Throughout the preceding essays of our Prehistory of the Bible Prelude, we have examined what happens when inherited Christian beliefs are brought into conversation with contemporary science, historical scholarship, philosophical inquiry, and humanity's long religious history. Our investigations have required us to reconsider not simply individual doctrines but the underlying assumptions about reality through which those doctrines have been understood.
In Essay 6, Can Faith Survive What We Have Learned?, we examined whether Christian faith could remain meaningful when inherited explanations of creation, Scripture, divine action, humanity, and salvation were subjected to critical examination. We concluded that the historical development of religious belief need not require abandoning Christian faith, but it does require distinguishing theological convictions from the historically conditioned explanations through which those convictions have been expressed.
Essays 7A, B, and C then undertook a constructive responsibility. Rather than continuing only to criticize inherited Christianity, we asked what kind of Christian theology might emerge when divine love becomes the governing principle through which God, creation, revelation, incarnation, Trinity, resurrection, salvation, and ethical participation are reconsidered.
Our resulting proposal affirmed Christianity's central confession that God is love while developing its interpretation within an open, relational, and continually becoming world. We sought to preserve the substantive Christian affirmations concerning Jesus Christ, divine incarnation, Trinity, and resurrection without requiring that every inherited metaphysical explanation remain permanently binding upon Christian understanding. At the same time, we maintained the independence of the philosophical investigations through which our relational understanding of reality had developed.
Our following three companion essays subsequently extended this constructive investigation. Originally they were developed outside of the Prehistory series but because of their theological content were later joined into it to complete our presentation of relational Christianity. Hence, the two-part study, From Rupture to Restoration, examined whether evil originates in God or whether human beings have sanctified their own destructive behavior in God's name. It further explored the implications of God's relationally generative love for sin, evil, forgiveness, restoration, and the conduct of Christian communities. Our third companion essay, How Relational Christian Faith Understands Sin, Evil, and Salvation ...Without Presuming Humanity Is Born Sinful, developed a relational understanding of human nature, moral agency, destructive becoming, and Christian salvation as both restorative and generative.
Together, the three additional studies have provided a fuller primer in relational Christian theology, extending its implications from God's own relational and generative Self to human responsibility, Christian discipleship, ecclesial conduct, ecological participation, and hope within an unfinished creation. They have also served as a preliminary constructive test of our independent relational philosophy, demonstrating how its ontological and metaphysical proposals might provide guidance for theological interpretation without themselves becoming religious doctrines. Our purpose throughout has not been to establish another Christian religion, but to help Christianity understand God as love and live that love more fully toward humanity and the wider community of creation.
We now arrive at the concluding responsibility of this Prelude.
Can relational Christian theology serve as a sufficiently comprehensive Christian worldview without compromising either the independence of relational philosophy or the integrity of Christian faith?
This question requires more than demonstrating that individual doctrines can be reinterpreted through relational language. A comprehensive worldview must provide a sufficiently coherent account of reality, human existence, knowledge, history, ethical responsibility, and the possibilities through which life acquires meaning. It must also recognize the limitations of its explanations and remain accountable to what continued inquiry may disclose.
Christian theology has historically attempted precisely such a comprehensive understanding of existence. Across centuries, its developing doctrines concerning God, creation, humanity, sin, salvation, divine providence, resurrection, and eternity have formed interconnected explanations of reality itself. These explanations arose through biblical interpretation, religious experience, philosophical reasoning, ecclesiastical authority, cultural inheritance, and continuing theological controversy. In this sense, Christian theology has frequently functioned not merely as a collection of religious teachings, but as its own theological ontology and metaphysics.
Our constructive approach proceeds differently. Rather than beginning with inherited Christian doctrines as the foundational explanations of reality, we first investigated reality through independent philosophical inquiry. Our developing accounts of Embodied Relational Reality (ERR) and Generative Relational Realism (GRR) emerged through investigations of relationship, differentiation, responsiveness, emergence, and becoming without requiring a Christian theological interpretation. Only afterward did we bring these philosophical proposals into dialogue with Christian faith.
This difference is methodological rather than a declaration of philosophical superiority. Independent relational philosophy does not automatically establish the existence of God, the truth of Christianity, or the adequacy of our particular metaphysical constructions. Nor does Christian confession become meaningless because its central theological affirmations cannot be independently demonstrated through scientific or historical investigation.
Instead, our undertaking seeks to distinguish the different kinds of inquiry through which human beings have attempted to understand reality, allowing philosophical investigation and Christian theological interpretation to remain intellectually accountable without requiring either to surrender its integrity to the other.
Essay 8 will examine whether this approach provides an adequate foundation for a coherent and responsible Christian worldview.
In the present Essay 8A, we will investigate i) how Christianity historically developed its own metaphysical assumptions, ii) how differing philosophical foundations influence Christian theological understandings of God and reality, iii) how inherited theological assumptions become operative worldviews shaping human belief and participation, iv) the significant relational inheritances already present within Christian history, and v) why our constructive methodology proceeds from independent philosophical inquiry toward distinctly Christian theological interpretation.
Essay 8B will then examine the resulting worldview more critically, testing its doctrinal coherence, confessional integrity, philosophical limitations, ethical consequences, and continuing possibilities for Christian faith.
Our purpose is not to establish a final system of religious certainty. Rather, it is to ask whether Christianity can remain faithful to its distinctive theological confessions while participating responsibly within the reality we increasingly understand through scientific discovery, historical investigation, and relational philosophical inquiry.
A. The Historical and Cultural Inheritances of Christianity
Christian theology did not begin as a complete philosophical explanation of the universe. It emerged through the religious experiences, inherited traditions, historical circumstances, and developing interpretations of generational communities seeking to understand their relationship with God.
As examined in our earlier Essays 2,3, and 4, of humanity's prehistoric development, the religious inheritance eventually received by Christianity extends far, far beyond the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt. Long before the emergence of Sumerian city-states and written religious traditions, Neolithic communities developed increasingly elaborate ceremonial practices, symbolic environments, and expressions of communal identity. These developments emerged from older Mesolithic cultural inheritances, themselves preceded by the much longer Paleolithic history of human development discovered in their symbolic activity, mortuary practices, social relationships, and attempts to understand their existence within the reality they believed themselves to be experiencing.
And although the precise beliefs and experiences of prehistoric peoples cannot be recovered, their archaeological remains suggest developing capacities for symbolic interpretation, ritual participation, and the attribution of meaning to life, death, nature, and the surrounding world. Such practices provide important prehistoric contexts for the later emergence of recognizable religious traditions. Over successive generations, these human capacities for experiencing, interpreting, and expressing reality found increasingly elaborate cultural and religious forms, eventually contributing to the ceremonial traditions, cosmological narratives, and theological explanations preserved by the civilizations of the ancient Near East.
Nor should this broad historical development lead us to assume an unbroken transmission of particular beliefs, practices, or the historical demonstration of divine encounters. Individual experiences and communal memories were continually subject to the changing circumstances of human existence. The deaths of individuals and entire communities, migrations, environmental disruptions, cultural displacement, conquest, assimilation, and encounters with neighboring peoples would interrupt, transform, or erase inherited understandings.
Some practices endured through repeated communal participation, while others were forgotten, absorbed into different traditions, or reinterpreted through new circumstances and emerging cultural expectations. Even when older symbols and narratives survived, their meanings could change considerably across generations. What later communities remembered as sacred inheritance may therefore have represented successive reconstructions of earlier experiences whose original meanings were no longer recoverable.
Ancient humanity's religious development was consequently neither a continuous accumulation of unchanged beliefs nor a straightforward progression toward increasingly complete understandings of divine reality, but a historically contingent process of experience, memory, transmission, loss, reinterpretation, and renewal.
Archaeological period | Approximate dates | Climate and geography | Human development |
|---|---|---|---|
Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) | ~3.3 million years ago to ~9700 BCE | Repeated Pleistocene glaciations and interglacial warming; changing grasslands, forests, coastlines, and migration corridors | Early stone technologies, human evolution, hunting and gathering, symbolic practices, art, and mortuary activity |
Mesolithic / Epipaleolithic (transitional stone-age cultures) | Broadly ~12,500-4000 BCE, depending on region | End of the last glacial period, Younger Dryas cooling, Holocene warming, rising seas, and ecological reorganization | More intensive food gathering, fishing, seasonal and settled communities, expanding ritual and symbolic traditions |
Neolithic (New Stone Age) | From ~10,000 BCE in Southwest Asia; ~4000 BCE in Britain | Generally warmer Holocene conditions; changing rainfall, vegetation, river systems, and cultivable landscapes | Cultivation, domestication, villages, food storage, expanding ceremonial architecture, and increasingly complex communal organization |
*These are approximate dates. Their beginnings and endings varied substantially by region.
*The important qualification is that the Middle East developed Neolithic societies thousands of years before northern Europe. In Britain, for example, the Mesolithic extended to approximately 4000 BCE, when farming practices spread into the region.
As we proceed from humanity's evolutionary ancient origins and its vastly longer history of human religious development, we come to the "Cradle of Civilization" found in Mesopotamia's extensive geography. Here civilizations came-and-went and were marked by several developments in human culture:
- Urban civilization - Cities such as Uruk, Ur, and Eridu.
