What Is Christian Humanism?

Jens Zimmermann locates Bonhoeffer within the Christian humanist tradition extending back to patristic theology. He begins by explaining Bonhoeffer's own use of the term humanism (and Christian humanism), and considering how his criticism of liberal Protestant theology prevents him from articulating his own theology rhetorically as a Christian humanism. He then provides an in-depth portrayal of Bonhoeffer's theological anthropology and establishes that Bonhoeffer's Christology and attendant anthropology closely resemble patristic teaching. The volume also considers Bonhoeffer's mature anthropology, focusing in particular on the Christian self. It introduces the hermeneutic quality of Bonhoeffer's theology as a further important feature of his Christian humanism. In contrast to secular and religious fundamentalisms, Bonhoeffer offers a hermeneutic understanding of truth as participation in the Christ event that makes interpretation central to human knowing. Having established the hermeneutical structure of his theology, and his personalist configuration of reality, Zimmermann outlines Bonhoeffer's ethics as 'Christformation'. Building on the hermeneutic theology and participatory ethics of the previous chapters, he then shows how a major part of Bonhoeffer's life and theology, namely his dedication to the Bible as God's word, is also consistent with his Christian humanism.

Being and Becoming

by R.E. Slater

      Being Worldly

      Being Secular

      Being Humanist

Labels meant to make

people living them ugly

by those who are ugly

Words meant to divide and kill

create strife and separate

Meanings misused and misappropriated

twisted into definitions of exclusion

      We become our words

      We become what we say and do

      We become our ugly intent

Being is a beautiful thing

Becoming is part of living and maturing

Being is me

Becoming is too

Being meets Becoming 

Making both whole

      Becoming Worldly

      Becoming Secular

      Becoming Humanist

These are expressions made whole when

a God of Love is placed in front of them

      Who meets me with who I should become

      Who meets world with what it can become

      Who meets us to tell us Love, and be Loved

There can be no apology
for being who we are

There can be no pulpit
crying separation from the world

There can be no creed of
oneness with God if not also His people

      Godly worldliness provides experience where there is none

      Godly secularity sees beauty wherever it looks

      Godly humanism sees the possibilities of mankind at its best

Being and Becoming

Flowing and Movement

Balance and Harmony

      Let it be and become

      Undivided and Whole

      In this Life now to Life everlasting



R.E. Slater

June 7, 2020

@copyright R.E. Slater Publications

all rights reserved

Christian humanism is not a new doctrine but an old observance from time immemorial found in the ancients, the major creeds of religions, the teachings of Jesus, and even today in BLM. It an attitude, a behavior, a significant and important form of communication with one another. It is built around the word Love. Too many think of humanism as replacing God. But what if it stood with God in exemplifying divine love and forgiveness? This is what is meant by "Christian" humanism. If religions like Christianity, Islam, and Judaism were to stay to their roots of grace and peace in God I would imagine our world would be a far better place. - re slater

Christian humanism sees people for who they are, serving where it can to help and aid. Jesus didn't say to hate the world but not to be corrupted by the world, including the corruption which comes with Christian secularity. A corruption which is silent in the face of racism and supremacy. If I was to chose between the world and the church I'd rather go it alone in God's creation than fellowship with false attitudes and doctrines. The church of God welcomes and embraces all. It does not seek to brainwash, strong-arm, place guilt upon, or shout down all who differ from its inhumane silence seeking power over God's love and weakness. - re slater

Wikipedia - "Christian humanism regards humanist principles like universal human dignity, individual freedom and the importance of happiness as essential and principal components of the teachings of Jesus. It emerged during the Renaissance with strong roots in the patristic period."

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A look at psychology of the person and sociology of society

through the eyes of Process Psychology and Sociology

Twinkl - link

Being and Becoming trailer 2014

Being and Becoming explores the concept and ultimately the choice of not schooling children, but of trusting and letting them learn freely what they are truly passionate about. The filmmaker's journey of discovery takes us through the US, Germany (where it's illegal not to go to school), France and the UK. This film is a quest for truth about the innate desire to learn. Trailer Music: Variation on Schumann Kinderszenen by Jay Gottlieb.

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Who is Carl Rodgers?

Wikipedia - Carl Ransom Rogers (January 8, 1902 – February 4, 1987) was an American  psychologist and among the founders of the humanistic approach (or client-centered approach) to psychology. Rogers is widely considered to be one of the founding fathers of psychotherapy research and was honored for his pioneering research with the Award for Distinguished Scientific Contributions by the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1956.

The person-centered approach, his own unique approach to understanding personality and human relationships, found wide application in various domains such as psychotherapy and counseling (client-centered therapy), education (student-centered learning), organizations, and other group settings. For his professional work he was bestowed the Award for Distinguished Professional Contributions to Psychology by the APA in 1972. In a study by Steven J. Haggbloom and colleagues using six criteria such as citations and recognition, Rogers was found to be the sixth most eminent psychologist of the 20th century and second, among clinicians, only to Sigmund Freud.

