Why Outcome Theology, like Outcome Politics, Betrays One's Faith

The church of Jesus Christ is [seemingly] absent in its season of Advent supposedly
proclaiming to the world Jesus' incarnate resurrectedness into humanity and all
 creation. A season we know as Christmas. But a season that is anything but
incarnate or ressurected. - re slater, 12.1.15

Faith's Old World

Lately I have been struggling with all the absurdity I have been listening to from the church in this season of American presidential politics (Fall 2015). The faith of Jesus I hold so precious is being blasted by many a Christian voice proclaiming distrust, fear, and protectionism from radical Islam as it rages to new heights known as Islamophobia. A height so great as to close America's borders to all immigrants seeking refuge and respite from hardship and evil while at the same time beating the war drum of vengeance upon all its self-proclaimed enemies.

An untenable plight causing us to ask ourselves, "Where is the church of Jesus Christ" who came to minister, heal, serve, and love the stranger, the despised, the outcast, even His enemy? As taken from the political rhetoric I have been listening to this kind of church of Christ is absent in its season of Advent supposedly proclaiming to the world Jesus' incarnate resurrectedness into humanity and all creation. A season we know as Christmas. But a season that is anything but incarnate or resurrected.

If incarnate, than the followers of Christ would act and speak differently than what I have been hearing. And if resurrected, there would be another kind of attitude - one of hope, healing, power, and strength - coming from within the church based upon its confidence in its Redeemer. But in its place I instead listen to the church's dream and deep-seated hope for Christ's coming as a bloody Conqueror to the world of sinful mankind in end-time expectation. An expectation that does no justice at all to the Jesus' present-time Sermon on the Mount. A Sermon preaching peace, grace, mercy, and forgiveness, not destruction and warfare.

Bad theologies, like bad dogmas, are prime motivators for why the world is as much at war now as it has been through the ages. Whether Jesus comes to kill, or to grant forgiveness, to the damned in the book Revelation is moot when held to the veracities of preaching grace and peace in the church now as shown to us through the Gospels of Christ. To read Revelation so literally as to wait in hope for its mythic language to leap from its pages is a grave error both ecclesiastically as well as eschatologically re the presentness of God's Kingdom now through Christ. Perhaps, we might consider Revelation's language as more that of "man's ancient struggle with sin within his own heart depicting a divine war between the Ancient of Days (Yahweh) for man's graceless hearts and prideful vengeance?" Nonetheless, it matters not what our eschatology is in the face of Christ's example of ministry and service in the gospels. If it will be so than it will be so. Till then we work by following our Lord into the throes of social justice, mercy, and grace to all, even our enemies.

Moreover, we reset our priorities and agendas to "work and speak and act" towards one another as real human beings in "solidarity with humankind" working towards the divine graces of peace and goodwill. To speak up against social injustices. To advocate for the despised and hated. To appreciate the needful distance between church and state. And to respect the civil rights of all men whoever they be. The Constitutional of the United States has all this goodness and appeal within it. A constitution partly built on the non-mainline church's oppressive experiences with the mainline churches of the Old World, and partly built upon its aspirations and dreams for a greater colony/society lived to the highest maxims of peace and goodwill, of tolerance and helpfulness to one another. This is no mistake. It was built upon hardship, religious oppression, exclusionary doctrines, and bad dogmas from the Old Europe. Let us not repeat this mistake and take an "Old World" view of our present situations today.

But if so, then the culmination of man's endless wars with each other is annihilation and doom caused by bad theology + bad politics. This would be the rightful equation for ungodly despair whether held by sinner or saint. A despair that is unnecessary if Christianity would pragmatically heed Jesus' call to grace and peace.

Or, even listen to the serious attempts by the moral parts of this world wishing to make peace with one another regardless of religion, faith, or doctrine. In the world's eyes, religion but seemingly adds gas to the fires of the ignobility of mankind when held to the lower standards of strife and  pride.

Faith's New World

So then, let us examine the several ways which orthodox Christianity might elevate its speech and doctrines. One comes from listening to one another. Another way comes from examining our beliefs and motives. And yet a third by repenting to God as seeking the light of His glory in our walks of life. Let's first begin with an introduction and then examine Dietrich Bonhoeffer as a prime candidate of a Christian caught between the crossfires of faith and reality:

"We wish to rupture the faith of the land. To disturb it, stir it, apply it, and

re-examine it at every level of our thought and being, actions and attitudes.

Even as the Lord Himself did during the times of His ministry to the lost

generations of both believers and unbelievers alike." - re slater, 10.16.14

At Relevancy22 we follow many of the trends within Christianity - whether from a radical anti-Christian viewpoint (aka Radical Christianity), or from a deeply convicted liberal view (aka biblical hermeneutics et al), or as a conservative traditionalist (mainstream (neo-)evangelicalism and postfundamentalism  - with a flavoring of Christian "common sense realism" that might be applied to each group's grasp of the truth as they wish to see it and purvey it. Similar to a cluster of blind scientists trying to describe an elephant - one thinking the animal is all nose, the other all hide, and the third large ears, missing the animal itself, so too Bonhoeffer is caricatured in this way by all theologic parties involved.

So that, when coming to Radical Theology, we will admit to that aspect of Christianity that can (and should be) religionless realizing that our cultures can never attain this aspect, only aspire within its religions and denominations.

That when coming to Liberal Christianity we should pay attention to liberal scholarship's observations and statements of the Bible as scholars in their own right of academia just so long as they do not loose the tradition of the historic orthodox Christian faith in Christ Jesus. An orthodox faith which we here at Relevancy22 have intentionally been elevating and re-describing within today's postmodern, post-secular, post-Christian contexts (heretofore described as emergent Christianity or postmodern Christianity but now as progressive Christianity). Contexts that neither deny Jesus nor refuse to listen to the newer discoveries and observations made of the Christian faith and its religious foundations. A difficult tightrope to walk... but nonetheless we walk it without collapsing into a loss of faith in the God who loves. And loves us through His Son as the ultimate expression of His grace and truth.

And finally, when coming to conservative Christianity - one which this writer here (myself) was birthed within and from the depths of its bowels - we seek its truths. But also wish to display its foibles, its bad theology, and fallacious dogmas. We would do the historic Christian faith no justice if we were not to examine all its foundations, its philosophies, its directions and bearing, lest we loose that precious faith itself to the false prophets of our day. Whether they be in the pulpits of the church or at the dais of the university lecture rooms. All who pretend to examine Jesus must proclaim Him Lord and King, Savior and God. Suffering Servant and loving Humanitarian.

Jesus is the conundrum of faith even as He can be all things to Radicals, Liberals, or Conservatives. Each group, each direction, each organization of thought has its own philosophical and religious lenses through which it chooses to see Jesus and the Christian faith. No less we here at Relevancy22 using a combination of all the above approaches without losing sight of the Lord's calling to be the mustard seed, the new wine, the lost coin of the Kingdom realm. Even the found faith of our days and times, years and appointments.

We wish to rupture the faith of the land. To disturb it, stir it, apply it, and re-examine it at every level of our thought and being, actions and attitudes. Even as the Lord Himself did during the times of His ministry to the lost generations of both believers and unbelievers alike. So be ye then salt, and light, and new wine, in the name of the Lord of Heaven and Earth.