- Writing - The development of cuneiform around 3400–3200 BCE.
- Organized government - City-states, kingship, administration, and written laws.
- Agriculture and irrigation - Large-scale agricultural systems supporting urban populations.
- Organized religious institutions - Temples, priesthoods, elaborate mythologies, and written theological traditions.
Mesopotamia is commonly described as “the Cradle of Civilization” particularly because of the emergence of Sumerian civilization in southern Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq). Importantly, Mesopotamia was not the birthplace of religion, human consciousness, or civilization in every sense. Religious and symbolic expression preceded Sumer by many millennia, while early agricultural settlements and complex communities had already developed elsewhere in the ancient Near East and outside of it.
We may therefore describe Mesopotamia as one of the principal cradles of urban civilization, where much older human traditions of symbolic expression, religious interpretation, agriculture, and communal organization developed into increasingly complex cities, institutions, and written religious traditions. Among the earlier cultures contributing to this development within Mesopotamia were the Hassuna, Samarra, and Halaf cultures (c. 6500–5100 BCE), followed by the expanding settlements and institutions of the Ubaid culture (c. 6200–4000 BCE). Beyond southern Mesopotamia, and sometimes considerably earlier, other Neolithic communities developed their own substantial settlements, ceremonial structures, and cultural traditions. These included Göbekli Tepe and the wider Taş Tepeler region (beginning c. 9600 BCE) in southeastern Anatolia, Jericho (with early settlement phases beginning c. 9600 BCE) in the southern Levant, and Çatalhöyük (c. 7500–5700 BCE) in central Anatolia. Farther west, the Vinča culture (c. 5700–4500 BCE) and Cucuteni–Trypillia culture (c. 5500–2750 BCE) developed distinctive settlement patterns, symbolic practices, and forms of communal organization in southeastern and eastern Europe. As observed, these were not all direct predecessors of Sumerian civilization, nor were they equivalent urban societies, but they demonstrate the geographical breadth and historical depth of cultural complexity before and alongside Mesopotamia's urban development.
By the time Sumerian urban civilization expanded during the fourth millennium BCE, especially through the development of cities such as Uruk around 3500–3100 BCE, other regions were pursuing their own, sometimes interconnected and sometimes independent, transitions from Neolithic communities toward increasingly complex civilizations. Predynastic Egypt (including the Naqada cultural sequence, c. 4000–3100 BCE) developed increasingly elaborate settlements, political institutions, and religious traditions along the Nile. To the east, societies of the Iranian plateau developed their own cultural and administrative systems, including the Proto-Elamite tradition (c. 3200–2700 BCE), which overlapped with early Sumerian urban civilization. Farther east, the Early Harappan / Indus Valley tradition (c. 3300–2600 BCE) emerged from a much longer regional history of Neolithic agricultural settlements, including Mehrgarh (beginning c. 7000 BCE), eventually giving rise to planned urban settlements in present-day Pakistan and northwestern India. Meanwhile, across the globe, the Norte Chico / Caral-Supe civilization of ancient Peru (emerging during the fourth millennium BCE and flourishing during the third) independently developed monumental platform mounds, ceremonial plazas, and increasingly complex communal institutions along the Peruvian coast, entirely apart from Old World developments.
Meanwhile - and in no connection with the developing "biblical world" of the Levant - across the globe in ancient Peru, the Norte Chico / Caral-Supe civilization (emerging during the fourth millennium BCE and flourishing during the third) independently developed monumental platform mounds, ceremonial plazas, and increasingly complex communal institutions along the Peruvian coast. Thus, Sumer was neither humanity's first complex cultural achievement nor the single birthplace of civilization, but one of several major centers in which much older human developments acquired increasingly elaborate urban, institutional, and religious forms.
But for many biblical students, ancient civilization began with the emergence of Sumerian civilization and its subsequent influence upon Akkadian and other succeeding Mesopotamian cultures as their increasingly elaborate religious traditions were written into expression and enculturated. Here, we find developing expressions of creation, divine councils, humanity, kingship, cosmic order, and the great flood that would become part of the broader cultural and literary inheritance of not only the ancient Near East but of the Bible itself within Canaanite, Jewish, and later Christian expressions.
And within Israel's wide historical experience we must also include Egyptian religious traditions as contributing to their own understandings of divine presence, cosmic order, human existence, and life beyond death. That is to say that Ancient Egypt influenced the Hebrew Bible through centuries of geographical proximity, imperial rule over Canaan, and cultural exchange, shaping biblical wisdom literature, sacred architecture, poetic imagery, and theological polemics. Rather than wholesale copying, biblical authors adapted familiar Egyptian symbols, literary forms, and royal metaphors to express their own distinct theology centered on Yahweh.
This then is the wider experience of ancient Israel that lastly included Canaanite religious and cultural traditions providing to Israel its immediate historical setting from which its Hebraic beliefs and religious context emerged and developed.
In review, Israel's religious identity did not arise in isolation as is typically taught in Christian churches but took shape through continuing interaction with surrounding peoples, including the longstanding influences of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Across successive generations, inherited understandings of divine presence, creation, kingship, covenant, sacred order, and human existence were preserved, contested, adapted, and reinterpreted through changing historical circumstances. The experiences of monarchy, conquest, exile, restoration, and foreign imperial rule further contributed to the transformation of Israelite religion and the eventual development of Judaism, its sacred Scriptures, covenantal traditions, prophetic expectations, and increasingly diverse understandings of God and the world.
It was within this historically layered Jewish religious environment of the first century that Christianity emerged, inheriting centuries and centuries of religious interpretation while developing its distinctive understandings of Jesus' identity, teachings, crucifixion, and proclaimed resurrection. Christianity thus became another chapter in humanity's much longer history of religious experience, cultural inheritance, theological interpretation, and the continuing reconstruction of understandings of reality.
And to our point, these early Christian interpretations were neither philosophically neutral nor entirely uniform. The Jewish Scriptures already contained substantial assumptions concerning the nature of God, creation, humanity, history, divine judgment, and the purposes of existence. Many of these understandings had developed through centuries of interaction with surrounding cultures, and those cultures with even earlier cultures before them. Thus we find continuities with, and reinterpretations, of earlier expressions of God, reality, and the mystification that is a common development across the early religious traditions of humanity.
We therefore discover that ancient Judaism was itself neither geographically uniform nor culturally isolated. Jewish communities living across different regions inherited common Scriptures and religious traditions while interpreting them through differing historical experiences, social circumstances, languages, and surrounding cultural influences. These differences did not necessarily eliminate shared religious identity, but they contributed to considerable diversity in how inherited understandings of God, covenant, sacred history, and human existence were expressed.
Early Christianity subsequently developed within this diverse Jewish environment, while its own expanding communities throughout the Mediterranean world likewise encountered differing languages, philosophical assumptions, religious practices, and cultural expectations. Consequently, Christian understandings of Jesus' identity and significance did not develop in a single, uniform cultural setting, but through historically situated communities that continued receiving, interpreting, and reconstructing their inherited religious convictions.
Consequently, Christianity inherited an already historically layered religious worldview, one that had developed through successive generations of experience, cultural interaction, religious interpretation, and theological reconstruction. Christianity did not begin with an independent account of reality but arose within an existing religious-and-metaphysical inheritance, even as its earliest communities began constructing new interpretations within that inheritance.
Similarly, as the Christian movement expanded throughout the Mediterranean world, its own theological explanations continued to inherit past cultural influences while engaging with, and developing through, ever wider contemporary cultural and philosophical traditions. Early Christian thinkers employed conceptual resources associated with Greek and Roman philosophy, including various Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic traditions, in their efforts to explain divine existence, human nature, spiritual knowledge, and the relationship between God and the world.
These philosophical traditions were not simply imposed upon an otherwise complete Christianity. They entered into continuing conversations with Christian Scripture, worship, communal experience, and developing theological commitments. Christian thinkers adopted some philosophical concepts, modified others, and rejected still others when they appeared incompatible with their understanding of faith.
This process helped produce increasingly sophisticated accounts of divine transcendence, human nature, creation, incarnation, Trinity, salvation, and ultimate fulfillment. Over time, Christian theological explanations became more systematic. Questions initially associated with particular religious experiences or interpretations developed into broader claims concerning what exists, how reality is constituted, how God acts, and what ultimate purposes govern human life.
Theological interpretation consequently became intertwined with philosophical explanation. This was not necessarily a failure of Christian thought. It was an understandable feature of religious communities attempting to make sense of their convictions within the intellectual worlds they inhabited. Christianity's developing theology was therefore never entirely separate from the historical and cultural circumstances through which its communities understood themselves, their Scriptures, their experiences, and the reality they believed God had created.
Nor has this historical process ceased within contemporary Christianity. Modern Christian communities continue receiving inherited theological convictions while encountering contemporary philosophical assumptions, scientific discoveries, political ideologies, cultural expectations, and changing understandings of human existence. Some influences are consciously examined and incorporated; others are resisted, modified, or accepted without recognizing their underlying assumptions. Consequently, Christianity today remains as historically situated, culturally diverse, and interpretively active as the communities through which its earlier traditions developed. Its theological expressions are neither culturally uniform nor independent of the intellectual worlds its believers inhabit.