Biography

Rogers was born on January 8, 1902, in Oak Park, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. His father, Walter A. Rogers, was a civil engineer, a Congregationalist by denomination. His mother, Julia M. Cushing,[3][4] was a homemaker and devout Baptist. Carl was the fourth of their six children.[5]

Rogers was intelligent and could read well before kindergarten. Following an education in a strict religious and ethical environment as an altar boy at the vicarage of Jimpley, he became a rather isolated, independent and disciplined person, and acquired a knowledge and an appreciation for the scientific method in a practical world. His first career choice was agriculture, at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where he was a part of the fraternity of Alpha Kappa Lambda, followed by history and then religion. At age 20, following his 1922 trip to Peking, China, for an international Christian conference, he started to doubt his religious convictions. To help him clarify his career choice, he attended a seminar entitled Why am I entering the Ministry?, after which he decided to change his career. In 1924, he graduated from University of Wisconsin and enrolled at Union Theological Seminary (New York City). Sometime afterwards he became an atheist.[6] Although referred to as an atheist early in his career, Rogers eventually came to be described as agnostic. However, in his later years it is reported he spoke about spirituality. Thorne, who knew Rogers and worked with him on a number of occasions during his final ten years, writes that, “in his later years his openness to experience compelled him to acknowledge the existence of a dimension to which he attached such adjectives as mystical, spiritual, and transcendental.”[7] Rogers concluded that there is a realm "beyond" scientific psychology, a realm which he came to prize as "the indescribable, the spiritual."[8]

After two years he left the seminary to attend Teachers College, Columbia University, obtaining an M.A. in 1928 and a Ph.D. in 1931. While completing his doctoral work, he engaged in child study. In 1930, Rogers served as director of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in Rochester, New York. From 1935 to 1940 he lectured at the University of Rochester and wrote The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child (1939), based on his experience in working with troubled children. He was strongly influenced in constructing his client-centered approach by the post-Freudian psychotherapeutic practice of Otto Rank,[9] especially as embodied in the work of Rank's disciple, noted clinician and social work educator Jessie Taft.[10][11] In 1940 Rogers became professor of clinical psychology at Ohio State University, where he wrote his second book, Counseling and Psychotherapy (1942). In it, Rogers suggested that the client, by establishing a relationship with an understanding, accepting therapist, can resolve difficulties and gain the insight necessary to restructure their life.

In 1945, he was invited to set up a counselling center at the University of Chicago. In 1947 he was elected President of the American Psychological Association.[12] While a professor of psychology at the University of Chicago (1945–57), Rogers helped to establish a counselling center connected with the university and there conducted studies to determine the effectiveness of his methods. His findings and theories appeared in Client-Centered Therapy (1951) and Psychotherapy and Personality Change (1954). One of his graduate students at the University of Chicago, Thomas Gordon, established the Parent Effectiveness Training (P.E.T.) movement. Another student, Eugene T. Gendlin, who was getting his Ph.D. in philosophy, developed the practice of Focusing based on Rogerian listening. In 1956, Rogers became the first President of the American Academy of Psychotherapists.[13] He taught psychology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison (1957–63), during which time he wrote one of his best-known books, On Becoming Person (1961). A student of his there, Marshall Rosenberg, would go on to develop Nonviolent Communication.[14] Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow (1908–70) pioneered a movement called humanistic psychology which reached its peak in the 1960s. In 1961, he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.[15] Carl Rogers was also one of the people who questioned the rise of McCarthyism in the 1950s. Through articles, he criticized society for its backward-looking affinities.[16]

Rogers continued teaching at University of Wisconsin until 1963, when he became a resident at the new Western Behavioral Sciences Institute (WBSI) in La Jolla, California. Rogers left the WBSI to help found the Center for Studies of the Person in 1968. His later books include Carl Rogers on Personal Power (1977) and Freedom to Learn for the 80's (1983). He remained a resident of La Jolla for the rest of his life, doing therapy, giving speeches and writing.

Rogers's last years were devoted to applying his theories in situations of political oppression and national social conflict, traveling worldwide to do so. In Belfast, Northern Ireland, he brought together influential Protestants and Catholics; in South Africa, blacks and whites; in Brazil people emerging from dictatorship to democracy; in the United States, consumers and providers in the health field. His last trip, at age 85, was to the Soviet Union, where he lectured and facilitated intensive experiential workshops fostering communication and creativity. He was astonished at the numbers of Russians who knew of his work.

Between 1974 and 1984, Rogers, together with his daughter Natalie Rogers, and psychologists Maria Bowen, Maureen O'Hara, and John K. Wood, convened a series of residential programs in the US, Europe, Brazil and Japan, the Person-Centered Approach Workshops, which focused on cross-cultural communications, personal growth, self-empowerment, and learning for social change.

In 1987, Rogers suffered a fall that resulted in a fractured pelvis: he had life alert and was able to contact paramedics. He had a successful operation, but his pancreas failed the next night and he died a few days later after a heart attack.[17]

Theory

Rogers' theory of the self is considered to be humanistic, existential, and phenomenological.[18] His theory is based directly on the "phenomenal field" personality theory of Combs and Snygg (1949).[19] Rogers' elaboration of his own theory is extensive. He wrote 16 books and many more journal articles describing it. Prochaska and Norcross (2003) states Rogers "consistently stood for an empirical evaluation of psychotherapy. He and his followers have demonstrated a humanistic approach to conducting therapy and a scientific approach to evaluating therapy need not be incompatible."