R.E. Slater

October 16, 2014

revised December 19, 2014

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

Eric Metaxas and the Egregious Misuse of Dietrich Bonhoeffer

http://www.scottpaeth.com/2014/03/eric-metaxas-and-the-egregious-misuse-of-dietrich-bonhoeffer.html

by Scott R. Paeth
Associate Professor of Religious Studies at DePaul University in Chicago, IL. He works in the fields of Christian Social Ethics and Public Theology.

March 20, 2014

I could have as easily titled this post "The Egregious Eric Metaxas's misuse of Dietrich Bonhoeffer," because, make no mistake, Metaxas is egregious, and the cottage industry he has cultivated in selling right wing Christian self-righteousness under the banner of comparing their moral sclerosis to the genuine courage and moral risk taken by Dietrich Bonhoeffer is disgusting and offensive. And the fact that he has done it through a biographical hatchet job that has become successful by flattering the delusions of American evangelicals that they are embroiled in a struggle for the soul of America that is in some way equivalent to that of the German Confessing Church just piles offense on offense.

So, when I read that, once more, Metaxas is peddling evangelical victimology under the cover of Bonhoeffer, I am both unsurprised and appalled. His latest comes in the form of an interview on a conservative Christian radio show, where he states, while comparing the struggles of Bonhoeffer (who, as a reminder, was murdered by the Nazis for his involvement in a conspiracy against the Reich):

"I’m talking about the theological liberals in the mainstream church that is just getting off in a whole other direction where they are just failing to teach biblical orthodoxy, failing to teach the Bible as the word of God and yet they still think of themselves as the church,” he said. “We see that obviously happening in issues of sexuality, but how can you say that most mainline denominations in America today are profoundly Christian when they have given up the ghost on all of these fundamentals of the faith? You had the exact same thing happening in Germany. It’s just setting things up so that when evil comes, where do people turn?"

So, just to be clear: Metaxas is hijacking the legacy and reputation of a man who, in a state of great moral and spiritual conflict, chose to resist what is commonly understood to be the most evil and despicable regime of the 20th century - a regime that corralled and murdered, among many others, homosexuals - and using that legacy to argue that the welcome extended by liberal churches to our gay and lesbian brothers and sisters is somehow "the exact same thing" as the complacent acceptance of Nazism by German Christians in the 1930s.

I'm sorry, but this is a crime against history and an offense against Christianity. It's bad theology, bad biblical criticism, and bad ethics. There is simply no basis for anyone to grant Eric Metaxas any credibility as an historian or as a commentator on Bonhoeffer, let alone a spokesperson for what constitutes "biblical orthodoxy" (a term I want to come back to in a moment). But of course, we've known this for a long time. One of the first -- and best -- reviews of Metaxas's Bonhoeffer biography was written by Clifford Green in The Christian Century and it completely and utterly dismantles the book. A small sample of that review:

"Two aspects of Bonhoeffer are so disturbing to Metaxas that he has to deny them outright or try to explain them away. Bonhoeffer, he insists, was not a pacifist. While pacifism as usually understood is not a good word to describe Bonhoeffer's position, his Christian peace ethic was rooted in the core doctrines of his theology—his Christology and his understanding of discipleship, his interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount and his doctrine of the church. He did not abandon his peace ethic while working to kill Hitler and end the Nazi regime. Just one sign of this stance is the fact that even during the war Bonhoeffer wrote in his Ethics and spoke to his fiancée in support of conscientious objection. These matters of theology and ethics are too subtle for Metaxas; consequently his treatment of the Lasserre-Bonhoeffer friendship in New York falsifies the sources and wallows in sentimentality.

"Worse, if possible, is Metaxas's embarrassment about Bonhoeffer's writing in Letters and Papers from Prison about "religionless Christianity." In a Trinity Forum interview he even stated that Bonhoeffer "never really said it," but then had to retract that because, well, Bonhoeffer did say it. But, Metaxas continues, he wrote it privately in a letter to Bethge and never intended anyone to see it because it was "utterly out of keeping with the rest of Bonhoeffer's life." He calls Bonhoeffer's theological prison reflections a "few bone fragments . . . set upon by famished kites and less noble birds, many of whose descendants gnaw them still.""

Green concludes that "Given all this, the most descriptive and honest title for Metaxas's book would perhaps beBonhoeffer Co-opted. Or better: Bonhoeffer Hijacked." But, here, because he completely deserves it, let me pile on a bit from another review:

"The result is a terrible oversimplification and at times misinterpretation of Bonhoeffer’s thought, the theological and ecclesial world of his times, and the history of Nazi Germany. There are numerous errors, some small, some rather stunning. The most glaring errors occur in his account of the church struggle, which is portrayed as the battle between the Nazi-controlled German Christians against Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who here leads the Confessing Church together with Martin Niemoeller. In Metaxas’ version, the Barmen declaration repudiates Nazi anti-Semitism, the Confessing Church breaks away from the Reich Church, and the neutral or intact churches are completely absent from the scene (there are not even index entries for Bishops Wurm, Marahrens, or Meiser, the last of whom is referred to but not named). Bonhoeffer of course leads the way, both in the name of true Christianity and on behalf of the Jews. This oversimplification of the battle lines and the complexities of the church struggle (and of Bonhoeffer himself) characterizes the portrayal of the entire period. National Socialism and its leaders are of course unambiguously anti-Christian. Most of the generals in the resistance against Hitler, we learn, are “serious Christians”. Luther’s anti-Semitism is attributed to his digestive troubles, and Metaxas does not address how anti-Semitism, whatever its source, had permeated the mindset of German Protestantism and the wider culture. ... In some places it is offensive, as when Metaxas argues that supporters of the Aryan paragraph were not really anti-Semitic: “Some believed that an ethnically Jewish person who was honestly converted to Christian faith should be part of a church composed of other converted Jews. Many sincere white American Christians felt that way about Christians of other races until just a few decades ago.” (Why, some of their best friends …). Along the way Metaxas inserts shorthand summaries that range from the silly (Luther as “the Catholic monk who invented Protestantism”) to the bizarre (the difference between Barth and Harnack is compared to contemporary debates “between strict Darwinian evolutionists and advocates of so-called Intelligent Design”)."

There is only one reason that Metaxas hasn't been completely laughed out of any and all serious conversation about Bonhoeffer, and that is because he flatters the self-conception of conservative evangelicals.

I should probably just end there, but it is worth noting a couple of the underlying problems in Metaxas's whole approach, particularly in this interview. First is his insistence that the dividing line between his evangelical cohort of followers and "liberal Christianity" is over this idea of "Biblical orthodoxy," which is of course another way of saying "Liberal Christians don't go out of their way to condemn homosexuality," a topic that occupies all of about five verses in the entire Bible. "Biblical orthodoxy" never seems to attend such [(gay)] issues as, for example, nonviolence, which was central to Jesus' teaching, or charging interest on loans (known in the Bible as usury, but known in the United States as "the engine of our economy").

But then again, evangelicals of the kind who like to be flattered by Metaxas's historical distortions aren't really all that concerned with war or economic injustice, both of which are much more central to the moral concerns of the Bible than any issues of "sexual orthodoxy." It's passing strange when your conception of what constitutes orthodoxy of any sort revolves around the isolated focus on such a minuscule aspect of the Biblical text. It's even stranger when your conception of orthodoxy focuses, not on questions of God's nature, Christ's incarnation, the nature of his sacrifice or the possibilities of salvation, but instead on one question that was culturally marginal at the time the Bible was written and has become crucial today only because a subset of the human family has decided that it would very much like to be treated as fully human thank-you-very-much. If that's orthdoxy, I'll take heresy any day of the week.