The important question for our investigation, therefore, is not whether Christianity has been influenced by the surrounding cultures and philosophies of its time. It demonstrably has, and continues to be. Rather, the question is what happens when these historically developing explanations become so closely identified with Christian faith that their cultural and philosophical assumptions are no longer distinguished from the religious convictions they were originally intended to interpret.
B. The Accumulation of Christian Ontology and MetaphysicsOntology concerns what exists and the fundamental character of being.
Metaphysics investigates the structure, relationships, causation, possibilities, and underlying conditions of reality.
Christian theology has frequently addressed both kinds of questions, even when its primary purpose was religious rather than explicitly philosophical.
The confession that God created the world raises questions concerning the nature of divine existence, the origin and dependence of the cosmos, and the relationship between eternal and temporal reality.
The doctrine of divine providence raises questions concerning causation, freedom, necessity, contingency, and the possibility of divine intervention.
Christian understandings of humanity introduce assumptions concerning the relationship between body and soul, consciousness, moral agency, mortality, and the possibility of continuing personal existence beyond death.
The doctrine of original sin, in many of its historical interpretations, connects human nature with assumptions concerning an original condition of creation, humanity's moral inheritance, and the emergence of suffering and death.
Likewise, incarnation, Trinity, resurrection, judgment, and salvation require explanations concerning divine and human existence, identity, continuity, transformation, and ultimate reality.
These are not merely religious questions concerning worship or spiritual practice. They are also philosophical questions concerning the nature and structure of existence.
Across Christian history, their answers accumulated into increasingly comprehensive theological understandings of reality.
For example, an interpretation of humanity's original condition may shape the doctrine of sin. The understanding of sin may subsequently determine the perceived necessity and character of salvation. The interpretation of salvation may influence theories of Christ's atoning work, divine judgment, resurrection, and eternal destiny.
The resulting system may possess considerable internal coherence because its doctrines have been interpreted in relation to one another. Yet coherence within a theological system does not independently establish either the historical or metaphysical truth of its foundational assumptions.
If an inherited understanding of humanity's origins becomes difficult to reconcile with evolutionary history, then doctrines constructed around that understanding may also require reconsideration.
This does not automatically demonstrate that Christian faith itself is mistaken. But it does reveals that some theological explanations may depend upon historical or metaphysical assumptions that cannot be maintained simply through appeal to their inherited religious authority.
Our preceding investigations into human evolution, biblical prehistory, and the development of religious thought have repeatedly encountered this problem. The historical emergence of religious explanations must be distinguished from the reality those explanations seek to describe. Recognizing this distinction allows Christian theology to reconsider its own philosophical foundations without assuming that every modification represents a rejection of faith.
C. Philosophical Inheritance and Ecclesiastical AuthorityThe development of Christian theological metaphysics was not accomplished through philosophical inquiry alone. It also occurred through institutional processes in which particular interpretations gained religious authority.
As Christianity developed, theological disagreements concerning God, Christ, Scripture, religious practice, and salvation required communities to distinguish teachings they regarded as faithful from those considered unacceptable.
The early ecumenical councils became important settings for clarifying Christian doctrinal identity, particularly concerning the Trinity and the relationship between the divine and human in Jesus Christ.
The Councils of Nicaea in 325, Constantinople in 381, and Chalcedon in 451 were especially influential in the development and authorization of formulations that subsequently became foundational to major Christian traditions.
These councils did not create Christian belief from nothing. They addressed controversies arising from earlier interpretations, inherited worship, scriptural testimony, and philosophical disagreement. The result of their decisions contributed to the establishment of doctrinal boundaries within which later theological interpretation proceeded. The relationship between theological conviction and philosophical inquiry consequently became complicated.
On the one hand, Christian thinkers continued developing sophisticated philosophical arguments from their theological convictions. Augustine drew extensively upon philosophical resources associated with Platonism, while Thomas Aquinas later engaged Aristotelian philosophy in constructing a systematic account of God, creation, human nature, and theological knowledge. Their contributions demonstrate that classical Christian theology cannot responsibly be dismissed as uncritical religious speculation.
On the other hand, philosophical inquiry within established Christian theological systems was frequently conducted under prior confessional commitments. Theological conclusions concerning divine nature, incarnation, Trinity, or salvation could function as authoritative boundaries within which acceptable philosophical interpretations were developed. This arrangement was neither historically uniform nor necessarily regarded as problematic by those practicing it. Many Christian thinkers understood philosophy and theology as complementary forms of inquiry, capable of illuminating different dimensions of truth.
Nevertheless, the distinction between conclusions established through independently available philosophical reasoning and conclusions accepted through religious confession was not always preserved in subsequent popular or institutional transmission. Often, what was believed was in search of a truth to support that belief irrespective of whether either the belief or the truth were acceptable. Thus, a doctrine originally articulated through complex philosophical argument could gradually become part of an inherited religious worldview, received by later generations without corresponding knowledge of the historical questions or metaphysical assumptions through which it developed.
What had once been debated might subsequently be treated as obvious.
What had once been an explanatory proposal might become an unquestionable requirement of religious belonging.
And what had once been a historically situated philosophical interpretation might eventually be received as though it were a direct and timeless description of divine reality.
These developments deserve careful historical qualification. They were not universal features of every Christian tradition, nor do they mean that church authority always prohibited philosophical criticism. Yet they do illustrate how historically developing religious interpretations may acquire forms of authority associated with the kinds of confessions that would make their underlying assumptions difficult to reconsider... sometimes at the cost of an individual life or entire community.
How Philosophical Foundations Shape Theological Understanding
A. From Substance Metaphysics to Relational Immanence
A critical examination of Christianity's metaphysical inheritance must not confuse historical accumulation with intellectual incoherence. Christian theology has produced substantial philosophical achievements. Augustine, Aquinas, Eastern Christian theologians, Protestant reformers, and numerous modern Christian thinkers developed sophisticated understandings of divine existence, knowledge, morality, causation, freedom, and human participation. Their traditions were neither simple collections of unrelated doctrines nor merely uncritical borrowings from surrounding philosophical cultures. Many possessed recognizable philosophical structures, internally developed arguments, and systematic relationships among their central convictions.
Nevertheless, Christian theology was never constructed within a single, uniform metaphysical framework but is rather an eclectic collection of interpretive constructions. Its historical development involved the continuing reception, adaptation, rejection, and reconstruction of philosophical assumptions inherited from different intellectual traditions. Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and subsequent philosophical influences entered into conversation with biblical interpretation, ecclesiastical authority, religious experience, and developing confessional commitments. Over time, these varied inheritances contributed to what became recognizable forms of classical, traditional, and denominational Christianity. Although these traditions frequently achieved substantial internal coherence, they also preserved differing and sometimes competing assumptions concerning the nature of God, divine power, creation, human freedom, and the structure of reality.
Yet classical Christianity's diverse metaphysical inheritances also included significant relational understandings of existence. Biblical covenantal traditions, Trinitarian reflection, Eastern Christian teachings concerning participation in divine life, mystical theology, and later understandings of divine-human responsiveness all contributed significant relational expressions to Christian thought. These traditions complicate any simple contrast between an allegedly static Christianity and a contemporary relational alternative. Our constructive proposal does not claim that Christian relationality began with modern process philosophy, nor that inherited Christian metaphysical systems were incapable of describing meaningful divine-human relationships.
The deeper question is whether relationship describes what already-existing beings do, or whether relationship is fundamental to what beings are. An inherited theological system may affirm relational responses such as communion, love, participation, and mutual responsibility while also continuing to understand creational existence through metaphysical categories in which substances or independently constituted identities remain philosophically primary. Within some classical theological explanations, God is understood as eternally complete, immutable, impassible, and self-sufficient, possessing a divine nature that does not depend upon creation or undergo change through relationships with the world. God's love and communion are genuinely affirmed, but creation cannot contribute anything to God's own essential actuality.
Here we encounter a fundamental difference then between a theology that incorporates relational qualities into an already inherited metaphysics of substance versus a theology grounded in a relational ontology where relation is the primitive basis for reality itself. If a substance-first philosophy is deemed the ontological primitive than a theology built upon this perception provides us with a God who is fully self-contained and without any relational necessity for outreach. This would be the classical position of divine transcendence in which substance precedes relationality. But a relational philosophy of existence would provide to a relational theology a God who is fully involved with creation without delimiting God's relational Self.
Thus, within the classic presumption, relationship is treated as an add-on characteristic of an otherwise fully independent-and-completed divine existence, whereas within our relational understanding, God's immanence describes God's continuous and intrinsic participation within creation. Rather than positing divine metaphysical self-sufficiency, a relational theology would insist that God's own relational actuality cannot be adequately understood apart from God's living relationship with creation. God is fully involved, fully present, and continually active within creation.
