. It places accountability within a more comprehensive concern for truthful judgment, protection, justice, and transformation.
Human beings need not be born condemned in order to become responsible. Responsibility develops because our actions matter, because others experience their consequences, and because our participation can help sustain or transform the conditions of shared existence.
At this point the theological question now becomes whether Christian salvation can be understood through this same relational logic: not as deliverance from an inherited divine condemnation, but as God's loving participation in healing what has been wounded and opening possibilities for a different future.
We may now ask what becomes of Christian salvation when humanity is no longer understood as born sinful and God is no longer understood through competing dispositions of love and punitive wrath.
Our relational Christian theology begins with the confession that God IS love. Love is not simply one divine attribute among others, occasionally balanced against holiness, sovereignty, justice, or judgment. Rather, love defines God's own Self and gives meaning to every expression of divine life. Whatever we say concerning God's power, presence, faithfulness, judgment, or saving participation must therefore remain consistent with the character of divine love.
This understanding follows from our broader relational theology. If divine reality is understood as fundamentally relational, then divine participation cannot be reduced to the external decisions of an isolated supernatural being. Nor can salvation require God to overcome an unwillingness to love. Within our Christian panentheistic interpretation, God is already present within the becoming of creation, lovingly and generatively participating in its possibilities without coercively determining their outcomes.
Such generativity expresses the relational character of God's own Self, whose love continually nurtures possibilities for creativity, novelty, healing, and the flourishing of creation. Divine love is therefore not merely responsive to what creation has become but generative in its participation with what creation may yet become.
Within this framework, salvation is not fundamentally rescue from an inherited divine condemnation, but participation in the healing and transformation of destructive relational existence. It concerns actual lives, damaged relationships, oppressive conditions, unrealized possibilities, and the continuing work through which greater well-being may become possible.
Salvation is therefore both restorative and generative. It seeks not merely to repair what has been damaged but to participate in the emergence of new possibilities for life, freedom, relationship, and flourishing that may never previously have existed.
This does not reduce salvation to psychological improvement or social reform alone. It provides a broader understanding of what divine participation may mean within the whole of existence. Human transformation involves personal, communal, institutional, and ecological relationships, all of which participate in the unfolding life of creation.
A broader relational theology may therefore interpret salvation through the continuing possibilities of liberation, healing, renewed agency, and restorative and generative becoming. Its language need not presume any particular religious tradition but may speak to the shared longings expressed across the world's diverse faiths. Within our specifically Christian theology, we interpret these possibilities through our confession of God's faithful, generative, and universally offered love.
Divine Judgment Reconsidered
Such a theology must also reconsider judgment. If God is love in God's own being, divine judgment cannot originate in either an offended sovereignty or a divine desire for vengeance. Yet love also does not imply divine indifference toward cruelty, exploitation, or suffering.
Broadly, the idea of judgment, understood relationally, is the truthful disclosure and moral evaluation of destructive participation in light of love's concern for the well-being of creation. It names what has been injured, recognizes responsibility, protects those endangered, and confronts the arrangements through which harm persists.
Yet divine judgment when founded on love is also generative in its purpose. It seeks not condemnation but the opening of possibilities through which destructive relationships may be interrupted, transformed, or replaced by more life-giving forms of relational existence.
Divine holiness, therefore, need not mean separation from an impure humanity. It may instead describe the unwavering integrity of divine love, which neither abandons the wounded nor sanctifies the violence of those who wound them.
Likewise, divine power is not measured by the ability to compel obedience or guarantee predetermined outcomes. Within our process-relational theology, God's power is persuasive, generative, and faithfully present, inviting possibilities for transformation without overriding creaturely agency.
Jesus Christ and the Meaning of Redemption
Christianity gives these relational convictions their distinctive confessional expression through Jesus Christ.
We confess Jesus Christ as God incarnate, understanding his life, ministry, crucifixion, and proclaimed resurrection through the governing reality of divine love. The incarnation need not be interpreted principally as a divine emergency response to an originally corrupted humanity. Rather, it may be understood as the personal and historical disclosure of God's relational presence within creation.
Jesus' ministry of healing, inclusion, forgiveness, and solidarity-with-the-vulnerable, expresses the restorative and generative character of divine love. His ministry did not merely seek the healing of wounded lives but the emergence of new relationships, renewed human agency, and more compassionate forms of communal existence. His crucifixion therefore iconically reveals the cruel destructiveness of human religious and political power, while his refusal to answer violence with domination embodies the character of noncoercive love.