In fact, it's worth noting that, if we were looking for any group who was acting "just like" the Nazis with regard to gays and lesbians, we'd be far more likely to be successful if we looked to those conservative evangelicals who have been hard at work in Uganda over the past several years trying, ultimately successfully, to get legislation passed to declare homosexuality a crime and to put gays and lesbians in prison. These are the same brand of conservative evangelicals, it should be noted, that seem to conform to what Metaxas means by "biblical orthodoxy." So please, Eric, be careful where you are swinging your Nazi comparisons.

Of course, the whole evangelical hermeneutic could best be described as "interpreting the Bible while pretending we're not interpreting it. It would be more honest to say that conservatives of the Metaxas strain and liberals have different interpretations of the Bible, and then inquiry as to which interpretation best comports with what we can say of about God's will based on the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. But that approach would lead inevitably to the conclusion that the conservative obsession with other people's sex lives is utterly ridiculous and anti-Christian, and they can't have that.

But finally, I think a word has to be said on behalf of Bonhoeffer. Insofar as Metaxas has set himself up as the go-to contemporary interpreter of Bonhoeffer, he has done a huge disservice to the complexity and ambiguity inherent in Bonhoeffer's thought. Evangelicals have an understandable attachment to earlier works like Discipleship and Life Together, while liberals are often fascinated by the fragmentary material collected in Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison. The earlier books have a strong emphasis on obedience to God and personal Christian commitment, ideas that have a strong resonance in evangelical circles, while the latter books point to the difficulties of discerning God's will in ambiguous circumstances, and imagine the possibilities of a "religionless Christianity" that approaches things from the perspective of those on the margins of society. 

The unfortunate truth is that, because he was murdered, we have no way of knowing what direction Bonhoeffer's thought might have taken after the war. It's therefore worth displaying a bit of humility in attempting to assert with confidence what Bohoeffer "really" thought near the end of his life. However, if we were looking for an interpreter on that front, Eberhard Bethge would be a far better choice than Eric Metaxas, as Bethge was the editor of Bonhoeffer's prison writings, the compiler of the Ethics, and one of Bonhoeffer's most frequent prison correspondents. Bethge himself seemed content to let Bonhoeffer's words and action speak for themselves, without filtering them through the anachronistic lenses of contemporary disputes. The truth is that there is something in Bonhoeffer for those on the political and theological left as well as those on the right. Metaxas is not totally wrong when he sees those elements in Bonhoeffer that are attractive to conservatives. But his utter dishonesty in his presentation of those issues, his shoddy scholarship, and his repulsive comparisons of liberals to Nazis should be enough to render everything else he has to say irrelevant.

So now, let us finally be done with Eric Metaxas. May I never have to hear his name or discuss his "work" ever again.

Bonhoeffer: Agent of Grace - Religionless Christianity

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugLAJvUCiBw#action=share



A scene from movie 'Bonhoeffer: Agent of Grace' - "Lamb among wolves."
German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the great pacifist theologian speaks of
a religionless Christianity centered around Jesus and the suffering of mankind.

Amazon Link

Bonhoeffer the Assassin?: Challenging The Myth.

Recovering His Call To Peacemaking by Nation.

Mark Thiessen ( 2013 ) Paperback

This careful examination questions the assumption that Bonhoeffer was involved in plots to assassinate Hitler and reveals Bonhoeffer's consistent commitment to peace.

Related Links to Mark Theissen Nation @ Relevancy22

Roger Olson - When Pacifism Meets Reality: Examining Dietrich Bonhoeffer's "Hitler-Dilemma"

• “There is no evidence that Bonhoeffer was ‘involved in the plots to kill Hitler.’ Hopefully we have also shown that there is no real evidence that Bonhoeffer himself affirmed the killing of Hitler.” (p. 93).

• But, according to Bethege, there is no doubt that he believed Bonhoeffer at least tentatively gave up his pacifism in a “boundary situation,” namely, the extremity of having to end the war and the holocaust.

• Bethge clearly thought, from personal conversations with Bonhoeffer, that Bonhoeffer thought the Krisau Circle, von Moltke, and non-violent resistance to Hitler was useless.

• My conclusion is that the authors of Bonhoeffer the Assassin? (and Foreword author Hauerwas) fail to give us a strong enough statement of Bethge’s proximity to Bonhoeffer throughout the time of his involvement in the resistance against Hitler and unjustly cast doubt on his veracity about Bonhoeffer’s role in it. Anyone who reads the book must also read Bethge’s biography of Bonhoeffer, or at least the portion of it dealing with the conspiracy, and then make up their own mind. Believing Nation, et al., will require more than doubting Bethge. And if Bethge could be wrong about this, he must not [then] be considered as a "reliable" witness to the life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.

Scot McKnight - The Continuing Debate to Bonhoeffer's German Resistance and Its Implications for Jesus' "Kingdom Ethics"

• There is tension here between his “this-worldliness” and his earlier Discipleship. That he has to say he still stands by the early work is a telling concession that emerged in his thinking as a result of his participation in the conspiracy.

• Bonhoeffer’s own journey is the struggle the church has always had with how to live out the Sermon on the Mount.

• The most important element of this scheme was that Bonhoeffer changed his mind from being a pacifist to being a (Niebuhrian) realist

• Mark Thiessen Nation, along with Anthony G. Siegrist and Daniel P. Umbel, have now published their work: Bonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking (Grand Rapids: BakerAcademic, 2013). They ask if Bonhoeffer was involved in the conspiracy to kill Hitler. They conclude he was not. In part two of this review I will sketch their views and respond to their proposal.

• What this book does in the middle chapters, chapters harder to read than the others, is to demonstrate that there is a decisive break between Barcelona and Discipleship, one in which Bonhoeffer shifts from anti-pacifism to pacifism on the basis of the Sermon on the Mount and Jesus’ teachings.

• I no longer think Bonhoeffer made a tragic mistake in entering into the conspiracy and so shifted from his pacifism because I’m not convinced he entered into the conspiracy. Bonhoeffer may well have sustained his pacifism.

Scot McKnight - Review of "Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer," by Charles Marsh

• Eric Metaxas (Bonhoeffer) told a different story, a more evangelical one, which is why so many evangelicals have found Bonhoeffer in the last five years. Mark Thiessen Nation provides in his study (Bonhoeffer the Assassin?) a different journey for Bonhoeffer (see reviews by Scot McKnight and Roger Olson).

Amazon Link

• But the best written description of Bonhoeffer’s journey is now byCharles Marsh, Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Why use the word “journey”? Because people have made meaning out of Bonhoeffer’s life and theological development according to the scheme they find in his story. The fork in the road or the place of decision is right here: When Bonhoeffer returned to Germany after that aborted visit to Union Theological Seminary in the summer of 1939, did his theology shift from a pacifist Discipleship and Life Together direction toward a more Niebuhrianrealism/responsibility vision? That is, did he enter into the Abwehr (double agent) in Hitler’s National Socialist party as one who was seeking the downfall, assassination, and replacement of Hitler, or was his life as a double agent a ruse for his continued life in the ministry of the ecumenical movement?