Here we are therefore describing two differing theological understandings of God: classical theism vs immanent-and-relational panentheism. In the latter view, God is not the lesser for being a relational God, nor is God a distant, self-contained being who comes-and-goes from creation. A relational view means that God does not merely enter into loving relationships with creation; but rather, God is relational love in God's very inmost being. Relationship is not simply something God does. It is fundamental to who God is.
Consequently, our relational theology does not eliminate divine transcendence in the sense that God is other than creation, but understands it differently in that God transcends creation without being relationally separated from it. Where a classical metaphysics-based theology would frequently emphasize God's independently constituted being, a relational metaphysics-based theology would take seriously the divine Triunity as an expression of divine relationality within God's own Self.
Thus, God's transcendence does not require creational distance. Nor does God's immanence imply divine Self-confinement in order to maintain divine holiness. Nor would God's own divine relationality constitute divine deficiency, nor any form or state of lesser divinity. Statedly, God's relationality with creation is the supreme expression of who God IS. This then is the theology of God known as relational immanence and how it immanates from God's Self.
B. From Relational Reality to Relational Divine Being
Throughout our observations contrasting non-relational and relational metaphysics, we are demonstrating how profoundly one's philosophical understanding of reality influences one's theological understanding of God.
The Christian confession that God is love may remain unchanged, while the metaphysical understanding of what it means for God to be love undergoes substantial reconstruction. It is precisely because of these underlying philosophical foundations that our understanding of God's being, presence, and participation within creation can change so significantly.
Here, within relational Christian theology we wish to teach of a God who is fully present rather than absent; intimately involved rather than distantly removed; genuinely responsive rather than unaffected; relationally generative rather than coercively controlling. We therefore wish to speak of a God whose love is not simply an expression of divine activity but the very constitution of God's own relational being.
This distinction was especially important in our earlier philosophical investigations. The philosopher A.N. Whitehead understood creativity as ultimate within his metaphysics, with God participating in, rather than standing outside, the creative advance of actuality. Our own independent philosophical investigations in Embodied Relational Reality (ERR) and Generative Relational Realism (GRR) proposed a further reconstruction: relation is ontologically primitive, while process, creativity, differentiation, and novelty arise within generative relational reality. Relation is not another independently existing substance, force, or deity standing above God and creation. Rather, it describes what is fundamental to the constitution and becoming of relational reality itself.
And it is here that our philosophical inquiry opens toward a profoundly different understanding of God's own divine Person. When we arrived at relational reality as fundamental to existence, we began to recognize that this same description might also speak to God's own Self. If all existence is relationally constituted, then God cannot be introduced into our Christian theological interpretation as an exception: a separately constituted divine THING who subsequently chooses to establish relationships. Within our relational Christian theology, God is relational through and through and through. Relationality does not merely describe God's behavior, qualities, or favorable disposition toward creation. It belongs to who God is.
So that within this relational perception, God's own life is not complete in the classical sense of being personally closed-off to the world's becoming (sic, absolute transcendency). Why? Because God is neither an isolated divine substance nor a distant sovereign whose relationships leave the divine life wholly unaffected. God is living, relational, and genuinely responsive to creation. As the cosmos evolves, differentiates, suffers, flourishes, and brings forth new possibilities, these developments matter to God's own continuing experience. They are not merely observed from an immutable distance nor from an impassive disposition, but are received deeply within the relational life of God's Self. Thus, God's experience of creation is consequential to God's own relational becoming.
C. Divine Love and the Generative Becoming of Creation
This is also why creativity and novelty acquire renewed theological significance. Within ERR/GRR, creativity does not stand above relation as an independently existing metaphysical principle. Rather, creativity becomes possible through the generative character of relational reality. Novelty emerges because relational existence is open to differentiation, interaction, and possibilities not exhausted by what has already become. And when interpreted through our Christian panentheistic theology, this generative openness may be understood as expressive of the relational heart of God. God is not simply the external creator of a completed universe but the living divine presence within an unfinished creation, who is continually participating in its generative possibilities through love rather than coercive control.
God and creation are therefore distinct without being relationally separated. In our panentheistic interpretation, creation exists within the encompassing life of God, while God is present within creation without being reducible to the cosmos or identical with its constituent realities. God's relational being is not first established as an isolated existence to which creation is subsequently attached. Nor does this require us to conclude that God's existence began with the present universe. Rather, divine relationality is fundamental, and God's concrete relationship with an evolving creation is living, mutual, and consequential.
Thus we may say within our relational Christian confession that God is love not merely because God performs loving actions, but because relational love expresses God's very Self. God does not become loving only when creation appears; love belongs fundamentally to divine identity. Moreover, God's enduring character of love does not require that every aspect of divine experience remain immutable or unchanging as the classical transcendence position creedally insists. Rather, God's love is constant in character while genuinely responsive in its living relationships. And since relational theology insists on an open, undetermined future, it can be correctly stated that the world contributes novelty to God's experience - even as God participates in the world's becoming through persuasive, noncoercive love. Divine faithfulness is therefore not the absence of relational change, but the enduring presence of love throughout changing relationships.
D. Reconstructing Christian Revelation Through Relational Philosophy
This understanding of God's relational being also requires reconsidering our Christian understanding of divine inspiration and revelation. If God is continually and generatively present within creation, then divine communication need not be understood as an exceptional activity reserved for particular individuals, religious communities, historical occasions, or sacred writings. Rather, what Christianity describes as the inspiration of the Holy Spirit may be understood as God's ordinary, continuous, and universally available participation within the becoming of creation - both human and nonhuman. Such participation is neither coercive nor dependent upon its recipients recognizing it as divine.
Consequently, our understanding of Scripture does not require a privileged category of divine communication traditionally described as special revelation. The biblical writings may instead be understood as historically preserved expressions of human religious experience, inspiration, memory, and interpretation, subsequently reconstructed through generations of communal participation. Their religious significance does not require a metaphysically privileged origin, nor does their historical preservation establish the divine authority of their contents. This broader understanding of inspiration allows us to affirm God's continuing communication with creation without attributing humanity's historically conditioned religious beliefs and moral failings to God. (For further discussion, see Apdx B.)
We must nevertheless preserve an essential methodological distinction. Our independent relational philosophy neither demonstrates God's existence, nor establishes the Christian confession that God is love, nor require every interpretation of reality to become theological. Which means that the philosophical development of relational reality within the context of ERR/GRR has investigated the fundamental relational character of existence without depending upon Christian doctrine. And it is from this philosophical position which our relational theology has subsequently interpreted reality through its own confessional commitments pertaining to God, creation, Jesus Christ, incarnation, Trinity, resurrection, and divine love. These each are distinguishable forms of inquiry, even when their explanations enter into constructive conversation. And importantly, the relational theology that has developed from a relational philosophy are in unity with one another - as versus the eclectic tradition of classical Christianity.
This, finally, is why our approach differs from simply assembling a new combination of inherited doctrines, philosophical concepts, or denominational traditions. We are not attempting to create another eclectic theological system by selecting attractive relational qualities from otherwise incompatible metaphysical assumptions. Rather, we are asking what Christian faith may become when its theological interpretations are reconstructed through a coherent relational understanding of reality. Such reconstruction does not require abandoning Christianity's historical confessions, but it does require reconsidering the philosophical explanations through which those confessions have been understood.
The broader relational inheritances of Christianity will receive dedicated attention in Section IV. For the present, the important conclusion is that Christianity's metaphysical history must be understood as diverse, cumulative, intellectually substantive, and continually developing. Importantly, our proposal does not dismiss that inheritance. It asks whether Christian theology may become more coherent by understanding God, creation, divine participation, and the continuing emergence of reality through relationality as fundamental rather than secondary to existence.
A religious worldview becomes especially consequential when its theological assumptions are treated not merely as beliefs about God but as the necessary explanations of reality itself.
- Within such a worldview, creation may be interpreted primarily through a predetermined divine plan.
- Human nature may be understood through inherited assumptions concerning an original fall.
- Suffering may be explained as punishment, providential necessity, or the consequence of a primordial human transgression.
- Divine power may be imagined through unilateral sovereignty, while religious authority may be justified through appeals to an unquestionable understanding of God's will.
These interpretations have not been affirmed uniformly throughout Christian history. Nevertheless, they illustrate how particular theological assumptions can shape more comprehensive understandings of the world.
Their significance extends beyond abstract doctrinal discussion.
- An understanding of divine sovereignty can influence political and ecclesiastical authority.
- A doctrine of human depravity can shape perceptions of personal worth, moral responsibility, and the legitimacy of institutional control.
- An interpretation of salvation can affect how Christians understand those belonging to other religious traditions or none at all.
- Likewise, beliefs concerning creation and humanity's place within it can influence responsibilities toward nonhuman life, ecological systems, and future generations.
A theological worldview therefore contributes to how communities understand not only what exists, but what kinds of behavior appear justified within that existence.
Yet these practical consequences do not necessarily flow in only one direction. The same inherited doctrine may support different ethical interpretations, and historical communities frequently contest the meanings of their own traditions.
Our purpose is not to claim that classical Christian theology inevitably produces domination or intellectual resistance. Rather, it is to recognize that religious explanations possess philosophical and ethical consequences, and that these consequences must remain open to examination.