Nineteen propositions

His theory (as of 1951) was based on 19 propositions:[20]

1. All individuals (organisms) exist in a continually changing world of experience (phenomenal field) of which they are the center.
2. The organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. This perceptual field is "reality" for the individual.
3. The organism reacts as an organized whole to this phenomenal field.
4. A portion of the total perceptual field gradually becomes differentiated as the self.
5. As a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of evaluative interaction with others, the structure of the self is formed—an organized, fluid but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the "I" or the "me", together with values attached to these concepts.
6. The organism has one basic tendency and striving—to actualize, maintain and enhance the experiencing organism.
7. The best vantage point for understanding behavior is from the internal frame of reference of the individual.
8. Behavior is basically the goal-directed attempt of the organism to satisfy its needs as experienced, in the field as perceived.
9. Emotion accompanies, and in general facilitates, such goal directed behavior, the kind of emotion being related to the perceived significance of the behavior for the maintenance and enhancement of the organism.
10. The values attached to experiences, and the values that are a part of the self-structure, in some instances, are values experienced directly by the organism, and in some instances are values introjected or taken over from others, but perceived in distorted fashion, as if they had been experienced directly.
11. As experiences occur in the life of the individual, they are either, a) symbolized, perceived and organized into some relation to the self, b) ignored because there is no perceived relationship to the self structure, c) denied symbolization or given distorted symbolization because the experience is inconsistent with the structure of the self.
12. Most of the ways of behaving that are adopted by the organism are those that are consistent with the concept of self.
13. In some instances, behavior may be brought about by organic experiences and needs which have not been symbolized. Such behavior may be inconsistent with the structure of the self but in such instances the behavior is not "owned" by the individual.
14. Psychological adjustment exists when the concept of the self is such that all the sensory and visceral experiences of the organism are, or may be, assimilated on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship with the concept of self.
15. Psychological maladjustment exists when the organism denies awareness of significant sensory and visceral experiences, which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the self structure. When this situation exists, there is a basic or potential psychological tension.
16. Any experience which is inconsistent with the organization of the structure of the self may be perceived as a threat, and the more of these perceptions there are, the more rigidly the self structure is organized to maintain itself.
17. Under certain conditions, involving primarily complete absence of threat to the self structure, experiences which are inconsistent with it may be perceived and examined, and the structure of self revised to assimilate and include such experiences.
18. When the individual perceives and accepts into one consistent and integrated system all his sensory and visceral experiences, then he is necessarily more understanding of others and is more accepting of others as separate individuals.
19. As the individual perceives and accepts into his self structure more of his organic experiences, he finds that he is replacing his present value system—based extensively on introjections which have been distortedly symbolized—with a continuing organismic valuing process.
20. In relation to No. 17, Rogers is known for practicing "unconditional positive regard", which is defined as accepting a person "without negative judgment of .... [a person's] basic worth".[21]

Development of the personality

With regard to development, Rogers described principles rather than stages. The main issue is the development of a self-concept and the progress from an undifferentiated self to being fully differentiated.

Self Concept is the organized consistent conceptual gestalt composed of perceptions of the characteristics of 'I' or 'me' and the perceptions of the relationships of the 'I' or 'me' to others and to various aspects of life, together with the values attached to these perceptions. It is a gestalt which is available to awareness though not necessarily in awareness. It is a fluid and changing gestalt, a process, but at any given moment it is a specific entity. (Rogers, 1959)[22]

In the development of the self-concept, he saw conditional and unconditional positive regard as key. Those raised in an environment of unconditional positive regard have the opportunity to fully actualize themselves. Those raised in an environment of conditional positive regard feel worthy only if they match conditions (what Rogers describes as conditions of worth) that have been laid down for them by others.

Fully functioning person

Optimal development, as referred to in proposition 14, results in a certain process rather than static state. He describes this as the good life, where the organism continually aims to fulfill its full potential. He listed the characteristics of a fully functioning person (Rogers 1961):[23]

1. A growing openness to experience – they move away from defensiveness and have no need for subception (a perceptual defense that involves unconsciously applying strategies to prevent a troubling stimulus from entering consciousness).
2. An increasingly existential lifestyle – living each moment fully – not distorting the moment to fit personality or self-concept but allowing personality and self-concept to emanate from the experience. This results in excitement, daring, adaptability, tolerance, spontaneity, and a lack of rigidity and suggests a foundation of trust. "To open one's spirit to what is going on now, and discover in that present process whatever structure it appears to have" (Rogers 1961)[23]
3. Increasing organismic trust – they trust their own judgment and their ability to choose behavior that is appropriate for each moment. They do not rely on existing codes and social norms but trust that as they are open to experiences they will be able to trust their own sense of right and wrong.
4. Freedom of choice – not being shackled by the restrictions that influence an incongruent individual, they are able to make a wider range of choices more fluently. They believe that they play a role in determining their own behavior and so feel responsible for their own behavior.
5. Creativity – it follows that they will feel more free to be creative. They will also be more creative in the way they adapt to their own circumstances without feeling a need to conform.
6. Reliability and constructiveness – they can be trusted to act constructively. An individual who is open to all their needs will be able to maintain a balance between them. Even aggressive needs will be matched and balanced by intrinsic goodness in congruent individuals.
7. A rich full life – he describes the life of the fully functioning individual as rich, full and exciting and suggests that they experience joy and pain, love and heartbreak, fear and courage more intensely. Rogers' description of the good life:

• This process of the good life is not, I am convinced, a life for the faint-hearted. It involves the stretching and growing of becoming more and more of one's potentialities. It involves the courage to be. It means launching oneself fully into the stream of life. (Rogers 1961)[23]

Incongruence

Rogers identified the "real self" as the aspect of one's being that is founded in the actualizing tendency, follows organismic valuing, needs and receives positive regard and self-regard. It is the "you" that, if all goes well, you will become. On the other hand, to the extent that our society is out of sync with the actualizing tendency, and we are forced to live with conditions of worth that are out of step with organismic valuing, and receive only conditional positive regard and self-regard, we develop instead an "ideal self". By ideal, Rogers is suggesting something not real, something that is always out of our reach, the standard we cannot meet. This gap between the real self and the ideal self, the "I am" and the "I should" is called incongruity.

Psychopathology

Rogers described the concepts of congruence and incongruence as important ideas in his theory. In proposition #6, he refers to the actualizing tendency. At the same time, he recognized the need for positive regard. In a fully congruent person, realizing their potential is not at the expense of experiencing positive regard. They are able to lead lives that are authentic and genuine. Incongruent individuals, in their pursuit of positive regard, lead lives that include falseness and do not realize their potential. Conditions put on them by those around them make it necessary for them to forgo their genuine, authentic lives to meet with the approval of others. They live lives that are not true to themselves, to who they are on the inside out.

Rogers suggested that the incongruent individual, who is always on the defensive and cannot be open to all experiences, is not functioning ideally and may even be malfunctioning. They work hard at maintaining and protecting their self-concept. Because their lives are not authentic this is a difficult task and they are under constant threat. They deploy defense mechanisms to achieve this. He describes two mechanisms: distortion and denial. Distortion occurs when the individual perceives a threat to their self-concept. They distort the perception until it fits their self-concept.

This defensive behavior reduces the consciousness of the threat but not the threat itself. And so, as the threats mount, the work of protecting the self-concept becomes more difficult and the individual becomes more defensive and rigid in their self structure. If the incongruence is immoderate this process may lead the individual to a state that would typically be described as neurotic. Their functioning becomes precarious and psychologically vulnerable. If the situation worsens it is possible that the defenses cease to function altogether and the individual becomes aware of the incongruence of their situation. Their personality becomes disorganised and bizarre; irrational behavior, associated with earlier denied aspects of self, may erupt uncontrollably.

Applications

Person-centered therapy

Rogers originally developed his theory to be the foundation for a system of therapy. He initially called this "non-directive therapy" but later replaced the term "non-directive" with the term "client-centered" and then later used the term "person-centered". Even before the publication of Client-Centered Therapy in 1951, Rogers believed that the principles he was describing could be applied in a variety of contexts and not just in the therapy situation. As a result, he started to use the term person-centered approach later in his life to describe his overall theory. Person-centered therapy is the application of the person-centered approach to the therapy situation. Other applications include a theory of personality, interpersonal relations, education, nursing, cross-cultural relations and other "helping" professions and situations. In 1946 Rogers co-authored "Counseling with Returned Servicemen" with John L. Wallen (the creator of the behavioral model known as The Interpersonal Gap),[24] documenting the application of person-centered approach to counseling military personnel returning from the second world war.

The first empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the client-centered approach was published in 1941 at the Ohio State University by Elias Porter, using the recordings of therapeutic sessions between Carl Rogers and his clients.[25] Porter used Rogers' transcripts to devise a system to measure the degree of directiveness or non-directiveness a counselor employed.[26] The attitude and orientation of the counselor were demonstrated to be instrumental in the decisions made by the client.[27][28]

Learner-centered teaching

The application to education has a large robust research tradition similar to that of therapy with studies having begun in the late 1930s and continuing today (Cornelius-White, 2007). Rogers described the approach to education in Client-Centered Therapy and wrote Freedom to Learn devoted exclusively to the subject in 1969. Freedom to Learn was revised two times. The new Learner-Centered Model is similar in many regards to this classical person-centered approach to education. Rogers and Harold Lyon began a book prior to Rogers death, entitled On Becoming an Effective Teacher—Person-centered Teaching, Psychology, Philosophy, and Dialogues with Carl R. Rogers and Harold Lyon, which was completed by Lyon and Reinhard Tausch and published in 2013 containing Rogers last unpublished writings on person-centered teaching.[29] Rogers had the following five hypotheses regarding learner-centered education:

1. "A person cannot teach another person directly; a person can only facilitate another's learning" (Rogers, 1951). This is a result of his personality theory, which states that everyone exists in a constantly changing world of experience in which he or she is the center. Each person reacts and responds based on perception and experience. The belief is that what the student does is more important than what the teacher does. The focus is on the student (Rogers, 1951). Therefore, the background and experiences of the learner are essential to how and what is learned. Each student will process what he or she learns differently depending on what he or she brings to the classroom.
2. "A person learns significantly only those things that are perceived as being involved in the maintenance of or enhancement of the structure of self" (Rogers, 1951). Therefore, relevancy to the student is essential for learning. The students' experiences become the core of the course.
3. "Experience which, if assimilated, would involve a change in the organization of self, tends to be resisted through denial or distortion of symbolism" (Rogers, 1951). If the content or presentation of a course is inconsistent with preconceived information, the student will learn if he or she is open to varying concepts. Being open to consider concepts that vary from one's own is vital to learning. Therefore, gently encouraging open-mindedness is helpful in engaging the student in learning. Also, it is important, for this reason, that new information be relevant and related to existing experience.
4. "The structure and organization of self appears to become more rigid under threats and to relax its boundaries when completely free from threat" (Rogers, 1951). If students believe that concepts are being forced upon them, they might become uncomfortable and fearful. A barrier is created by a tone of threat in the classroom. Therefore, an open, friendly environment in which trust is developed is essential in the classroom. Fear of retribution for not agreeing with a concept should be eliminated. A classroom tone of support helps to alleviate fears and encourages students to have the courage to explore concepts and beliefs that vary from those they bring to the classroom. Also, new information might threaten the student's concept of him- or herself; therefore, the less vulnerable the student feels, the more likely he or she will be able to open up to the learning process.
5. "The educational situation which most effectively promotes significant learning is one in which (a) threat to the self of the learner is reduced to a minimum and (b) differentiated perception of the field is facilitated" (Rogers, 1951). The instructor should be open to learning from the students and also working to connect the students to the subject matter. Frequent interaction with the students will help achieve this goal. The instructor's acceptance of being a mentor who guides rather than the expert who tells is instrumental to student-centered, nonthreatening, and unforced learning.

Rogerian rhetorical approach

In 1970, Richard Young, Alton L. Becker, and Kenneth Pike published Rhetoric: Discovery and Change, a widely influential college writing textbook that used a Rogerian approach to communication to revise the traditional Aristotelian framework for rhetoric. The Rogerian method of argument involves each side restating the other's position to the satisfaction of the other. In a paper, it can be expressed by carefully acknowledging and understanding the opposition, rather than dismissing them.[30]

Cross-cultural relations

The application to cross-cultural relations has involved workshops in highly stressful situations and global locations including conflicts and challenges in South Africa, Central America, and Ireland.[31] Along with Alberto Zucconi and Charles Devonshire, he co-founded the Istituto dell'Approccio Centrato sulla Persona (Person-Centered Approach Institute) in Rome, Italy.

His international work for peace culminated in the Rust Peace Workshop which took place in November 1985 in Rust, Austria. Leaders from 17 nations convened to discuss the topic "The Central America Challenge". The meeting was notable for several reasons: it brought national figures together as people (not as their positions), it was a private event, and was an overwhelming positive experience where members heard one another and established real personal ties, as opposed to stiffly formal and regulated diplomatic meetings.[32]

Person-centered, dialogic politics

Some scholars believe there is a politics implicit in Rogers's approach to psychotherapy.[33][34] Toward the end of his life, Rogers came to that view himself.[35] The central tenet of a Rogerian, person-centered politics is that public life does not have to consist of an endless series of winner-take-all battles among sworn opponents; rather, it can and should consist of an ongoing dialogue among all parties. Such dialogue would be characterized by respect among the parties, authentic speaking by each party, and – ultimately – empathic understanding among all parties. Out of such understanding, mutually acceptable solutions would (or at least could) flow.[33][36]

During his last decade, Rogers facilitated or participated in a wide variety of dialogic activities among politicians, activists, and other social leaders, often outside the U.S.[36] In addition, he lent his support to several non-traditional U.S. political initiatives, including the "12-Hour Political Party" of the Association for Humanistic Psychology[37] and the founding of a "transformational" political organization, the New World Alliance.[38] By the 21st century, interest in dialogic approaches to political engagement and change had become widespread, especially among academics and activists.[39] Theorists of a specifically Rogerian, person-centered approach to politics as dialogue have made substantial contributions to that project.[34][40]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

*This section includes a list of references, but its sources remain unclear because it has insufficient inline citations. Please help to improve this section by introducing more precise citations. (October 2017)

Carl Rogers served on the board of the Human Ecology Fund from the late 50s into the 60s, which was a CIA-funded organization that provided grants to researchers looking into personality. In addition, he and other people in the field of personality and psychotherapy were given a lot of information about Khrushchev. "We were asked to figure out what we thought of him and what would be the best way of dealing with him. And that seemed to be an entirely principled and legitimate aspect. I don't think we contributed very much, but, anyway, we tried."[41]