• ...the best way to act as a responsible Christian under Hitler was to assume the guilt of the nation and seek his country’s collapse. Maybe the best way of all to frame this is to say Bonhoeffer took leave of Discipleship by the time he was writing Ethics. That, at any rate, is the most common journey told of Bonhoeffer’s theological development. I have already covered Mark Thiessen Nation’s proposal and this post is about Marsh’s study, but it appears to me Bonhoeffer’s pacifism can remain in tact in spite of his realism since he saw entrance into the resistance as guilt (personal and national).

• Seemingly ahead of everyone else in theological circles, including Barth, Bonhoeffer saw the Jewish Question as the Christian Problem. He helped his sister and brother in law escape from Germany to England through Switzerland. They survived the war, Dietrich did not. Marsh’s Bonhoeffer is probing pluralism in affirmative terms, and Marsh is accurate.

• Marsh, in my view, downplays Discipleship and Life Together because, again in my view, he sees a different journey for Bonhoeffer: it is one that sees the highlight years in DB’s life not in the outside-the-system seminary (they weren’t underground until the end) writings and spirituality but in the more “responsible” political theology of the Ethics and his Letters and Papers from Prison. His sketches of DB’s theology after his return to Germany and while in prison were a highlight for me.

Scot McKnight - Who Owns Bonhoeffer? Or, How to Take Sides in Theological Disputes

• Will the real DB stand up? Is he a radical (anti-)Christian seeking a religionless Christianity (sic, Peter Rollins)? Is he a deeply convicted liberal advocating for social justice, Christian resistance to both the conservative church and against mainstream political fascism of Germany? Or, is he a conservative traditionalist as Metaxas advocates who left his childhood faith for another kind of Christianity altogether (noting the difference in his theologic life between his writings on Discipleship to that of Ethics)?

Scot McKnight - Taking Sides in Theological Disputes (last article in link)

• For DB, taking sides was as much about attitude as it was about correctness. He could appreciate a Rudolf Bultmann for his theologic work though differing from RB as well. But when listening to the conservative church react to RB as against theologic anti-intellectualism, Dietrich faulted the attitude of the conservative church for its failings to truly listen to the struggle of the times Rudolf was working both with and against. That this foster attitude upon the church by self-proclaimed leaders of its evangelical faith was dangerous to listen to, absorb, and act upon. - abridged: re slater

* * * * * * * * 

No, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Didn’t Try To Kill Adolf Hitler

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/formerlyfundie/no-dietrich-bonhoeffer-didnt-try-to-kill-adolph-hitler/

by Benjamin L. Corey

December 19, 2014

Comments

It seems quite often when I discuss the theology of Christian Nonviolence, some folks are quick to drop the name of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer for many has become a “trump card” in discussions on nonviolence when one wants to give an example of someone who used violence to confront evil, as he has the reputation of being an attempted assassin of Adolph Hitler. Unfortunately, Bonhoeffer is a poor example of the desired point as there is no evidence that was actively involved in planning or attempting to assassinate Hitler -  a basic fact accepted by the academy but seemingly missing from common internet discussions on Bonhoeffer.

To address this issue on the blog, I decided to sit down with Dr. Joseph McGarry, a Bonhoeffer scholar, and ask him to briefly explain in simple terms why thinking of Bonhoeffer as an assassin is probably not the best way to view the historical evidence.

Dr. McGarry was awarded his PhD in systematic theology from the University of Aberdeen in 2013, writing on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology of formation in Christ. His doctoral thesis has been accepted for publication by Fortress Press under the title Christ Among a Band of People: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Formation in Christ. He has been published in Theology Today, The Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care, and The Bonhoeffer Legacy: Australasian Journal of Bonhoeffer Studies. He has also contributed numerous lectures for the Evangelical Theological Society, the American Academy of Religion, and the Society for the Study of Theology. Furthermore, he is a diehard fan of the Buffalo Bills (who can’t seem to beat the New England Patriots).

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BLC: Dr. McGarry, it seems that it is a popular assumption in today’s culture that Bonhoeffer was a Christian theologian from Germany who was executed because he tried to assassinate Hitler. However, having attended several Bonhoeffer presentations by scholars at the American Academy of Religion, it seems to me that no serious Bonhoeffer scholar sees him as an assassin or even as a direct accomplice to any assassination attempt. Which version of history is correct? And, if Bonhoeffer wasn’t actually involved in an assassination attempt, where did this myth come from?

Dr. McGarry: Yeah, there’s a somewhat prevalent misnomer, and I’d imagine the myth stems from a series of logical deductions and some assumptions along the way. When people think about the Bonhoeffer’s life and involvement in the resistence, the flow of logic goes something like this:

• a) Dietrich Bonhoeffer worked for the Abwehr, and was recruited there by his brother in law, Hans von Dohnányi;

• b) Members of the Abwehr’s leadership (specifically Hans Oster, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and Dohnányi) actively planned attempts on Hitler’s life;

• c) When the “Zossen files” were discovered in September 1944 (after the failure of the 20 July plot) von Dohnányi was clearly implicated in assassination planning, and the rest of the Abwehr by extension.

• Therefore, everyone associated with these files was executed for treason against the Reich. Generally, it is then assumed that— because Bonhoeffer was executed with these other people who actively planned Hitler’s assassination—Bonhoeffer himself was actively involved as well.

Unfortunately, it is this assumption that scholars have again and again called an overstatement of the evidence. Something closer to reality is that Bonhoeffer was (at least) one level removed from the active planning. He was part of the organization but not part of the core. He was surely knowledgeable that *something* was being planned, but he was not part of the inner circle and it is likely he didn’t know what that *something* was.

Rather, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a courier, passing messages—particularly to England through his friend Bishop George Bell—and trying to get assurances from the Allied forces that they would stop bombing Germany when Hitler’s regime was overthrown. Bonhoeffer’s job was to try to find a way to convince England to stop destroying Germany. He was a messenger, not an assassination planner. He likely provided a measure of theological justification for what others were doing (as can be seen in his Christmas 1942 letter “After 10 Years”), but he himself was—at best—a bit player in the overall scheme of things. When we think of Bonhoeffer and Hitler’s assassination, it’s probably better to think of his role as “message boy” and not “core leader”.

Now, there is a current stream of interpretation that says that Bonhoeffer had actually no knowledge whatsoever that the Abwehr leadership was planning an assassination, but this seems to me to be a bit of an overstatement from the other side.

Either way, the general consensus of scholarship is that Bonhoeffer himself was neither a core member of the resistance, nor was he central to any of the planning that the Abwer did.

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BLC: If Bonhoeffer’s connection with the role of assassin is an overstatement of the evidence, how did we get here? Was he even focused on finding a way to destroy Hitler’s power?

Dr. McGarry: I think we get to this point from some very well intentioned people who have been truly impacted by Bonhoeffer’s amazing biography. It’s compelling, it’s dramatic. A man who forsakes all in the way he did, especially with how he returned from New York in 1939, believing that he needed to be with his nation if he were to have any right to rebuilt it…..it’s powerful stuff.