Christianity's historically developing ontology and metaphysics should therefore be evaluated not solely by their internal coherence or institutional longevity, but also by the adequacy of their assumptions, their responsiveness to historical and scientific knowledge, and the kinds of human participation they encourage.
This brings us to the distinctive methodological concern of our present undertaking.
We have not begun by assuming that Christianity's inherited descriptions of reality must remain philosophically authoritative simply because they have become part of Christian tradition.
Instead, our investigations into reality have developed independently through philosophical examination, drawing upon contemporary understandings of the natural world while remaining open to competing interpretations.
Only afterwards have we asked how Christian theology might responsibly interpret that reality through its own historically developed confessions.
This approach does not make our philosophical proposals final or exempt them from criticism. It does, however, permit us to distinguish more explicitly between what is being investigated, the philosophical explanations proposed, and the religious interpretations subsequently brought into dialogue with those explanations.
Christian theology may continue to serve as a comprehensive interpretation of reality. But its credibility should not depend upon protecting every inherited philosophical assumption from historical examination, scientific discovery, or critical reconsideration.
Our central concern is therefore not whether Christianity possesses a metaphysics. It plainly has developed many. The question is whether a distinctly Christian theology can remain meaningful and faithful while permitting its inherited metaphysical explanations to be reconsidered through an independently accountable philosophy of reality.
The answer to that question requires examining an important feature of Christianity's own history: the multiple relational inheritances through which Christians have already understood divine life, human participation, communion, transformation, and love.
It is to these traditions that we now turn in Section IV.
Although our relational Christian theology proceeds from an independently developed relational philosophy, it does not arise without significant Christian precedents. Throughout Christianity's long history, numerous theological traditions have emphasized divine presence, communion, participation, responsiveness, and transformative love. These provide important points of continuity between our constructive undertaking and the Christian faith we have inherited.
Biblical Relationality. The Hebrew Scriptures frequently portray God through covenantal relationships characterized by faithfulness, compassion, grief, and responsiveness to human circumstances. Similarly, the New Testament presents relational expressions of divine life through Jesus' ministry, the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit, and humanity's participation in the life of God. Although these writings do not establish a systematic relational ontology, they provide substantial resources for relational theological interpretation.
Trinitarian Relationality. Christian reflection upon the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit has long recognized relationship as significant to divine identity. The theological concept of perichoresis, describing the mutual indwelling of the divine Persons, provides an especially important expression of divine communion. Here, relationality concerns not simply God's activities toward creation but the Christian understanding of God's own inner life.
Participatory and Mystical Relationality. Eastern Christianity's understanding of theosis, or participation in divine life, emphasizes humanity's continuing transformation through communion with God. Likewise, Christian mystical traditions have frequently expressed an intimate understanding of divine presence that challenges popular perceptions of God as distant or removed from everyday existence.
Process and Open-Relational Theology. More recently, the philosophical and theological contributions of Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, John Cobb, Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, and contemporary open and relational theologians such as Thomas Jay Oord have substantially reconsidered divine power, responsiveness, love, and participation within an evolving creation. Their investigations provide particularly important contemporary precedents for our own constructive undertaking.
Yet we must distinguish between recognizing Christianity's relational inheritances and establishing a philosophy in which relation itself is ontologically primitive. The presence of relational expressions within historical Christianity does not necessarily indicate that its underlying metaphysics was relationally constituted. Nor do contemporary relational theologies necessarily proceed from identical philosophical foundations.
Our own undertaking in ERR/GRR consequently represents both a continuity with, and a reconstruction of, these traditions. Rather than gathering their relational expressions into another eclectic theological system, we have sought to develop an independently accountable relational philosophy through which Christianity's inherited theological understandings might be reconsidered with greater philosophical consistency.
Our purpose is not simply to recover Christianity's relational heritage but to reconsider the very foundations upon which that heritage might be more coherently understood and further developed. In doing so, we may discover new theological possibilities within familiar Christian confessions concerning God, creation, incarnation, divine presence, and love.
A more extensive survey of these Christian relational inheritances will be provided in Essay 8B (see Apdx C).
For now, having acknowledged our indebtedness to Christianity's historical and contemporary relational traditions, we turn to the distinctive methodological order through which our own relational Christian theology has developed.
The distinctive feature of our constructive undertaking lies not simply in its theological conclusions but in the methodological order through which those conclusions have developed.
Historically, Christian theology has frequently begun with inherited religious convictions and subsequently employed philosophical reasoning to explain, organize, and defend those convictions. Its resulting understandings of reality consequently developed within already established religious commitments. Although this methodology has produced considerable intellectual achievements, it can also make philosophical inquiry subordinate to theological expectations.
Our methodology reverses this order.
Rather than beginning with Christian theological convictions and proceeding toward a philosophy of reality capable of supporting those convictions, we begin by investigating reality independently of religious expectation. Our philosophical investigations remain accountable to scientific discovery, historical scholarship, rational inquiry, and further philosophical reconsideration without requiring that their conclusions conform to an inherited religious worldview.
Within our Reality & Metaphysics series, this methodological progression has been expressed through the following sequence:
Reality → Ontology → Metaphysics → Interpretation → Theology → Ethics → Participation
Reality precedes our explanations of it. Ontology investigates its fundamental constitution, while metaphysics explores the structures, possibilities, and generative character of existence. Interpretation subsequently provides the means through which human beings develop understandings of reality, including those expressed through religious and theological traditions.
It is within this philosophical context that our investigations into Embodied Relational Reality (ERR) and Generative Relational Realism (GRR) have developed. Neither requires a Christian theological interpretation to establish its philosophical significance. Only afterwards do we ask what Christian faith might mean within such a relational understanding of existence.
This methodological reversal does not diminish the significance of Christian faith. Rather, it releases Christian theology from the responsibility of defending inherited philosophical assumptions simply because those assumptions have become associated with its religious confessions.
Christian theology becomes free to reconsider its understanding of God without requiring reality to conform to its inherited descriptions of God.
Importantly, the developing relationship between our relational philosophy and relational Christian theology is neither one of philosophical subordination to religion nor religious subordination to philosophy. Each retains its distinctive responsibilities, methods of inquiry, and intellectual integrity. Their relationship becomes one of continuing constructive dialogue rather than predetermined agreement.
Furthermore, because our relational philosophy has developed independently of Christian confession, it remains available for philosophical investigation and interpretation by people belonging to other religious traditions or none at all. Its significance is not confined to the particular theological reconstruction undertaken here.
Our relational Christian theology thus represents a distinctly Christian interpretation of a broadly accessible relational philosophy of reality. Its coherence must be continually examined, its limitations acknowledged, and its theological and ethical consequences responsibly considered. (For further discussion, see Essay 8B, Apdx D.)
What remains to be investigated, therefore, is whether this methodological reconstruction can provide a sufficiently comprehensive, coherent, and ethically credible Christian worldview. It is to this responsibility that Essay 8B will turn.
Throughout Essay 8A, we have examined how Christianity developed its own philosophical understandings of reality through centuries of religious experience, cultural inheritance, philosophical engagement, and theological interpretation. These developments produced substantial intellectual achievements while also introducing historically conditioned assumptions that became deeply embedded within Christian faith.
Our purpose has not been to diminish these achievements but to distinguish the Christian confessions themselves from the philosophical explanations through which they have been understood.
We have demonstrated how a reconsideration of our philosophical foundations can substantially transform our theological understanding of God. Divine transcendence, immanence, relationality, love, and inspiration acquire different meanings when interpreted through a philosophy in which relation is fundamental to existence itself.
The significance of our undertaking is that we have arrived at these theological reconstructions through a relational philosophy independently developed from Christian theology. Rather than requiring reality to conform to inherited religious explanations, we have allowed our investigations into reality to inform the continuing development of Christian theological understanding.
Yet establishing a constructive methodology is only part of our responsibility. We must also examine whether the resulting relational Christian theology possesses sufficient coherence, comprehensiveness, and practical significance to serve as a Christian worldview.
Can it meaningfully integrate our contemporary understandings of reality with the distinctive confessions of Christian faith?
Can its theological explanations remain consistent with one another without compromising the independence of their philosophical foundations?
And can its understandings of divine love, human existence, and creation encourage more humane, restorative, and generative forms of participation within the world?
These questions move our investigation beyond the reconstruction of individual doctrines toward an examination of the Christian worldview as a whole.
Importantly, we are not seeking another closed theological system that claims to possess final explanations of reality. An open and relational philosophy would be contradicted by a theology unwilling to reconsider itself. Both must remain responsive to further discovery, changing circumstances, emerging possibilities, and the limitations of human understanding.
The ultimate credibility of our relational Christian worldview will reside not only in the coherence of its philosophical and theological explanations but also in the character of the lives and communities it helps to develop.
If our confession that God is love genuinely informs our understanding of reality, then it must also inform how we participate within that reality. Our theology must become consequential to how we understand ourselves, receive one another, respond to suffering, restore damaged relationships, and care for the wider community of creation.
It is to these philosophical, theological, and ethical responsibilities that we now turn in Essay 8B - The Coherence and Practice of Relational Christian Faith.
