According to some Christian outlooks we were made for another world. Perhaps, rather, we were made for this world to recreate, reclaim, redeem, and renew unto God's future aspiration by the power of His Spirit. - R.E. Slater
Secularization theory has been massively falsified. We don't live in an age of secularity. We live in an age of explosive, pervasive religiosity... an age of religious pluralism. - Peter L. Berger
Exploring the edge of life and faith in a post-everything world. - Todd Littleton
I don't need another reason to believe, your love is all around for me to see. – anon
Thou art our need; and in giving us more of thyself thou givest us all. - Khalil Gibran, Prayer XXIII
Be careful what you pretend to be. You become what you pretend to be. - Kurt Vonnegut
Religious beliefs, far from being primary, are often shaped and adjusted by our social goals. - Jim Forest
People, even more than things, need to be restored, renewed, revived, reclaimed, and redeemed; never throw out anyone. – anon
Certainly God's love has made fools of us all. - R.E. Slater
An apocalyptic Christian faith doesn't wait for Jesus to come, but for Jesus to become in our midst. - R.E. Slater
Christian belief in God begins with the cross and resurrection of Jesus, not with rational apologetics. - Eberhard Jüngel, Jürgen Moltmann
Our knowledge of God is through the 'I-Thou' encounter, not in finding God at the end of a syllogism or argument. There is a grave danger in any Christian treatment of God as an object. The God of Jesus Christ and Scripture is irreducibly subject and never made as an object, a force, a power, or a principle that can be manipulated. - Emil Brunner
Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh means "I will be that who I have yet to become." - God (Ex 3.14)
Our job is to love others without stopping to inquire whether or not they are worthy. - Thomas Merton
The church is God's world-changing social experiment of bringing unlikes and differents to the Eucharist/Communion table to share life with one another as a new kind of family. When this happens we show to the world what love, justice, peace, reconciliation, and life together is designed by God to be. The church is God's show-and-tell for the world to see how God wants us to live as a blended, global, polypluralistic family united with one will, by one Lord, and baptized by one Spirit. – anon
The cross that is planted at the heart of the history of the world cannot be uprooted. - Jacques Ellul
The Unity in whose loving presence the universe unfolds is inside each person as a call to welcome the stranger, protect animals and the earth, respect the dignity of each person, think new thoughts, and help bring about ecological civilizations. - John Cobb & Farhan A. Shah
If you board the wrong train it is of no use running along the corridors of the train in the other direction. - Dietrich Bonhoeffer
God's justice is restorative rather than punitive; His discipline is merciful rather than punishing; His power is made perfect in weakness; and His grace is sufficient for all. – anon
Our little [biblical] systems have their day; they have their day and cease to be. They are but broken lights of Thee, and Thou, O God art more than they. - Alfred Lord Tennyson

Saturday, September 2, 2017

Definitions of Continental Philosophy






Continental Philosophy refers to a set of traditions of 19th and 20th Century philosophy in mainland Europe. It is a general term for those philosophical schools and movements not included under the label Analytic Philosophy, which was the other, largely Anglophone, main philosophical tradition of the period.

As a movement, Continental Philosophy lacks clear definition, and may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views, its main purpose being to distinguish itself from Analytic Philosophy, although the term was used as early as 1840 by John Stuart Mill to distinguish European Kant-influenced thought from the more British-based movements such as British Empiricism and Utilitarianism.

Continental Philosophy, then, is a catch-all label incorporating such Continental European-based schools as German Idealism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, Romanticism, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Marxism, Deconstructionism, Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, Hermeneutics, French Feminism, and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School.

Although many consider that the distinction between Continental and Analytic Philosophy is misleading or even worthless, some common "Continental" themes can be identified:
  • It generally rejects Scientism (the view that the natural sciences are the best or most accurate way of understanding all phenomena).
  • It tends towards Historicism in its view of possible experience as variable, and determined at least partly by factors such as context, space and time, language, culture and history.
  • It typically holds that conscious human agency can change these conditions of possible experience, and tend to see their philosophical inquiries as closely related to personal, moral, or political transformation.
  • It tends to emphasize metaphilosophy (the study of the subject and matter, methods and aims of philosophy itself, or the "philosophy of philosophy").