I think there’s also a tendency for us to look for heroes of the Christian faith–people who encourage us and who give us something to aspire toward. Surely Dietrich Bonhoeffer is that kind of person–a man of conviction who did what he felt was right, what was difficult, and ended up dying for how he lived his faith. I mean, let’s be honest, that was a significant factor in my own study of his work. But, in the midst of telling that type of story, there’s a temptation to overplay the hand, so to speak. It’s easy to forget that a very significant portion of his employment with the Abwehr had to do with his desire to escape the front lines. He wasn’t going to fight for the Reich. First, he tried to escape active combat by becoming a chaplain, but he was denied. His only other option would have been to come forward as a conscientious objector, but that would have earned him a one way ticket to a concentration camp. He ended up going to New York on a theological fellowship in 1939 as a way to escape, but he was overcome with guilt and returned just a few weeks later. So he returns to Germany, certain to be sent into combat, and he was trying to find a way out. And then, he found a way into the Abwehr. A way to escape the war. Though he was very sympathetic to the resistance movement, the main reason he joined the Abwehr wasn’t to be part of the resistance so much as to avoid military service (Bonhoeffer was originally imprisoned as a draft dodger, and it wasn’t until late 1944 that it was revealed that he worked in the same section of the Abwehr as those who planned the assassination plot). Though he was executed for his association with people who planned the assassination, he was put in prison for avoiding conscription.

I think that’s what often happens when we look at Bonhoeffer’s life: we focus on the stuff that shapes the heroic story of David standing up against Goliath–standing for the Gospel. And it’s not as if it’s wrong, it’s just only half of the picture. The other half (which we can’t put to the side) is the well connected pastor from a family who had political connections that could give him an exemption from combat service. It just so happened they worked for the Abwehr and that was his ticket out. If they worked as janitors in a steel factory, then he would have been doing that instead.

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The short summary of the whole is this: Bonhoeffer did not want to die in a concentration camp, and he didn’t want to be sent off to fight either. Thus, he used family connections to find a way out of both scenarios: joining the Abwehr. While he was there, some members of the Abwehr did plan an overthrow of Hitler, but the evidence shows Bonhoeffer was at least one step removed from the circle of people who did that. However, because he was likely aware that *something* was being discussed (without knowing what that was), he did use personal friendships to ask the Allies to stop bombing and killing his family and friends (an attempt at peacemaking, not violence) which they declined. In the end, he was executed not because he was part of an assassination attempt, but simply because he was associated with people who were.

Bonhoeffer is one of my favorite people in history, as perhaps he is yours. However, to claim that he was a would-be assassin, is simply an overstatement of the historical facts.

For further reading on this topic, I recommend: Bonhoeffer The Assassin? Challenging The Myth, Recovering His Call To Peacemaking.

What is Human Free Will in Philosophical Theology? (Sin & Salvation: Annihilation, Hell, or Purgatory?)

Free Will in Philosophical Theology
http://thomasjayoord.com/index.php/blog/archives/free_will_in_philosophical_theology/#.UxxxNfldX9w

by Thomas Jay Oord

March 4, 2014

[with additional commentary by re slater

edited March 11, 2014]

The majority of great philosophers and theologians have believed in free will. Contemporary discussions of what free will is, and how it might function, however, have not always been clear. In his new book, Free Will in Philosophical Theology, Kevin Timpe takes free will as his central concern to explore theological issues.

Timpe is well suited to write this kind of book. He is a leading force/voice in the contemporary philosophy of free will discussions. He calls his own view of the nature of free will, “source incompatiblism,” and this view is presupposed in this work [an incompatibilist position argues against a deterministic universe composed of a non-free will state of being. - r.e. slater]

Timpe’s goal for the book is to clarify the possible role a particular kind of virtue libertarianism might play in thinking through a range of theological issues that involve free will. He also intends not to affirm anything clearly at odds with the main historical thrust of Christianity [that is, you may expect a classical expression of free will with no open or process theism admitted. However, as a libertarian position it sits as the polar opposite to metaphysical determinism that argues against any kind of free will state or its expression - r.e. slater] .

After an opening chapter and brief discussion on the nature and importance of free will, Timpe looks at the relation between free will and [what he calls] "the good." He argues that an agent’s moral character puts constraints on what actions he or she is capable of freely choosing to perform. When an agent chooses, he/she acts for the sake of some end perceived to be good in some way [a debatable objective but the author here seems to be reinforcing the classical idea of God Himself as the primal source as a moral agent of force, rectitude, and being for "the good." Hence, whatever God is, is that which creaturely freewill will oppose. And man, as formed in God's image, ultimately will choose for "the good" or for "virtue" however deformed or devolved it is from its originating Maker and Presence, as a sinner living in a sinful world. Thus we have the Christian redaction to the Greek idea of "the good" or "virtue" through the lens of all things God. - r.e. slater

And we also have here the beginnings of syllogistic expressions of God in terms of a moral principle or force as versus an evil principle or force as respecting and describing sin. However, as we have cautioned earlier, and stated repeatedly, God is neither a prescribed principle or argument, or metaphysical power or force, but a primal being that who is relational, and who stands in an "I-Thou" relationship to ourselves. That there is a grave danger in any Christian treatment of God as an object. That the God of Jesus Christ (who is very God Himself Incarnate amongst His creation) is irreducibly subject and never made as an object, a force, a power, or a principle, that can be manipulated by human discussion," quoting Emil Brunner. - r.e. slater]

Although recognizing the influence of passions, Timpe argues that passions and emotions do not undermine free will. But they can inhibit the proper expression of freedom. Happily, growth in moral character inclines one to choose the good more often: “An increase in virtue will strengthen the connection between the agent’s passions and the good” (17). [this position reminds one of the Greek position of "virtue." - r.e. slater]

Sin and Salvation

Hamartiology is an important theological issue, especially as it pertains to freedom of the will. Timpe addresses hamartiology in a chapter exploring the primal sin, which is the original – first – sin committed by an agent created by an essentially good God.

The question arises: Why would an agent created as good choose evil? The primal sin, which because it was first was not influenced by previous sins or sinner, is difficult to explain. Timpe argues that voluntarist accounts of the fall are not more problematic that intellectualist accounts. He concludes that there is inexplicability at work in accounting for the primal sin: “It looks then as if a Christian account of primal sin cannot avoid all arbitrariness” (48). [However, this theological position chooses a "creationists" view of the Fall and not an evolutionary position which projects that "sin" as a societal understanding was in a position of nascent development of conscience from beast to man. That is, the conscience of the evolving sentient creature was being formed with greater and greater poignancy between the conscious self and societal members (eusociality) in what was felt to be "sin" and not "sin" as it differed regionally or tribally or by evolving species. The creationist position thus does not account for an evolving conscience but a fully formed one that was at its "height" of development before "devolving" after the Fall. This then is problematic for the evolutionist as conscience is seen in just the opposite state... that of one of evolving instead of being fully formed. As one that is continuing to "evolve" in accordance with evolving eusocial self and societal standards within which "free will" is an expression. - r.e. slater]

Moving from sin to conversion, Timpe takes up the issue of salvation and the divine and creaturely roles therein. His argument in this chapter is that God’s grace is the sole non-instrumental efficient cause of saving faith. But humans control whether they come to saving faith.