Bellah, Robert N. Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age. Harvard University Press, 2011.
Hodder, Ian, ed. Religion in the Emergence of Civilization: Çatalhöyük as a Case Study. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Smith, Mark S. The Early History of God: Yahweh and the Other Deities in Ancient Israel. 2nd ed. Eerdmans, 2002.
Smith, Mark S. The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel's Polytheistic Background and the Ugaritic Texts. Oxford University Press, 2001.
Walton, John H. Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible. 2nd ed. Baker Academic, 2018.
Smithsonian Institution. Human Origins Program. Archaeological and paleoanthropological research resources.
Augustine. The Trinity (De Trinitate). Translated by Edmund Hill. New City Press, 1991.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Especially Part I, Questions 2–26.
Chadwick, Henry. Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen. Oxford University Press, 1966.
McGrath, Alister E. Christian Theology: An Introduction. 6th ed. Wiley-Blackwell, 2017.
Pelikan, Jaroslav. The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine. 5 vols. University of Chicago Press, 1971–1989.
Plantinga, Cornelius, Jr. Engaging God's World: A Christian Vision of Faith, Learning, and Living. Eerdmans, 2002.
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford University Press, 1924.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. Macmillan, 1925.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Religion in the Making. Macmillan, 1926.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Corrected edition, edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. Free Press, 1978. Originally published 1929.
Whitehead, Alfred North. Modes of Thought. Macmillan, 1938.
Hartshorne, Charles. The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God. Yale University Press, 1948.
Rescher, Nicholas. Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy. State University of New York Press, 1996.
Seibt, Johanna. “Process Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Louth, Andrew. The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2007.
Zizioulas, John D. Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church. St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985.
Moltmann, Jürgen. The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God. Harper & Row, 1981.
Moltmann, Jürgen. God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God. Harper & Row, 1985.
Cobb, John B., Jr., and David Ray Griffin. Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition. Westminster Press, 1976.
Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. God, Christ, Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology. Crossroad, 1982.
Clayton, Philip, and Arthur Peacocke, eds. In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a Scientific World. Eerdmans, 2004.
Keller, Catherine. Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming. Routledge, 2003.
Oord, Thomas Jay. The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence. IVP Academic, 2015.
Oord, Thomas Jay. Open and Relational Theology: An Introduction to Life-Changing Ideas. SacraSage Press, 2021.
Ricoeur, Paul. Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Fortress Press, 1995.
Lindbeck, George A. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. Westminster Press, 1984.
Tracy, David. The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism. Crossroad, 1981.
Kaufman, Gordon D. In Face of Mystery: A Constructive Theology. Harvard University Press, 1993.
Kaufman, Gordon D. In the Beginning... Creativity. Fortress Press, 2004.
Brueggemann, Walter. Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy. Fortress Press, 1997.
Enns, Peter. Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament. 2nd ed. Baker Academic, 2015.
Slater, R.E., and ChatGPT. Relevancy22.
Reality & Cosmology Series and Reality & Metaphysics Series
Embodied Relational Reality (ERR).
Generative Relational Realism (GRR).
Investigations into Generative Asymmetry, Relational Freedom, Agency, and Responsible Participation.
Prehistory of the Bible: A Prelude to Relational Faith
Essay 6 - Can Faith Survive What We Have Learned?
Essay 7A - Toward a Relational Christian Theology: God, Creation, and Revelation.
Essay 7B - Toward a Relational Christian Theology: Christ, Salvation, and the Life of Faith.
Essay 7C - Conclusion and Appendices.
Companion Studies in Relational Christian Theology
From Rupture to Restoration (1/2): Is God Evil, or Have Humans Sanctified Their Own Evil in God's Name?
From Rupture to Restoration (2/2): Sin, Evil, Forgiveness, and the Relationally Generative Love of God.
How Relational Christian Faith Understands Sin, Evil, and Salvation ...Without Presuming Humanity Is Born Sinful.
I. Religious Prehistory and Biblical Inheritances
Robert Bellah, Ian Hodder, Mark S. Smith, John Walton, and the Smithsonian's Human Origins Program provide historical and archaeological contexts for understanding the emergence of human religious expression. Their contributions help situate Christianity within humanity's much longer history of experiencing, interpreting, and reconstructing its understandings of reality.
II. The Historical Formation of Christian Theology
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Henry Chadwick, Alister McGrath, Jaroslav Pelikan, and Cornelius Plantinga represent primary theological sources, historical scholarship, and contemporary expressions of the Christian worldview. They help us appreciate the intellectual achievements of inherited Christianity while recognizing the philosophical assumptions through which its theological traditions developed.
III. Ontology, Metaphysics, and Process-Relational Philosophy
Aristotle, Alfred North Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, Nicholas Rescher, and Johanna Seibt provide important philosophical resources for examining substance, process, relationship, creativity, and becoming. Their differing approaches help contextualize our independent development of Embodied Relational Reality (ERR) and Generative Relational Realism (GRR), particularly our proposal that relation itself is ontologically primitive.
IV. Christianity's Relational Inheritances
Andrew Louth, John Zizioulas, Jürgen Moltmann, John Cobb, David Ray Griffin, Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, Philip Clayton, Arthur Peacocke, Catherine Keller, and Thomas Jay Oord represent diverse Christian explorations of divine communion, participation, panentheism, responsiveness, and noncoercive love. Their contributions demonstrate both the historical depth and contemporary possibilities of relational Christian theology without presuming that all share the same metaphysical foundations.
V. Revelation, Interpretation, and Theological Method
Paul Ricoeur, George Lindbeck, David Tracy, Gordon Kaufman, Walter Brueggemann, and Peter Enns provide resources for reconsidering religious language, doctrinal formation, scriptural interpretation, and constructive theological methodology. Their differing perspectives assist us in distinguishing religious experience from its interpretation and theological confession from its philosophical explanation.
VI. Our Constructive Contribution
Our own investigations published on Relevancy22 represent a complementary but methodologically distinct undertaking. Rather than beginning with inherited Christian doctrine as the foundational explanation of reality, we have sought to develop an independent relational ontology and metaphysics before undertaking a specifically Christian theological reconstruction.
Our indebtedness to these authors does not require reproducing their philosophical or theological systems. Rather, their contributions provide historical orientation, intellectual companionship, critical contrasts, and constructive resources for our continuing investigations.
Ultimately, our purpose is to develop a relational Christian worldview whose philosophical foundations remain independently accountable, whose Christian confessions retain their religious integrity, and whose theological understandings encourage loving and responsible participation within an unfinished creation.
This appendix provides three complementary timelines: the human species and close hominin relatives associated with the Paleolithic; the archaeological cultures of the Mesolithic and related Epipaleolithic periods; and the emerging settlements, farming societies, and ceremonial traditions of the Neolithic.
These classifications do not represent three universal stages through which every human community passed at the same time. Their boundaries varied substantially by geographical region, ecological circumstances, and archaeological convention. Species also overlapped chronologically, while cultural development occurred through diverse and sometimes independent histories.
The purpose of these timelines is therefore not to present human development as an inevitable progression toward civilization or religion. It is to establish the historical depth and geographical diversity of the experiences, practices, memories, and interpretations from which later religious traditions eventually emerged.
Approximately 3.3 million years ago to the end of the last Ice Age, with regional variation.
The Paleolithic, or Old Stone Age, encompasses most of humanity's known technological prehistory. Archaeologists commonly distinguish Lower, Middle, and Upper Paleolithic phases, although these divisions developed primarily within particular regional archaeological traditions.
A. Lower Paleolithic - Early Hominins and the Development of Stone TechnologyApproximately 3.3 million to 300,000 years ago, using a broad chronological framework.
| Hominin species or group | Approximate dates | Geographical distribution and significance |
|---|---|---|
| Australopithecus species | ~4.2–1.9 million years ago, across different species | Eastern and southern Africa. Early bipedal hominins, some overlapping chronologically with the first known stone technologies. |
| Paranthropus species | ~2.7–1.2 million years ago | Eastern and southern Africa. Robust-jawed hominins adapted to varied diets and ecological environments. |
| Homo habilis | ~2.4–1.4 million years ago | Eastern Africa. Associated with early stone-tool traditions, especially Oldowan technologies. |
| Homo rudolfensis | ~2.4–1.8 million years ago | Eastern Africa. An early Homo species whose classification and evolutionary relationships remain debated. |
| Homo erectus / Homo ergaster | ~1.9 million–110,000 years ago | Africa and Asia. Associated with long-distance dispersal, Acheulean tools in many regions, and evidence of increasingly complex ecological adaptation. |
| Homo antecessor | ~1.2 million–800,000 years ago | Europe, particularly Atapuerca, Spain. An early European human species whose evolutionary relationships remain disputed. |
| Homo heidelbergensis | ~700,000–200,000 years ago | Africa and Europe under conventional classifications. Associated with large-game hunting, wooden spears, and possible early shelter construction. |
Important archaeological milestone: The Lomekwi 3 stone tools discovered in Kenya date to approximately 3.3 million years ago, predating the earliest widely accepted fossils of the genus Homo. Their makers have not been securely identified.