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Continental philosophy

Continental philosophy is a set of 19th- and 20th-century philosophical traditions from mainland Europe.[1][2] This sense of the term originated among English-speaking philosophers in the second half of the 20th century, who used it to refer to a range of thinkers and traditions outside the analytic movement. Continental philosophy includes the following movements: German idealismphenomenology, existentialism (and its antecedents, such as the thought of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), hermeneuticsstructuralismpost-structuralismFrench feminismpsychoanalytic theory, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and related branches of Western Marxism.[3]

It is difficult to identify non-trivial claims that would be common to all the preceding philosophical movements. The term "continental philosophy", like "analytic philosophy", lacks clear definition and may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views. Simon Glendinning has suggested that the term was originally more pejorative than descriptive, functioning as a label for types of western philosophy rejected or disliked by analytic philosophers.[4]Nonetheless, Michael E. Rosen has ventured to identify common themes that typically characterize continental philosophy.[5]

  • First, continental philosophers generally reject the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding natural phenomena. This contrasts with many analytic philosophers who consider their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences. Continental philosophers often argue that science depends upon a "pre-theoretical substrate of experience" (a version of Kantian conditions of possible experience or the phenomenological "lifeworld") and that scientific methods are inadequate to fully understand such conditions of intelligibility.[6]
  • Second, continental philosophy usually considers these conditions of possible experience as variable: determined at least partly by factors such as context, space and time, language, culture, or history. Thus continental philosophy tends toward historicism (or historicity). Where analytic philosophy tends to treat philosophy in terms of discrete problems, capable of being analyzed apart from their historical origins (much as scientists consider the history of science inessential to scientific inquiry), continental philosophy typically suggests that "philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence".[7]
  • Third, continental philosophy typically holds that human agency can change these conditions of possible experience: "if human experience is a contingent creation, then it can be recreated in other ways".[8] Thus continental philosophers tend to take a strong interest in the unity of theory and practice, and often see their philosophical inquiries as closely related to personal, moral, or political transformation. This tendency is very clear in the Marxist tradition ("philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it"), but is also central in existentialism and post-structuralism.
  • A final characteristic trait of continental philosophy is an emphasis on metaphilosophy. In the wake of the development and success of the natural sciences, continental philosophers have often sought to redefine the method and nature of philosophy.[9] In some cases (such as German idealism or phenomenology), this manifests as a renovation of the traditional view that philosophy is the first, foundational, a priori science. In other cases (such as hermeneutics, critical theory, or structuralism), it is held that philosophy investigates a domain that is irreducibly cultural or practical. And some continental philosophers (such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, the later Heidegger, or Derrida) doubt whether any conception of philosophy can coherently achieve its stated goals.
Ultimately, the foregoing themes derive from a broadly Kantian thesis that knowledge, experience, and reality are bound and shaped by conditions best understood through philosophical reflection rather than exclusively empirical inquiry.[10]

Contents


The term

The term "continental philosophy", in the above sense, was first widely used by English-speaking philosophers to describe university courses in the 1970s, emerging as a collective name for the philosophies then widespread in France and Germany, such as phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, and post-structuralism.[11]

However, the term (and its approximate sense) can be found at least as early as 1840, in John Stuart Mill's 1840 essay on Coleridge, where Mill contrasts the Kantian-influenced thought of "Continental philosophy" and "Continental philosophers" with the English empiricism of Bentham and the 18th century generally.[12] This notion gained prominence in the early 20th century as figures such as Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore advanced a vision of philosophy closely allied with natural science, progressing through logical analysis. This tradition, which has come to be known broadly as "analytic philosophy", became dominant in Britain and the United States from roughly 1930 onward. Russell and Moore made a dismissal of Hegelianism and its philosophical relatives a distinctive part of their new movement.[13]Commenting on the history of the distinction in 1945, Russell distinguished "two schools of philosophy, which may be broadly distinguished as the Continental and the British respectively", a division he saw as operative "from the time of Locke".[14]