In this, Timpe seeks to avoid Pelagianism (the denial of original sin and belief in the freedom of the will to do good by man apart from God), on one hand, and theological determinism (all facts and events exemplify natural laws, or that all events, including human choices and decisions, have sufficient causes), on the other. That is, God’s grace is necessary but not sufficient for saving faith (sic, theological determinism). Timpe hopes also [hopes to] avoid the problems associated with believing God gives grace needed for salvation to only some (e.g., limited election), while also endorsing the belief that grace is the [sole] cause of creatures coming to faith [this latter position will also fit it quite nicely with Thomas Oord's own preferred theologic interpretation of all things God, man, sin and bible known as relational theology. That God does all things as a God of love - from creation to salvation to completion by the expression of His grace and love as a sole motivator, sufficient primary cause, and end objective. A position of which I would chose as well as a relational theist. - r.e. slater]

Eschatology

Two chapters address eschatological issues. The first explores how an individual’s free will affects the condition of that individual in the afterlife. Christianity has historically believed a necessary condition for an individual spending eternity in hell is that individual not choosing to respond correctly to God. A resident of hell does not choose God and is therefore not the kind of person fit for heaven. Persons freely form moral characters in the present life. Negative character formation makes them no longer psychologically capable of accepting God’s offer for reconciliation in the afterlife.

Such persons cannot move from hell to heaven through free choices, argues Timpe, because the person’s moral character becomes set at death. To justify the claim that moral character is set at death, Timpe argues that “whatever reasons one thinks there may be for why it is that death secures the psychological impossibility question, that it does so is established by the Christian tradition” (77).

As far as the redeemed are concerned, Timpe argues they retain freewill in the afterlife and yet are incapable of sinning. This “free but not capable of sinning” proposal may sound puzzling, and Timpe calls it “the problem of heavenly freedom.” Saints do not freely choose to sin when in heaven, he claims, because any temptation to sin suggests that these saints are not in a state of highest bliss. And any place not of highest bliss is not worthy of the name “heaven.” [I take this as a simplistic expression of classical Christian thought but perhaps not the best expression of the eternal state of heaven vs. the improbable state of humanity. - r.e. slater]

Few people destined for heaven, however, have a fully formed character necessary for resisting sin everlastingly. To resolve this problem, Timpe embraces the necessity of purgatory. He is attracted to a sanctification model of purgatory, rather than a punitive/satisfaction model. The sanctification model offers a developmental process whereby human character can be formed fully allowing saints to be free in heaven but unable to sin.

[If purgatory were an option I myself would express it similarly. But as has been stated in earlier articles re "synchronicity," this mortal life is the first, last, and final expression of God's divine grace upon any mortal soul's state of being. That this life in itself - and as it exists or is - is sufficient for God's grace to work itself out in our own lives - however lost or irrecoverable, dissolute or dense. That its extension into a purgatorial state, or hell itself, is unnecessary for God to fully work out His saving grace in this life. That God does not need more time to save are free willed souls. That the mystery is that He has enough time - and all the time He needs - in this life we live now. Not that these eternal states are beyond His grace, but that death is aptly described as a place of fully dying as free will beings, and no longer living. Thus, purgatory or hell are not completing places of salvation but of annihilation as I would read and understand it despite the hopeful projects of God's saving grace beyond the grave.

That it is a most fearful act to reject or disallow God's grace in its fullest achievement in our own lives by our own refusals or dismissals, anger or remorse, disbeliefs or pretensions. And that it's consequences are dire and fixed after death. A state which then lapses into the progressively evolving stages of annihilation till at last what once was created for everlasting fellowship with the eternal God of the universe becomes fully abandoned to self, to others, to creation, and to his/her own God, in four successively completing stages of self annihilation, or spiritual death, by the mortal free will of a being in rejection of God's saving grace.

Hence, hell is not seen as an everlasting state, but as a progressing state towards self annihilation however long that may mean (though I believe time to be both inconsequential and meaningless at this point), in its continuing commitment to rejecting God's grace not only in this life, but in the life to come. Until, at the last, all has died, even very existence itself, in the extinguishing moments of final seal. That our acts in this life are important and do count. And that our crimes here in this life can, and will, predispose us towards death's continuing state of ruin and abandonment from God by our own dark desires and sinful works. That sin does have a judgment to come - and not only for its egresses, harms, and offensives upon others. But that its greatest judgment is its continuing sealing effects upon our hardening our hearts to God's movement in our lives by its rejection of His grace time-and-again. Which very acts then abandon our very selves to sin's ruinous immortalizing death. And that despite our hardening hearts God doth still reach out to us in our final stages of death until He can do so no longer. This is the fullest meaning to human free will - that of its final refusal to its Maker. That it is a will that can reject even its Maker, its primal source of free will, while remaining freed to do so to its own loss, harm, and ruinous end.

However, the grace of God, His power and rule, can come into any situation by rendering any lost heart or dissolute soul unto Himself - even to the point to which we think not by merest request to do so however slight its mumblings or disbelieving hope. That salvation can-and-will-come by this merest hope or prayer - as it ever surrounded us by its presence when we saw it not. That it is a great mercy for any sinful man, woman, or being. And that it comes with the promise and requirement of God's initiating cause of grace unto our souls for its source and presence and inspiration. At the last, it is God's grace that is the primary cause and sole efficient source for man's free will embrace of all things good and inspiring. That God's reach into this singular life that He has given to us does so gravely when knowing of its awful consequences should we so chose against life itself for a death indescribable beyond the meaning and purpose of this life we presently live. That to live life is to live God, His grace, presence, being, and soul, in its goodness and love towards one another. - r.e. slater]

God's Freedom

Timpe closes the book by using his virtue libertarian model to examine the question of God’s own freedom. Despite differences between God and other agents, the considerations for free agents generally apply to God. Timpe addresses those who argue that libertarian accounts of God’s freedom run into conceptual problems if God’s nature is essentially good. As he sees it, a God without moral freedom would not be the greatest conceivable being.

God’s use of freedom differs from creatures in some ways, however. While moral freedom is necessary for creatures to form moral characters, moral freedom is not necessarily for God. God’s moral nature is eternally set, and God is not free to be immoral. God always does what is best despite being free.

In the final section of his chapter on divine freedom, Timpe addresses William Rowe’s work on God’s freedom and choice to create a world. Frankly, this section was the least understandable in what was otherwise a highly readable book. Rowe says that given every possible world, God could have created a better one. Timpe replies that “God could have a reason for picking one from among a set of worlds, even if He could have -- by necessity -- picked a better” (117). Timpe seems to be arguing that God’s perfect nature prevents God from choosing to actualize other possible worlds, and yet God could have chosen otherwise.

Criticism

The two major areas in which I found Timpe’s proposals unsatisfying pertained to eschatology and divine freedom. I am inclined toward afterlife scenarios in which the damned may eventually be redeemed. This inclination makes me unsatisfied with Timpe’s claim that sinners are psychologically “set” for eternity never to choose God’s gracious offer of redemption. [or, re "annihilation" one who is fully abandoned towards existentless fulfilment as determined by willful choice or moral character in this life. See the topic of "Synchronicity: Purgatory - Yeah or Nay?" in Relevancy22 - r.e. slater]

As far as the state of the saints in the afterlife, I’m attracted to views that allow for growth in grace in heaven (not purgatory). I’m inclined toward proposals that lead to saints developing holy habits inclining them toward righteousness but always allowing for the possibility that even saints may use their freedom wrongly.

The other major area I found unsatisfying may have more to do with my lack of clarity about Timpe’s last chapter (especially his work on Rowe). That is, Timpe’s view of free will seems centered primarily on the “choosing” aspect of libertarianism, or what he calls the “source” of incompatibilism.