Selected works by Carl Roger

1. Rogers, Carl, and Carmichael, Leonard (1939). The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child. Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
2. Rogers, Carl. (1942). Counseling and Psychotherapy: Newer Concepts in Practice. Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
3. Rogers, Carl. (1951). Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications and Theory. London: Constable. ISBN 1-84119-840-4.
4. Rogers, C.R. (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 21: 95-103.
5. Rogers, Carl. (1959). A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships as Developed in the Client-centered Framework. In (ed.) S. Koch, Psychology: A Study of a Science. Vol. 3: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context. New York: McGraw Hill.
6. Rogers, Carl. (1961). On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy. London: Constable. ISBN 1-84529-057-7.Excerpts
7. Rogers, Carl. (1969). Freedom to Learn: A View of What Education Might Become. (1st ed.) Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merill. Excerpts
8. Rogers, Carl. (1970). On Encounter Groups. New York: Harrow Books, Harper and Row, ISBN 0-06-087045-1
9. Rogers, Carl. (1977). On Personal Power: Inner Strength and Its Revolutionary Impact.
10. Rogers, Carl. (nd, @1978). A personal message from Carl Rogers. In: N. J. Raskin. (2004). Contributions to Client-Centered Therapy and the Person-Centered Approach. (pp. v-vi). Herefordshire, United Kingdom: PCCS Books, Ross-on-the-Wye. ISBN 1-898059-57-8
11. Rogers, Carl. (1980). A Way of Being. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
12. Rogers, Carl. and Stevens, B. (1967). Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human. Lafayette, CA: Real People Press.
13. Rogers, Carl, Lyon, Harold C., & Tausch, Reinhard (2013) On Becoming an Effective Teacher—Person-centered Teaching, Psychology, Philosophy, and Dialogues with Carl R. Rogers and Harold Lyon. London: Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-81698-4
14. Rogers, C.R., Raskin, N.J., et al. (1949). A coordinated research in psychotherapy. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 13, 149-200. Cited in: N.J. Raskin, The first 50 years and the next 10. Person-Centered Review, 5(4), November 1990, 364-372.

Processual Archaelology and Whiteheadian Process Philosophy

amazon link

Whiteheadian process philosophy is an integral philosophy of everything. It is how the world works; how the world developed; and how humanity came to be as birthed within a processual cosmology. In a far looser context specific to process systems themselves it will be noted that all sciences - including that of evolutionary and archaeological studies - are taking into their accounts of creation and human development the ideation of "processual systems" and how those entangled matrices have impacted one another.

The science-filled descriptors of "processual evolution" may not be exactly Whiteheadian in nature but are Whiteheadian by reference and observation to the processual creation we are bound to and how it morphs and gleans over-and-over-and-over, again-and-again-and-again, moment-by-moment. It is how the world works.

So then, by way of illustrating Whitehead's processual observations at work in a non-Whiteheadian processual context - that of science - let us briefly review the obtuse discussion below watching how it reflects how science might interact with the constructs of latent and dynamic processual systems as observed by Whitehead in the 1920s and 1930s.

R.E. Slater

November 15, 2022

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https://prezi.com/dyy52z9kue9i/processual-archaeology/

https://screencast-o-matic.com/watch/cYXledM5qJ

What is the ‘process’ in cultural process

and in processual archaeology?

article link

Posted on May 15, 2020 by sooteris kyritsis

(continued from 12/03/19)

SHIFTING MEANINGS OF CULTURAL PROCESS

I suspect that what made the concept of cultural process difficult to discuss in the 1970s and 1980s was that it was a ‘vogue word’ – a word that was used to show that the user had acquired the term and all the supposed intellectual accessories that went with it (Service, 1969). M. Johnson (1999: 188) correctly suggested that conceptual ambiguity was exacerbated because the term process could be ‘used by an author in one sense and read in quite another’. This ambiguity allowed an unremarked shift in the meaning of the term over time.

Binford (1968b; see also Binford and Binford, 1968b) not only recognized the difference between the category of processes comprising the synchronic operation family and the diachronic evolution family, but he also noted that the archaeological record had been created by human behaviors, among other processes, and that the creation processes comprised a different category (Figure 2). He argued that an archaeologist must distinguish between explaining the archaeological record – a modern static phenomenon –and an extinct cultural system – a past dynamic phenomenon.

A processual archaeologist seeks to understand ‘processual relationships among various classes of material items in the dynamics of cultural systems’, but such understanding can only come after one has explained observations made on the archaeological record [which] necessarily involves coping with problems of process. We attempt to explain similarities and differences in archaeological remains in terms of the functioning of material items in a cultural system and the processual features of the operation or evolution of the cultural systems responsible for the varied artifact forms, associations, and distributions observable in the ground. (Binford, 1968b: 273)

In the last quoted sentence, the wording before the second ‘and’ refers to behavioral processes that create the archaeological record; the words after that refer to the dynamic cultural processes (both synchronic operational and diachronic evolutionary) at work when the culture existed.