Since the 1970s, however, many philosophers in the United States and Britain have taken interest in continental philosophers since Kant, and the philosophical traditions in many European countries have similarly incorporated many aspects of the "analytic" movement. Self-described analytic philosophy flourishes in France, including philosophers such as Jules VuilleminVincent DescombesGilles Gaston GrangerFrançois Recanati, and Pascal Engel. Likewise, self-described "continental philosophers" can be found in philosophy departments in the United Kingdom, North America, and Australia,[15] and some well-known analytic philosophers claim to conduct better scholarship on continental philosophy than self-identified programs in continental philosophy, particularly at the level of graduate education.[16]"Continental philosophy" is thus defined in terms of a family of philosophical traditions and influences rather than a geographic distinction.

History

The history of continental philosophy (taken in its narrower sense) is usually thought to begin with German idealism.[17] Led by figures like FichteSchelling, and later Hegel, German idealism developed out of the work of Immanuel Kant in the 1780s and 1790s and was closely linked with romanticism and the revolutionary politics of the Enlightenment. Besides the central figures listed above, important contributors to German idealism also included Friedrich Heinrich JacobiGottlob Ernst SchulzeKarl Leonhard Reinhold, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.

As the institutional roots of "continental philosophy" in many cases directly descend from those of phenomenology,[18] Edmund Husserl has always been a canonical figure in continental philosophy. Nonetheless, Husserl is also a respected subject of study in the analytic tradition.[19] Husserl's notion of a noema, the non-psychological content of thought, his correspondence with Gottlob Frege, and his investigations into the nature of logic continue to generate interest among analytic philosophers.

J. G. Merquior[20] argued that a distinction between analytic and continental philosophies can be first clearly identified with Henri Bergson (1859–1941), whose wariness of science and elevation of intuitionpaved the way for existentialism. Merquior wrote: "the most prestigious philosophizing in France took a very dissimilar path [from the Anglo-Germanic analytic schools]. One might say it all began with Henri Bergson."

An illustration of some important differences between "analytic" and "continental" styles of philosophy can be found in Rudolf Carnap's "Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language" (Originally published in 1932 as "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache"), a paper some observers[who?] have described as particularly polemical. Carnap's paper argues that Heidegger's lecture "What Is Metaphysics?" violates logical syntax to create nonsensical pseudo-statements.[21] Moreover, Carnap claimed that many German metaphysicians of the era were similar to Heidegger in writing statements that were not merely false, but devoid of any meaning.

With the rise of Nazism, many of Germany's philosophers, especially those of Jewish descent or leftist or liberal political sympathies (such as many in the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School), fled to the English-speaking world. Those philosophers who remained—if they remained in academia at all—had to reconcile themselves to Nazi control of the universities. Others, such as Martin Heidegger, among the most prominent German philosophers to stay in Germany, embraced Nazism when it came to power.

Both before and after World War II there was a growth of interest in German philosophy in France. A new interest in communism translated into an interest in Marx and Hegel, who became for the first time studied extensively in the politically conservative French university system of the Third Republic. At the same time the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger became increasingly influential, perhaps owing to its resonances with French philosophies which placed great stock in the first-person perspective (an idea found in divergent forms such as Cartesianism, spiritualism, and Bergsonism). Most important in this popularization of phenomenology was the author and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who called his philosophy existentialism. (See 20th-century French philosophy.) Another major strain of continental thought is structuralism/post-structuralism. Influenced by the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, French anthropologists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss began to apply the structural paradigm to the humanities. In the 1960s and '70s, post-structuralists developed various critiques of structuralism. Post-structuralist thinkers include Jacques LacanJacques DerridaMichel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.