I’m inclined to agree on the importance of this choosing aspect, but I also equally emphasize the choices of libertarianism, that is the various options whereby the chooser chooses but could have done otherwise. And this makes me wonder if the God Timpe envisions ever faces genuine options to do otherwise than the one option God’s perfect nature requires. Here our divergent notions of God’s relation to time and omniscience (I’m an open theist) seem to make a difference in how we think about God’s relation to the future and the options (or, apparently in Timpe’s case, option) a necessarily loving God encounters. [here Thomas speaks to both open and process theism of which I would be in great agreement. - r.e. slater]

Summary

Although I have different metaphysical commitments than Timpe with regard to God’s relation to time and although by disposition I am less inclined to defend some beliefs in the classic tradition (e.g., purgatory), I often agreed with his proposals. A virtue libertarian with theological motivations like mine and not Timpe’s may have written a little different book. But this book is a strong foray into tackling problems presented free will theists, and it does an admirable job of offering plausible solutions. In sum, this is a strong book on free will in philosophical theology.

* * * * * * * * * *

Conversations with the Damned

http://purpletheology.com/conversations-with-the-damned/

Austin Fischer

February 24, 2014

Over the next few weeks, I’ll be responding, directly and indirectly, to some questions and thoughts surrounding the book. In the next couple of posts, I’ll address the (insinuated criticism) that I rejected Calvinism because I didn’t really understand it. I think I rejected Calvinism because I did understand it and I think more young evangelicals would reject it if they did too. I’ll trace this out more in later posts, but here’s a good starting point.

Conversations with the Damned

“The decree is dreadful, I confess.” –Calvin, Institutes 3.3.7, 955

My journey out of Calvinism started when I heard whimpering in the basement.

I loved the theological home Calvinism had given me. Smooth, clean lines. Lots of history and detailed architecture. Everything has a place. It put me in my place and God in his place—at the center of the universe. I pictured myself at the great eschatological banquet, enjoying the party and gorging on the food!

But there it was again. A noise coming from the basement.

It was where we Calvinist kept the damned. Following many esteemed teachers, I had told myself they were there because they deserved it and God ordained it for his glory (more on this in later posts). Many people can leave it there, but I’ve always been curious, so even as a good Calvinist, I would peek inside and talk with them.

What I found down there was one hell of a problem, and while it didn’t instantly make me walk away from Calvinism (I’d say Calvinism was my home for around 5 years), it certainly made me lose my appetite for it. I went to Calvin for help and discovered I wasn’t crazy—he himself said God’s ordination of the reprobate to hell was “dreadful.”

To this day, I completely understand why people opt for Calvinism. I just don’t understand how it doesn’t make them a bit nauseous, at least from time to time.

It’s Dreadful

So following Calvin and my own time as a Calvinist, I’d suggest this: if you nuance and euphemism-to-death the doctrine of reprobation to the point that you don’t stand back from it and with Calvin say, “It’s dreadful, it’s terrible”, then you don’t understand it, you don’t get it, you haven’t been honest about it.

In my opinion (and speaking from my own journey and feedback I’ve received on the book), many of the young evangelicals who have signed off on Calvinism have not read the fine print of the reprobate, they haven’t conversed with the damned—they’re too busy enjoying the glory party. They have not faced what awaits them in the basement of their Calvinist home. Their teachers have not been upfront with them. They have not reached the place where they step back and say, “It’s terrible.”

I don’t like telling people what they can and can’t believe, but I’d suggest that if you want to be a faithful, honest, consistent Calvinist, you need to have a thorough conversation with the damned. You need to reach the place where you look at reprobation and say, “It’s terrible.” Before you rejoice in God’s electing mercy towards you, stand before the damned and lose your appetite, if only for a second.

If you can’t do that, then I stand with Calvin:

You really don’t understand Calvinism.

3 Christian Perspectives on War: Just War Theory, Christian Pacificism, and Active Peacemaking, Part 2

The ethics of a Syrian military intervention:

The experts respond

http://www.religionnews.com/2013/08/29/the-ethics-of-a-syrian-military-intervention-the-experts-respond/

 

Yonat Shimron

August 29, 2013

 

WASHINGTON (RNS) As the Obama administration readies for a probable military strike against Syria, Religion News Service asked a panel of theologians and policy experts whether the U.S. should intervene in Syria in light of the regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians. Would the “Just War” doctrine justify U.S. military action, and what is America’s moral responsibility? Here are their responses, which have been edited for clarity.

 

 

Duke University Divinity School emeritus theologian Stanley Hauerwas is often considered America’s most important Protestant theologian. Photo courtesy Duke University

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This image available for Web and print publication. For questions, contact Sally Morrow.

 

Stanley Hauerwas

Professor emeritus of theological ethics at Duke Divinity School

 

What possible grounds does the United States have for intervention? The language of the world’s policeman comes up again. You want to know, ‘Who appointed you the world’s policeman?’

 

You could say the U.S. can justify the intervention because stability is part of our foreign policy in order to maintain ourselves as the premier country in the world. So it’s smart to intervene. But there’s no moral justification.

 

Of course (nerve) gas is a terrible weapon. You hear echoes of weapons of mass destruction. And with gas you can’t control it in terms of its indiscriminate effects. But again, I just don’t know how intervention fits under “just war” categories. Syria isn’t attacking the United States.

 

The U.S. ought to ask the Arab League to do something. Near neighbors have more responsibility in these situations. If the U.S. intervenes, we just reinforce the presumption, which is true, that we’re an imperial power.

 

The language of intervention and no-intervention is meaningless. America has hundreds of military bases around the world. We’ve intervened. The question is what are the limits of American intervention? Right now there doesn’t seem to be any. President Obama is clearly worried about being involved in an intervention in Syria you can’t get out of. I appreciate that. But America is everywhere.

 

The just war tradition is based on a series of arguments to be tested before using force against another population. Legitimate and competent authorities must logically argue that the use of force will end or limit the suffering of a people and these forceful actions are the last options after all diplomatic, social, political, and economic measures have been exhausted.

 

 

William Galston is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. Religion News Service photo courtesy Brookings Institution

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William Galston

Senior fellow, Brookings Institution

 

In principle, just war theory does justify military intervention to protect innocent human life — as long as the proposed action meets the tests of effectiveness and proportionality. But nations may undertake military action only after every other possible means of ending the bloodshed has been exhausted.

 

Although we can argue about whether that condition has been met in the case of Syria, prospects for diplomatic progress appear slim, and the Syrian government’s recent use of poison gas against a rebel stronghold probably derailed diplomacy indefinitely. For the Assad regime, there’s no middle ground; if it doesn’t prevail militarily, it will disappear. So it’s reasonable to conclude that if we do nothing, nothing will change, and the slaughter of civilians will continue indefinitely.

 

If we can act effectively to protect innocent human life, we have an obligation do so — unless the costs to us are prohibitive (and there’s no reason to suppose they must be). We failed that test in Rwanda but met it in the Balkans. We do not know whether the options we now have will prove effective, but that uncertainty does not justify doing nothing.

 

 

Qamar-ul Huda, senior program officer in the Religion & Peacemaking Center of the United States Institute of Peace. Photo courtesy United States Institute of Peace

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This image available for Web and print publication. For questions, contact Sally Morrow.