The cross is therefore not understood as a measure of God's violence that is required before God becomes willing to forgive. But discloses the suffering that human beings inflict on one another and the love that refuses to surrender its restorative purpose to that violence.
The resurrection, within Christian confession, expresses God's enduring affirmation of life and the continuing possibility of redemption beyond the apparent finality of death and destruction. It may also be understood as an expression of divine generativity, in which redemption signifies not merely the recovery of what has been lost but the emergence of possibilities not previously realized.
Each of these Christian confessions remain a theological affirmation - not a historical or philosophical demonstration that every loss will be reversed or every personal existence indefinitely continued.
In this reconstruction, salvation arises from who God eternally is, not from a change in God's disposition toward humanity. Divine love does not await satisfaction before becoming gracious. It is already present, calling creation toward healing, justice, freedom, and renewed participation.
The remaining question is how this saving love may become meaningfully expressed within the actual conditions of human life.
If salvation concerns both the restoration and generative transformation of relational existence, then its significance cannot remain confined to religious belief or promises concerning an ultimate future. It must become visible in how human beings respond to suffering, confront wrongdoing, restore damaged possibilities, and participate in generating new possibilities for the well-being of others.
Relational salvation is not merely something received. It is also something participated in. This does not mean that human beings save themselves independently of God or one another. Rather, transformation occurs through relationships in which divine love, human agency, and the conditions of creation are understood to participate without coercion or predetermined outcomes.
Forgiveness is important within this process, but it cannot substitute for accountability. To forgive is not necessarily to excuse wrongdoing, eliminate its consequences, or require those harmed to resume relationships that remain destructive.
A person who has suffered violence may need protection, truthful acknowledgment, material restitution, and freedom from further contact with the person responsible. These needs are not failures of forgiveness. They may be necessary expressions of responsible love.
Reconciliation must therefore be distinguished from restoration to an earlier relationship. Some relationships can be healed through repentance, accountability, and renewed trust. Others cannot responsibly be restored in their previous form. The appropriate transformation may involve changed boundaries, institutional safeguards, or the permanent cessation of destructive participation.
Nor can every loss be repaired. Death, historical injustice, lost opportunities, and enduring injuries leave consequences that cannot simply be undone. Relational theology must resist describing such suffering as necessary preparation for a predetermined divine good.
Nevertheless, irreversibility does not eliminate the possibility of further becoming. New relationships, changed institutions, meaningful remembrance, and responsible action may create possibilities that did not previously exist.
Our understanding of salvation must also extend beyond the individual. Communities and institutions can perpetuate suffering, but they can also participate in its interruption. Educational practices, economic arrangements, religious communities, political institutions, and ecological responsibilities all influence the conditions through which life develops.
Responsible participation means examining whether our relationships expand or diminish the possibilities of others. It asks us not merely to avoid wrongdoing, but to cultivate circumstances in which dignity, agency, justice, and flourishing become more widely possible.
Within our broader relational framework, this is the ethical significance of generative becoming: participation that creates, preserves, or renews possibilities for shared life rather than unnecessarily restricting them.
Within Christian theology, such participation becomes an expression of discipleship. To follow Jesus Christ is to practice the restorative and generative love we confess as fundamental to God's own being. Service, mercy, justice, forgiveness, hospitality, and care for creation are therefore not secondary religious obligations. They are concrete expressions of participation in the generative love of God's own Self, through which new possibilities for shared life may emerge.
Finally, relational Christian theology understands hope without requiring that every future outcome be guaranteed.
If God acts through persuasive rather than coercive love, then creaturely responses remain consequential. People may resist transformation, institutions may perpetuate injustice, and opportunities for healing may be lost. Divine faithfulness does not require denying these possibilities.
Our hope rests not in the certainty of predetermined outcomes, but in the enduring and generative character of divine love. God neither sanctifies destruction nor abandons creation to it. God's loving participation continually nurtures possibilities for healing, renewal, and creative transformation, even where the restoration of what once existed is no longer possible.
Thus, living beyond inherited sin does not mean imagining a humanity untouched by wrongdoing. It means relinquishing the assumption that human existence begins in condemnation and instead embracing the responsibility of participating in a world where our relationships genuinely matter.
We are not called to recover an originally perfect humanity that history cannot establish in the memory of a mythic Garden of Eden. But we are invited to participate in the continuing creation of possibilities for life, justice, reconciliation, and love.
Salvation, in this understanding, is not a return to what humanity once was. It is participation in what humanity, through relational becoming and divine love, may yet become.