Broadly 300,000–12,000 years ago, with overlapping populations and regional archaeological phases.
| Human species or population | Approximate dates | Geographical distribution and significance |
|---|---|---|
| Homo neanderthalensis | ~400,000–40,000 years ago | Europe and western Asia. Complex stone technologies, social care, probable deliberate burials in some contexts, and genetic interaction with modern humans. |
| Denisovans | Middle and Late Pleistocene; exact range uncertain | Known primarily from ancient DNA and limited fossils in Asia. Interbred with Neanderthals and Homo sapiens. |
| Homo naledi | ~335,000–236,000 years ago | Southern Africa. Combined anatomical features associated with earlier hominins and the genus Homo. Claims of deliberate funerary activity remain debated. |
| Homo sapiens | ~300,000 years ago–present | Originated in Africa and dispersed across the world. Developed diverse symbolic, technological, artistic, and social traditions. |
| Homo floresiensis | Fossils ~100,000–60,000 years ago; associated tools extend later | Flores, Indonesia. Small-bodied island human species associated with stone-tool production. |
| Homo luzonensis | At least ~67,000–50,000 years ago | Luzon, Philippines. Known from limited fossils with a distinctive combination of anatomical features. |
The Paleolithic witnessed profound changes in human social and technological capacities. These included stone-tool manufacture, hunting and gathering strategies, long-distance migrations, increased cooperation, the use and management of fire, and eventually increasingly visible forms of symbolic communication.
Later Paleolithic archaeological evidence includes ornaments, pigments, figurative art, musical instruments, and mortuary practices. Such material remains demonstrate that human communities were capable of expressing meanings beyond immediate subsistence, although the precise significance of particular practices cannot always be recovered.
Importantly, these developments were not restricted to a single human species nor a single moment of cognitive transformation. Several hominin populations existed concurrently, and some shared technologies, ecological practices, and genetic relationships.
Historical significance: Human interpretation of existence preceded written language and organized religious institutions by immense spans of time.
Approximately 12,500–4000 BCE in a broad comparative framework, with considerable regional variation.
The Mesolithic, or Middle Stone Age in the European archaeological sequence, refers broadly to cultural developments associated with the transition from the last glacial period into the Holocene.
In Southwest Asia, archaeologists frequently use the term Epipaleolithic for related late hunter-gatherer developments preceding the Pre-Pottery Neolithic. These classifications should not be applied indiscriminately to Africa or Asia, where different regional archaeological systems are used.
By this period, Homo sapiens were the only surviving human species known to have persisted into the Holocene. Mesolithic distinctions therefore concern regional cultural practices rather than separate human species.
| Region | Archaeological cultures or traditions | Approximate chronology | Cultural characteristics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Levant and Southwest Asia | Kebaran and Natufian | ~20,000–9500 BCE, broadly | Wild cereal harvesting, microlithic tools, intensified settlement, communal practices, and early sedentary lifeways, especially among Natufian communities. |
| Northern Europe and Scandinavia | Maglemosian, Kongemose, Ertebølle | ~9000–4000 BCE | Forest, freshwater, and coastal adaptations; fishing equipment, watercraft, shell middens, and pottery among some later communities. |
| Western and Central Europe | Azilian, Sauveterrian, Tardenoisian | ~12,000–5000 BCE, regionally | Adaptation to postglacial environments, geometric microliths, hunting technologies, and distinctive symbolic objects. |
| Southeastern Europe | Iron Gates Mesolithic and Lepenski Vir | ~9500–5500 BCE, broadly | Danube fishing communities, increasingly settled occupations, distinctive architecture, and carved sandstone sculptures. |
| North Africa | Iberomaurusian and Capsian | ~20,000–6000 BCE, across different traditions | Microlithic technologies, varied hunting and gathering practices, shell and snail remains, mortuary activity, and regional cultural adaptation. |
| South Asia | Bhimbetka and Bagor archaeological traditions | Late Pleistocene through Holocene phases | Rock art, microlithic technologies, hunting and gathering, with some later transitions toward animal management and pastoralism. |
| East Asia | Incipient and Initial Jōmon, Japan | From approximately 14,000–5000 BCE | Early pottery, fishing, gathering, woodland resource use, and increasingly settled communities, without immediate dependence upon agriculture. |
Note: The Green Sahara, or African Humid Period, provided changing ecological opportunities for populations in northern Africa, especially during the early and middle Holocene. It should not be treated as the uniform environment of all Iberomaurusian and Capsian communities. Likewise, the Jōmon sequence is a Japanese regional classification rather than a conventional European-style Mesolithic culture.
B. Climatic and Ecological TransformationsThe Mesolithic and related Epipaleolithic developments occurred during substantial changes in global climate and geography.
| Climatic or geological event | Approximate date | Human significance |
|---|---|---|
| Last Glacial Maximum | ~26,500–19,000 years ago | Extensive ice sheets, lowered sea levels, exposed continental shelves, and altered migration routes. |
| Late-glacial warming | Especially after ~14,700 years ago | Changing vegetation, retreating ice sheets, and expanding ecological opportunities. |
| Younger Dryas | ~12,900–11,700 years ago | Renewed cooling, especially in North Atlantic regions, with varied regional consequences. |
| Beginning of the Holocene | ~9700 BCE | Warmer interglacial conditions, changing coastlines, expanded forests in many regions, and new ecological circumstances for human communities. |
| Early-to-middle Holocene environmental changes | ~9700–4000 BCE, regionally | Shifting rainfall, river systems, vegetation, coastlines, and opportunities for increasingly settled lifeways. |
Mesolithic communities inherited the biological and cultural capacities developed across the preceding Paleolithic. These capacities were expressed within changing ecological environments, technological practices, and increasingly differentiated regional communities.
In some regions, substantial settlements and elaborate communal or mortuary practices developed before the widespread adoption of agriculture. The Natufian cultural tradition in the Levant provides an important example of this process.
Such developments challenge any simple assumption that sophisticated symbolic or ceremonial life emerged only after the introduction of farming.
Historical significance: The Mesolithic demonstrates that human symbolic expression, communal memory, and ritual possibilities continued developing within diverse hunter-gatherer societies, sometimes alongside increasingly permanent settlements and intensified resource management.
Beginning approximately 10,000 BCE in Southwest Asia, with later and geographically diverse developments elsewhere.
The Neolithic, or New Stone Age, is conventionally associated with the development of cultivated food resources, domesticated animals, more permanent settlements, expanded communal institutions, and changing technologies.
These developments did not occur simultaneously. Nor did every Neolithic society possess all these characteristics from its earliest phases. In several regions, substantial settlements, ceremonial architecture, pottery, or intensive food gathering appeared before fully developed agricultural systems.
A. Early Neolithic Cultures of Southwest Asia
| Culture, site, or archaeological phase | Approximate dates | Region | Principal developments |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-Pottery Neolithic A (PPNA) | ~9700–8800 BCE | Levant and Upper Mesopotamia | Early cultivation, increased sedentism, communal buildings, and developing village societies. |
| Göbekli Tepe and Taş Tepeler | Beginning ~9600 BCE | Southeastern Anatolia / Upper Mesopotamia | Monumental stone enclosures, carved animal imagery, and elaborate communal ceremonial architecture. |
| Jericho / Tell es-Sultan | Neolithic settlement from the tenth–ninth millennia BCE | Southern Levant | Permanent settlement, communal architecture, early monumental construction, and changing mortuary practices. |
| Pre-Pottery Neolithic B (PPNB) | ~8800–7000 BCE, regionally | Levant and surrounding regions | Expansion of farming villages, increasing reliance on domesticated plants and animals, and distinctive household and mortuary traditions. |
| Çayönü and related settlements | Approximately tenth–seventh millennia BCE | Southeastern Anatolia | Changing domestic architecture, agriculture, animal management, and communal structures. |
| Çatalhöyük | ~7400–6200 BCE for its principal eastern Neolithic settlement | Central Anatolia | Large, closely packed settlement; household rituals, burials, wall paintings, and symbolic art. |
| Culture or site | Approximate dates | Region | Principal developments |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hassuna culture | ~6500–6000 BCE | Northern Mesopotamia | Agricultural villages, pottery production, and established settlement traditions. |
| Samarra culture | ~6200–5700 BCE | Central and northern Mesopotamia | Pottery traditions, farming settlements, and developing irrigation practices. |
| Halaf culture | ~6100–5100 BCE | Northern Mesopotamia and Syria | Distinctive painted pottery, village networks, and specialized cultural practices. |
| Ubaid culture | ~6200–4000 BCE, across regional phases | Mesopotamia | Agricultural settlements, irrigation, increasingly elaborate communal and temple institutions, and important foundations for later urban development. |
| Mehrgarh | From approximately the seventh millennium BCE | Present-day Pakistan | Early farming communities, animal domestication, mudbrick construction, and technological developments preceding Indus urban civilization. |
| Vinča culture | ~5700–4500 BCE | Southeastern Europe | Large settlements, ceramics, figurines, distinctive symbols, and craft production. |
| Cucuteni–Trypillia culture | ~5500–2750 BCE | Eastern Europe | Expanding settlements, painted ceramics, specialized crafts, and exceptionally large later settlements. |
Note. The Ubaid culture and some other later traditions extend into periods commonly classified as Chalcolithic, or Copper Age, rather than remaining exclusively Neolithic. They are included because they illustrate the transition from established village societies toward more complex institutions.