 

Qamar-ul Huda

Senior program officer in the Religion & Peacemaking Center of the U.S. Institute of Peace

 

The just war tradition, in religious or secular traditions, emphasizes the principle of proportionality, that is to say that an attack on any population shouldn’t target noncombatants, the environment or natural resources; the attack shouldn’t annihilate the opponent’s military if it is clear they are in a position of surrendering or losing.

 

“Just war” arguments for a military intervention in Syria need to consider the problem of no action by the international community, which can increase civilian suffering and validate the actions of an abusive government. These discussions need to study the problems of intervening and limiting the force against military institutions and how civilians will be protected in the midst of the intervention and post intervention.

 

Also, we need to examine, when the intervention is over, how efforts can limit or mitigate sectarian violence and the possibilities of a civil war. We need to ask: Ultimately what new responsibilities do the interveners have in rebuilding, reconstructing and restoring peace in Syrian society?

 

 

 The Rev. Drew Christiansen, a Jesuit priest and visiting scholar at Boston College who has been a longtime adviser to the U.S. Catholic bishops on international affairs and the Middle East. Photo courtesy Caitlin Cunnihgham, Boston College

 

 

The Rev. Drew Christiansen

Jesuit priest and visiting scholar at Boston College and longtime adviser to the U.S. Catholic Bishops on international affairs

 

My problem is that I don’t see why this kind of chemical attack matters so mightily when 100,000 civilians have been killed in Syria already. It seems to me that you’ve had massive attacks on civilians — with the world standing aside — that should have been the reason for intervention. But there’s also a question of proportionality and success, and I think that there are good reasons to think you might make things worse by a military attack.

 

There’s no objective for success right now. They’d do much better to try to work long-term for support of the elements of the rebellion that the U.S. wants to support, and we should work strenuously to build up the capacity to respond and build up the responsibility to protect (vulnerable populations), which we can’t do now.

 

I just don’t see why the particular (chemical weapons) attack should justify intervention at this point, especially if it’s just a rap on the knuckles to remind Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Now if the chemical attacks were to become a pattern there would be good reason to intervene. But for one occasion, it seems to me that it doesn’t weigh up compared to those who should have been protected and haven’t been, and those who still need protection. I just don’t understand. It seems to me you need a strategic objective, which doesn’t exist, and therefore just war norms don’t apply.

 

 

Tyler Wigg-Stevenson,

founder and director of the Two Futures Project and the author of the forthcoming “The World Is Not Ours To Save: Finding the Freedom to Do Good.” Photo courtesy Tyler Wigg-Stevenson

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Tyler Wigg-Stevenson

Chair of the World Evangelical Alliance’s Global Task Force on Nuclear Weapons and author of “The World Is Not Ours To Save: Finding the Freedom to Do Good”

 

As Christians we know precisely and unambiguously what we are for, in Syria as everywhere: peace, justice, and reconciliation. We also stand absolutely in opposition to all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, because they weaponize the tactic of indiscriminate killing, categorically forbidden by every Christian tradition of ethics on war and peace.

 

This clarity regarding moral ends, however, does not carry an automatic prescription of means to achieve them. This is what complicates our thinking about the American response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons. The one who takes innocent life, in any situation, calls down the wrath of the Lord upon his or her head. But the United States is not the sword of God. Its response to Assad’s atrocities must be contextualized by prudential wisdom about the extended consequences of different actions. In such matters no “expert” can really know the future.

 

This is why our moral certitude actually leaves us in a place of profound tension regarding proposals for tactical intervention: We know what is right, but not the course of action to bring about the right. All we have is a set of convictions against which we can weigh a host of imperfect proposals.

 

 

Rabbi Michael Broyde, professor of law and senior fellow, Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion. Photo courtesy Rabbi Michael Broyde

 

Rabbi Michael Broyde

Professor of law and senior fellow, Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion

 

Jewish traditional just war theory can certainly be used to justify military intervention in Syria both to topple a dictator and to save the lives of those without guilt. But even more needs to be noted. The Jewish tradition avers that it is wrong to stand by while one’s neighbors blood is shed (and while that biblical verse does not directly apply for a variety of technical reasons), its ideals certainly ought to guide us. When the lives of innocent people are at stake, all people should do whatever they can to save those lives, even if this means that the lives of the guilty will be lost.

 

Of course, if there is any lesson in modern times, it is that the theory of just war in any religious or legal tradition can not only be evaluated based on the theory, but also based on the likelihood of success. A proper application of just war theory can produce a situation in which good people apply just and lawful force to a bad situation and make it much worse, both in theory and in practice.

 

In the real world, just war theory has to actually work, and not just theoretically work. Doing nothing is a moral option when doing anything makes a bad situation worse. Options that bring peace and protect the innocent are to be favored when reasonable people think that they are likely to work in fact.

 

 

Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University. Photo courtesy Andrew Bacevich

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Andrew J. Bacevich

Professor of international relations at Boston University

 

From a moral perspective, it appears that observers see killing civilians with chemical weapons as somehow different from killing civilians with conventional weapons. I don’t know why there would be any distinction. Egyptians who are killed are just as dead as the Syrians who were killed, and though it appears that dying of a chemical weapons attack is an awful experience, frankly bleeding to death from a gunshot wound to your chest or stepping on a mine that blows off your leg is equally awful. So anyone who makes an argument that there’s a moral obligation to act has to address that question: Why here and not there?

 

The second aspect it seems to me is: What do we expect to achieve? Even if there is a moral case for intervention, how does the use of force remedy the situation? It appears to me that this is going to be a very limited attack with a very limited target set. There’s no intention of overthrowing the regime and no intention of limiting the chemical weapons capability of the Syrian Army.

 

So beyond allowing ourselves to feel virtuous because we have done something in response to a reprehensible act, what has been gained? If indeed the episode in Syria rises to the level where it is different from Egypt and we really are morally obligated to do something, then it ought to be something more than just a gesture. And of course as a practical matter, [frankly] nobody’s got the appetite to do anything more than make gestures.

 

 

Robert Parham

Executive editor of EthicsDaily.com and executive director of the Baptist Center for Ethics.

 

As President Obama campaigns for military action against Syria, Christians would do well to remember the eight rules of “Just War.”

 

First is the just cause of protecting innocent human life.

 

Second is securing the authorization for war from Congress.

 

Third is last resort, the exhaustion of efforts at conflict resolution before launching a war.

 

Fourth is just intent. Restoring U.S. honor or punishing Syria after it has crossed the “red line” of chemical weapons hardly passes just intent.

 

Fifth is probability of success–a high chance to achieve war’s stated purpose.

 

Sixth is proportionality of cost. War must do more good than harm. Do U.S. strikes prolong the civil war and create more refugees?

 

Seventh is just means. Targeting non-combatant civilians is immoral, which makes strikes in urban areas problematic.

 

Eighth is clear announcement. The U.S. must state clearly why and when Syria will be struck.

 

These are high moral hurdles to cross. Yet it is better to cross them than to rush into war – war is always more costly with more negative unforeseen consequences than war-makers project.

 

 

(This article was reported by Yonat Shimron, Sarah Pulliam Bailey, David Gibson and Lauren Markoe.)

 

KRE/AMB END RNS

 

 

continued -

3 Christian Perspectives on War: Just War Theory, Christian Pacificism, and Active Peacemaking,
Part 1

http://relevancy22.blogspot.com/2013/09/3-christian-perspectives-on-war-just.html