We began this investigation with a simple proposition: Human beings are not born sinful. They are born relational. This distinction changes more than our understanding of original sin. It changes how we interpret human nature, moral responsibility, evil, divine love, and the meaning of salvation.
Christianity's inherited explanations of sin sought to account for genuine human experiences of wrongdoing, suffering, estrangement, and the persistence of destructive behavior. Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki helped us recognize how these realities emerge within historically inherited relationships and institutions. Our own relational philosophical investigations have carried this inquiry further by proposing that sin is not ontologically primitive. Relation is.
Human beings are neither fundamentally corrupt nor automatically good. They are embodied participants in an unfinished reality whose relationships generate possibilities for both destruction and flourishing. Their actions matter because they affect the continuing becoming of others and the world they share.
Within our relational Christian theology, God is love through and through. Divine judgment, forgiveness, justice, and salvation cannot arise from a divine character contrary to love. They must express the same unwavering, relationally responsive, and generative Self.
Salvation therefore need not describe humanity's rescue from an inherited condemnation. It may instead describe God's loving participation in the healing, liberation, reconciliation, and transformation of creation, continually nurturing possibilities for what creation may yet become.
We are not born condemned and subsequently invited to become worthy of love. We are born into relational existence, already within the encompassing presence of divine love, and invited to participate responsibly in what life may yet become.
This is the promise and responsibility of relational Christian faith: not the recovery of an imagined perfect beginning, but the continuing possibility of becoming more fully loving, just, compassionate, and humane within an unfinished world.
Selected Primary, Philosophical, and Theological Sources
Augustine of Hippo. On Nature and Grace. 415 CE. Available through New Advent - Church Fathers.
Cobb, John B., Jr., and David Ray Griffin. Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition. Westminster Press, 1976. Book information.
Hartshorne, Charles. The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God. Yale University Press, 1948. Publisher's edition.
Oord, Thomas Jay. The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence. IVP Academic, 2015. Publisher's edition.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Philosophy and Christian Theology." Section 2.4, "Sin, Original Sin, and the Fall." Read article.
Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. God, Christ, Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology. Crossroad, 1982. Book information.
Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. The End of Evil: Process Eschatology in Historical Context. State University of New York Press, 1988. Book information.
Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. "Original Sin Revisited." Process Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, 1991, pp. 233–243. https://doi.org/10.5840/process199120422. Read full article at Religion Online.
Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. The Fall to Violence: Original Sin in Relational Theology. Continuum, 1994. Revised paperback edition, 1995. Publisher's edition.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Corrected edition, edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. Free Press, 1978. Originally published 1929. Edition information.
Biblical Texts
The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (ESV). Crossway.
Principal passages relevant to the essay include Genesis 2–3; Ezekiel 18; Matthew 5–7; Luke 15; John 9:1–3; Romans 5:12–21; Romans 8; 1 Corinthians 15:21–28; 2 Corinthians 5:17–21; and 1 John 4:7–21.
These biblical passages are treated as historically situated theological witnesses whose meanings have been interpreted differently across Christian traditions, rather than as independent demonstrations of the metaphysical claims developed in this essay.
Augustine of Hippo - The Classical Western Inheritance
Augustine provides an important historical source for understanding the development of original sin within Western Christianity. His On Nature and Grace expresses the conviction that human nature, originally created good, became corrupted through sin and consequently requires divine grace for its restoration. Augustine's contribution is essential because many subsequent Catholic and Protestant interpretations of humanity, grace, atonement, and salvation developed in conversation with his theological framework.
Our essay does not dismiss Augustine's concern with moral failure or humanity's need for transformation. It questions whether his account of inherited corruption provides an adequate understanding of human origins and relational existence in light of contemporary knowledge.
Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki - Original Sin Reconstructed Through Relational Theology
Suchocki is the principal theological conversation partner for this study. Her writings offer a substantial reconstruction of sin through human interdependence, violence, social inheritance, institutional organization, and the well-being of creation.
In Original Sin Revisited, Suchocki examines why an exclusively individualistic understanding of wrongdoing cannot adequately address the inherited and collective character of destructive human relationships. The Fall to Violence develops this concern further, connecting violence, human solidarity, social structures, forgiveness, and transformation. God, Christ, Church places these questions within her broader process-theological understanding of Christian faith, while The End of Evil considers their implications for redemption and eschatological hope.