C. The Neolithic Transition Toward Urban CivilizationNeolithic development did not culminate universally in cities. Many farming villages remained comparatively small, while other communities expanded into increasingly complex settlement systems.
In southern Mesopotamia, however, developments associated with later Ubaid and Uruk societies contributed to the growth of substantial urban centers during the fourth millennium BCE.
| Development | Approximate date | Historical significance |
|---|---|---|
| Early Southwest Asian cultivation and settlement | Tenth–ninth millennia BCE | Expansion of village life and cultivation practices in some regions. |
| Domestication and established farming economies | Ninth–seventh millennia BCE, regionally | Increasing reliance upon cultivated crops and managed or domesticated animals. |
| Mesopotamian village networks and Ubaid institutions | Sixth–fifth millennia BCE | Growing settlement integration, irrigation, specialized production, and communal institutions. |
| Uruk urban expansion | Fourth millennium BCE | Large cities, monumental buildings, economic specialization, and increasingly extensive administrative systems. |
| Early Mesopotamian writing | ~3400–3200 BCE | Administrative records eventually opening the way for written literary, historical, and religious traditions. |
| Early Dynastic Sumer | ~2900–2350 BCE | Developed city-states, royal institutions, temple economies, and increasingly accessible written traditions. |
D. Neolithic Religious and Cultural Significance
The Neolithic was not the birthplace of religious consciousness. Nevertheless, changing forms of settlement, subsistence, and social organization created additional contexts through which inherited symbolic practices and communal understandings could be expressed.
Monumental buildings, household burials, figurines, carved imagery, ceremonial installations, and changing mortuary practices indicate increasingly visible forms of symbolic and communal activity.
Sites such as Göbekli Tepe demonstrate that elaborate ceremonial structures could arise within societies still substantially dependent upon hunting and gathering. Other communities, including those at Çatalhöyük, expressed symbolic and mortuary practices within enduring domestic environments.
These developments do not demonstrate a universal progression from animism to polytheism, from ritual to theology, or from presumed primitive belief to supposedly advanced religion. They show instead that human cultures developed numerous ways of organizing, interpreting, and expressing their experiences of existence.
Historical significance: The Neolithic contributed important social, ecological, technological, and institutional conditions through which older human symbolic practices could be reconstructed into the increasingly elaborate communal traditions preceding literate civilizations.
| Approximate period | Major developments | Historical interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3 million years ago | Earliest widely recognized stone tools at Lomekwi | Technological behavior predates the genus Homo. |
| 2.4–1.4 million years ago | Early Homo species and Oldowan technologies | Diversification of toolmaking and ecological adaptation. |
| 1.9 million–300,000 years ago | Expansion of Homo erectus and other human lineages | Dispersal, technological change, and increasing human diversity. |
| ~300,000 years ago | Early Homo sapiens in Africa | Emergence of our species within a wider and overlapping hominin history. |
| ~120,000–40,000 years ago | Expanding evidence of symbolic and social complexity | Diverse forms of ornamentation, mortuary practices, technologies, and cultural expression. |
| ~26,500–19,000 years ago | Last Glacial Maximum | Major geographical and ecological constraints on human populations. |
| ~20,000–10,000 BCE | Late Paleolithic and regional Epipaleolithic traditions | Intensified resource use, cultural diversification, and settlement changes. |
| ~12,900–9700 BCE | Younger Dryas cooling | Significant climatic disruption preceding the Holocene. |
| ~9700 BCE | Beginning of Holocene | Warming and ecological transformations across many regions. |
| ~9700–7000 BCE | Early Neolithic developments in Southwest Asia | Cultivation, domestication, settlements, and monumental communal structures. |
| ~7500–5000 BCE | Expansion and diversification of Neolithic societies | Agricultural villages, ceremonial traditions, pottery, and specialized production. |
| ~6200–4000 BCE | Ubaid and related developments | Growing settlement systems and institutional foundations of southern Mesopotamian urbanism. |
| ~4000–3100 BCE | Uruk urban expansion | Large cities, administration, monumental architecture, and early writing. |
| ~2900 BCE onward | Early Dynastic Sumer and subsequent Mesopotamian states | Increasingly documented political, literary, and religious traditions. |
These chronological timelines demonstrate that the religious and philosophical inheritances eventually encountered in the ancient Near East arose within a much longer and more diverse history of human becoming.
Across millions of years, human and earlier hominin populations evolved within changing ecological environments. Over successive generations, communities developed technologies, social relationships, symbolic practices, and increasingly differentiated cultural traditions. Some became more enduring, while others disappeared or were transformed through migration, environmental disruption, population movement, and cultural encounter.
The emergence of agriculture, permanent settlements, monumental structures, and eventually written traditions did not initiate humanity's capacity for meaning-making. Rather, these developments provided new conditions through which older capacities for experiencing and interpreting reality could be extended, preserved, institutionalized, and reconstructed.
Nor does archaeological evidence establish that particular prehistoric communities experienced divine realities corresponding to the later descriptions of their religious descendants. The historical evidence allows us to investigate human practices and interpretations; which means that the existence and nature of divine reality remain separate philosophical and theological questions.
This is the distinction that makes these timelines relevant to Essay 8A. Christian theology did not arise independently of human cultural history. It inherited increasingly elaborate traditions of religious interpretation, some preserved in Scripture and others incorporated through subsequent philosophical and theological development.
Consequently, understanding the history of humanity's religious expressions helps us recognize the historically conditioned character of theological explanation without presuming to settle the independent question of reality itself.
It is precisely here that our distinction between philosophy and theology becomes important: the historical development of religious belief is evidence of how human beings have interpreted reality, but it does not, by itself, establish the ultimate character of the reality being interpreted..
I. The Inherited Christian Distinction Between General and Special Revelation
Traditional Christian theology has distinguished between general revelation, through which God becomes recognizable within creation, and special revelation, through which God communicates distinctively through selected individuals, historical events, Jesus Christ, and Scripture. Our relational Christian theology questions whether this distinction is metaphysically necessary.
II. Divine Inspiration as the Ordinary Activity of God
If God is relationally responsive and generative love, then divine inspiration may be understood as the ordinary, everyday communication of God throughout creation. The Holy Spirit participates continuously and non-coercively within naturally occurring reality rather than through exceptional supernatural activity.
III. Universal Inspiration Within Human and Nonhuman Creation
Divine participation extends throughout human and nonhuman existence, irrespective of religious belief, consciousness, or species. Its reception and expression differ according to the relational capacities and circumstances of creation's participants. Divine communication does not depend upon its recipients recognizing it as divine.
IV. From Inspiration to Experience, Interpretation, and Expression
Within human experience, inspiration may find expression through intuition, illumination, conscience, imagination, discovery, and inference. Yet we cannot independently distinguish divine participation from the naturally occurring processes through which these experiences arise. Inspiration neither guarantees the accuracy of its interpretation nor independently authenticates its perceived source.
V. Scripture as Historically Preserved Religious Witness
Scripture may therefore be understood as a historically preserved collection of religious beliefs, experiences, memories, and interpretations surviving through personal testimony, communal transmission, literary composition, institutional selection, and subsequent reinterpretation. Its religious significance need not require a metaphysically privileged mode of divine communication.
VI. The Problem of Presumed Divine Communication and Human Corruption
Nor must we presume that an originally perfect divine communication became corrupted through imperfect human recipients. Such an explanation retains an unverifiable premise while attempting to account for Scripture's historical, theological, and moral difficulties. Our relational alternative recognizes these difficulties as belonging to the human processes of religious interpretation rather than to God.
VII. Special Revelation and the Authorization of Religious Authority
Claims of special revelation may also authorize religious institutions and their teachings in ways comparable to ancient kingship's claims of divine appointment and supremacy of rule. Although sincerely held, such claims can invest historically conditioned interpretations with unquestionable authority, protecting religious institutions from necessary criticism, revision, and moral accountability.
VIII. Inspiration Without Epistemic or Religious Privilege
No religious community possesses exclusive access to divine communication. Not Jewish, Christian, Islamic, et cetera. What is distinctive is not God's manner of communication but the circumstances, experiences, interpretations, and consequences arising through humanity's participation in God's universally communicative presence. Consequently, Christianity's particular confession of Jesus Christ as God incarnate does not require that God's presence and communication throughout the rest of creation be understood as lesser, secondary, or less authentically divine.
Conclusion - A Continuously Communicative God Within an Unfinished Creation
Within our relational Christian theology, inspiration is universal in its divine availability, relationally differentiated in its reception, historically conditioned in its interpretation, and never self-authenticating in its claims to truth.
This remains a theological interpretation of relational reality rather than a conclusion independently established by ERR/GRR. Consequently, in Christian terms:
God is not occasionally communicative. God is enduringly communicative because God is enduringly relational. Divine inspiration expresses the continuing generative love of God's own Self throughout an unfinished creation.

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