The distinction is made by an archaeologist interested in contributing to anthropological theory (Binford, 1962). It, along with Schiffer’s (1976) more detailed discussion, ultimately led to refocusing the processual approach not on what might be thought of as the ultimate goal of identifying category 2 processes – those involving the operation and evolution of dynamic cultural systems – but on the more archaeologically proximate goal of category 1 processes – what became known as processes that result in the formation of the archaeological record (Schiffer, 1987). (I use 1 and 2 merely to signify order of analysis.) By the middle 1980s, for example, the text of an edited book entitled Structure and Process in Southeastern Archaeology, comprising 14 chapters authored by 16 archaeologists (Dickens and Ward, 1985), hardly mentions category 2 (cultural) processes and instead focuses nearly exclusively on category 1 (formation) processes.

Schiffer (1988) highlighted the distinctiveness of the two categories when he distinguished between ‘reconstruction theory’ (concerning category 1 processes) and ‘social theory’ (concerning category 2 processes). In her introduction to the recent volume Processual Archaeology, A.L. Johnson (2004) suggests that processes involve how a cultural system operates and also how the archaeological record is formed.

Additional evidence that formation processes usurped the priority of cultural processes is found in recent perspectives on Wauchope’s dilemma. Keegan (1991) suggests that at least some processes of interest are the behavioral processes that created the archaeological record, and others are the cultural processes or dynamics of an existing culture. Following Terrell (1986), Keegan (1991: 186–7) indicates that ‘cultural processes are the unfolding patterns of variability through time in conformity with nomothetic principles’. Terrell (1986) seems to have skirted Wauchope’s dilemma by suggesting that repetitive archaeological patterns were the results of predictable types of patterned human behavior. Echoing Kroeber (1948), Cunningham (2003: 391) indicates that ‘causal processes interact and combine in the creation of material patterns’.

This results in three things:

First, a particular pattern ‘can be created by entirely different sets of causal processes’ (2003: 392); this is equifinality (Lyman, 2004).

Second, analytical reconfiguration of processes allows one to ‘explain behavior that may differ substantially from any modern situation’ (Cunningham, 2003: 394). And,

Third, different processes and combinations thereof create different patterns in the material record (2003: 395).

Identifying which processes and combinations thereof create which patterns is not only the goal of formation process studies (Schiffer, 1987) and middle range research (Cunningham, 2003), but it is, seemingly, now of importance equal to that of identifying the cultural, social, and behavioral processes that processual archaeologists originally sought.

DISCUSSIONS OF CULTURAL PROCESS BY PROCESSUAL ARCHAEOLOGISTS

Eisenberg (1971) argued that Deetz’s (1965) analysis exemplifies processual archaeology because it adopts the view of a culture as a system and seeks to understand the role of kinds of artifacts (in Deetz’s case, ceramic decorations) in a cultural system. It was in fact a systems-theory perspective that produced the two most detailed discussions of cultural processes by archaeologists of which I am aware. One was by David Clarke; the other was by Frank Hole and Robert Heizer.

Clarke (1968: 22) wrote that the ‘primary processes are those of inevitable variation, multilinear development, invention, diffusion and cultural selection. Combined in many permutations and circumstances these processes give rise to such complex processes as acculturation, and cultural growth, decay and disintegration’. He explicitly defined a process as ‘a vector which describes a series of states of an entity or system undergoing continuous change in space or time’ (Clarke, 1968: 42, 668). Clarke (1968:43) believed that a ‘general system model . . . should be representative of cultural processes at several levels within a sociocultural unit’. He sought ‘a model for archaeological processes – archaeological entities changing as special kinds of dynamic systems, susceptible to analysis in terms of general systems theory’ (1968: 72). He indicated that ‘We should not expect the processes that operate upon cultures or culture groups to be the same as those that operate upon artifact attributes, although since the former entities are compounds of the latter elements we might expect the processes appropriate to higher entities to integrate the simpler processes as well’ (1968: 409). The first part of the immediately preceding sentence echoes Wauchope’s dilemma, and the last part concerns the magnitude and scale of processes.

Clarke (1968) lists various processes and provides a detailed and relatively lengthy

statement on category 2 (cultural, behavioral, social) processes that he thought operated on or within most sociocultural entities. He specified three ‘general processes’ ontogeny, migration, interaction – and then suggested that each was manifest in various ways by development of variants, decrease of variety, increase of variety, and transformation of variety of cultural elements (Clarke, 1968: 409–10). The problem, Clarke thought, was to derive a ‘nested hierarchy of socio-archaeological processes’ – processes that linked sociocultural change to change in artifacts of whatever scale (Clarke, 1968:411); this is an effort to resolve Wauchope’s dilemma. Each process Clarke listed is a general kind that includes more specific kinds of processes. Many of his processes fall within the diachronic evolutionary family.