We share Suchocki's concern that wrongdoing cannot be explained adequately through individual intention alone. Our difference lies in the philosophical starting point. Suchocki seeks to recover a meaningful relational interpretation of original sin. Our independent ERR/GRR framework begins with relational existence itself and investigates destructive becoming without requiring original sin as an explanatory category.
Alfred North Whitehead - Process, Creativity, and Becoming
Whitehead provides an important philosophical foundation for understanding reality as dynamic, relational, and continually becoming rather than as a collection of independently completed substances.
His understanding of creativity and the emergence of novelty supplies an essential background for our investigations. Nevertheless, our philosophical proposal does not simply reproduce Whitehead's metaphysics. Whereas creativity occupies the ultimate metaphysical position in Whitehead's account, our developing ERR/GRR framework proposes that relation is ontologically primitive, with creativity, differentiation, and novelty arising within generative relational existence.
This distinction is central to our account of human nature, destructive possibilities, and responsible participation.
Charles Hartshorne - God's Relational Being
Hartshorne's The Divine Relativity provides an important philosophical and theological alternative to traditional understandings of God as wholly immutable, impassible, and unaffected by creation.
His panentheistic account helps establish that divine relationality may be understood as fundamental to God's own life rather than merely describing God's external activities toward the world.
Our developing Christian theology shares this concern. God is not an independently self-contained divine being who subsequently acquires loving relationships. Relational love belongs to God's own Self. Hartshorne provides an important historical conversation partner for this theological reconstruction, although our particular formulations remain our own.
John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Griffin - Process Theology and Christian Reconstruction
Cobb and Griffin demonstrate how process philosophy may inform the reconstruction of established Christian theological doctrines. Their work explores God, creation, humanity, divine action, Christology, and Christian existence through a process-relational understanding of reality.
Their contribution is especially important for the methodological distinction developed in this essay: philosophical accounts of reality may enter into constructive dialogue with Christian faith without requiring the preservation of every inherited metaphysical assumption.
Our approach follows this broad reconstructive possibility while maintaining the independence of ERR/GRR and developing its own relational philosophical vocabulary.
Thomas Jay Oord - Divine Love Without Coercive Control
Oord's The Uncontrolling Love of God provides a significant contemporary contribution to open and relational theology, particularly concerning divine power, providence, suffering, freedom, and the nature of love.
His emphasis upon God's inherently noncoercive love is relevant to our rejection of divine violence, punitive wrath, and unilateral control as necessary explanations of God's relationship with creation.
Within our own constructive Christian theology, love defines God's Self, character, power, judgment, forgiveness, and saving participation. Divine love does not compete with a contrary divine disposition toward vengeance. Rather, all divine responses must be interpreted consistently with God's fundamentally loving nature.
Scripture and Contemporary Scholarship - Historical Witness and Critical Interpretation
The biblical texts included in this bibliography provide the scriptural background for Christianity's developing interpretations of creation, wrongdoing, judgment, repentance, forgiveness, redemption, and divine love.
Genesis, Paul, the teachings of Jesus, and the Johannine affirmation that God is love have played especially important roles in Christian theological construction. Their historical and interpretive diversity must be acknowledged rather than reduced to a single, supposedly timeless metaphysical explanation.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides an additional scholarly reference for distinguishing the related but different concepts of the first sin, the fall, original sin, personal wrongdoing, and atonement.
Together, these sources help clarify the historical problems our constructive theology seeks to address.
Our Constructive Contribution - From Relational Reality to Relational Christian Theology
The independent philosophical foundations of this essay arise from our continuing investigations in Reality & Cosmology and Reality & Metaphysics, particularly Embodied Relational Reality (ERR) and Generative Relational Realism (GRR).
These investigations provide the conceptual foundations for understanding relational constitution, embodied becoming, inherited constraints, generative and destructive possibilities, moral agency, and responsible participation.
Their conclusions are not presented as doctrines inherited from the authors above, nor do they independently establish the existence or character of God.
Rather, our theological construction proceeds through distinguishable but related inquiries: relational philosophy investigates the character of existence; broader relational theological reflection considers its possible ultimate significance; and Christian relational theology interprets that reality through its confession that God is love.
The resulting proposal does not require humanity to be born sinful, evil to originate in a primordial corruption, or salvation to begin with divine condemnation.
Instead, it understands human existence through relational becoming and Christian salvation through God's enduring participation in the healing, liberation, justice, reconciliation, and transformation of creation.
Our purpose is therefore not to reproduce an established theological system, but to develop a constructive relational Christian theology that remains philosophically accountable, historically responsible, and faithful to its governing confession: God is love.