Changes in Hole and Heizer’s multi-edition introductory textbook capture the growing importance of culture processes in archaeology. There is minimal mention of culture processes in the first two editions (Hole and Heizer, 1965, 1969), but the 1969 edition contains a discussion of the importance of systems theory to understanding cultural dynamics. The third edition (Hole and Heizer, 1973: 439) discusses cultural processes explicitly. 

The term ‘process’ or ‘processes’ crops up frequently in the writings of scientific archeology, and it is also used in history, in manufacturing, and in analysis. As we understand the term colloquially it refers to the sequential set of operations that lead from A to B . . . [Given examples in history, manufacturing and research one] can readily see that process means two quite different things. First, it may refer to a sequence of events. Second, it may refer to the causes of the sequence of events. In both meanings, process is conceptually linked with the states or conditions of the things under observation at different times. As process is used in archeology, it refers to an analysis of the factors that cause changes in state.

[I will suggest that Alfred North Whitehead's titled work, "Process and Reality" goes into the state of processual relationships in a far, far deeper manner than what is gleaned here in this article. - re slater]

The authors provide the same discussion in an abridged version of their book (Hole and Heizer, 1977: 358), where they also define ‘process’ in the glossary as ‘the operation of factors that result in a change of culture’ (1977: 387). Note that Hole and Heizer indicate that a process can be a simple description of a sequence of events, or it can refer to cause(s) of that sequence. Given processual archaeology’s hopes to explain the archaeological record rather than just describe it (Lyman and O’Brien, 2004), a reasonable inference is that processualists sought to identify causal processes that operated prehistorically.

One of the alleged benefits of archaeologists adopting systems theory was that ‘questions phrased in terms of [systems] concepts direct our attention away from institutions and events and toward processes, away from efforts to discover the first appearance of particular cultural practices and toward efforts to understand their gradual evolution,and away from constructions of these events that are relatively hard to define in terms of archaeological observations toward ones that are more sensitive to the data with which we deal’ (Plog, 1975: 215). Plog is unclear, but I suspect he hoped to identify dynamic cause(s) rather than describe static events in temporal terms. Thus perhaps Plog was concerned with how a cultural system operates. Salmon (1978: 175), after all, pointed out that ‘anthropologists were engaged in analyzing social and cultural systems long before the advent of modern systems theory’ (see for example Kluckhohn’s [1951] discussion of Linton [1936]). This is particularly evident if one is aware of the structural–functional approaches in anthropology early in the 20th century, and also of the typical definition of a system as the relationships (mechanical, structural, functional)between entities comprising the system (Hill, 1977; Maruyama, 1963; Plog, 1975;Salmon, 1978). Systems theory seems to be preadapted to studying the dynamic operation (static state of being) of a cultural system.

When Clarke wrote his magnum opus, he modeled his recommendations for archaeological research on systems theory. But he did so with the following explicit and emphatic caution:

"It would be all too easy to take systems theory as our model for archaeological [that is, sociocultural] processes and the cultural entities that generate them, without isolating precisely the kind of system these entities represent. This would simply extend systems theory and its terminology as yet another vague analogy of no practical potential." (Clarke, 1968: 39)

Because in Clarke’s (1968: 39) view, anthropologists were ‘only just beginning to analyze social systems in [systems theory] terms’, he devoted the majority of the nearly 700 pages of Analytical Archaeology to building a model of culture, including artifacts, as a system. He used systems theory concepts and terms such as ‘feedback’ and ‘homeostasis’ in his modeling efforts, but his cultural processes were not categorized by him as the generic deviation counteracting ones of the first cybernetics meant to study stasis nor the deviation amplifying ones of the second cybernetics meant to study change (Maruyama, 1963). Rather, they were ‘technocomplex repatterning’, ‘culture group repatterning’, ‘acculturation’, ‘diffusion’, ‘invention’, and the like (Clarke, 1968: 410–12). Flannery (1968, 1972), on the other hand, categorized the cultural processes he identified (seasonality, scheduling, centralization, segregation) as either one or the other of these two general categories (deviation counteracting or amplifying), and he, like Clarke, identified and named specifically cultural processes.

A significant influence on processual archaeologists’ focus on cultural processes was Maruyama’s (1963) discussion of the second cybernetics, or ‘deviation-amplifying mutual causal processes’ (see Flannery, 1968, 1972; Hill, 1977; Plog, 1975 for an introduction). In his 16-page article, Maruyama used the term ‘process’ 40 times, or 2.5 times per page. What Maruyama means by the term is never explicit. I suggest that he meant several things, including dynamic causes, relationships (mechanical, functional) between variables or entities, and influences of one variable or entity on another. Perhaps because it is unclear whether he meant static mechanical relations or causally dynamic ones, to this day some authors define a cultural process such as ‘centralization’ as ‘the degree of linkage between the various subsystems and the highest-order controls of a cultural system’ (Spencer, 1997: 215). This definition does not identify a dynamic cause though it does imply some kind of mechanical or functional relationship between phenomena. The name of a process has been applied to both a dynamic cause and its result. This seems to be the way that Maruyama (1963) used the term process, and his use likely influenced archaeologists.

(to be continued)

R. Lee Lyman

University of Missouri-Columbia, USA