Recent Anglo-American developments

From the early 20th century until the 1960s, continental philosophers were only intermittently discussed in British and American universities, despite an influx of continental philosophers, particularly German Jewish students of Nietzsche and Heidegger, to the United States on account of the persecution of the Jews and later World War IIHannah ArendtLeo StraussTheodor W. Adorno, and Walter Kaufmann are probably the most notable of this wave, arriving in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, philosophy departments began offering courses in continental philosophy in the late 1960s and 1970s. With the rise of postmodernism in the 1970s and 1980s, some British and American philosophers became more vocally opposed to the methods and conclusions of continental philosophers. For example, John Searle[22]criticized Derrida's deconstruction for "obvious and manifest intellectual weaknesses". Later, Barry Smith and assorted signatories protested against the award of an honorary degree to Derrida by Cambridge University.[23]

American university departments in literature, the fine arts, film, sociology, and political theory have increasingly incorporated ideas and arguments from continental philosophers into their curricula and research. Continental Philosophy features prominently in a number of British and Irish Philosophy departments, for instance at the University of Essex, Warwick, Sussex and Dundee, Manchester Metropolitan, Kingston University, Staffordshire University and University College Dublin, and in North American Philosophy departments, including the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, Boston College, Stony Brook University (SUNY), Vanderbilt University, DePaul University, Villanova University, the University of Guelph, The New School, Pennsylvania State University, University of Oregon, Emory University, Duquesne University, the University of Memphis, University of King's College, and Loyola University Chicago. The most prominent organization for continental philosophy in the United States is the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (known as SPEP).[24]

The rise of Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy can be interpreted both as a prophylactic and a therapeutic movement: on the one hand, Whitehead's life and thought show that analytic rigor and speculative imagination can work together; on the other hand, Whiteheadian scholarship has sometimes provided bridges between these fields.[25]

Significant works


·        A Cyborg Manifesto
·        After Theory
·        A Theory of Feelings
·        Being and Event
·        Being and Nothingness
·        Being and Time
·        Blindness and Insight
·        Dialectic of Enlightenment
·        Difference and Repetition
·        Eclipse of Reason
·        Eros and Civilization
·        Gender Trouble
·        Madness and Civilization
·        Minima Moralia
·        Mythologies
·        Negative Dialectics
·        Homo Sacer
·        I and Thou
·        Illuminations
·        Logical Investigations
·        One-Dimensional Man
·        Oneself as Another
·        Of Grammatology
·        Prison Notebooks
·        Phenomenology of Perception
·        The Phenomenology of Spirit
·        Reading Capital
·        Simulacra and Simulation
·        Society of the Spectacle
·        Technics and Time
·        The History of Sexuality
·        The Human Condition
·        The Myth of Sisyphus
·        The Order of Things
·        The Poetics of Space
·        The Postmodern Condition
·        The Second Sex
·        The Third Body
·        Time and Narrative
·        Totality and Infinity
·        Truth and Method
·        Writing and Difference


See also


·        Existential Thomism
·        Non-philosophy
·        Speculative realism



Notes

1.      Leiter 2007, p. 2: "As a first approximation, we might say that philosophy in Continental Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is best understood as a connected weave of traditions, some of which overlap, but no one of which dominates all the others."

2.      Critchley, Simon (1998), "Introduction: what is continental philosophy?", in Critchley, Simon; Schroder, William, A Companion to Continental Philosophy, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p. 4.

3.      The above list includes only those movements common to both lists compiled by Critchley 2001, p. 13 and Glendinning 2006, pp. 58–65

4.      Glendinning 2006, p. 12.

5.      The following list of four traits is adapted from Rosen, Michael, "Continental Philosophy from Hegel", in Grayling, A.C., Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject, p. 665

6.      Critchley 2001, p. 115.
7.      Critchley 2001, p. 57.
8.      Critchley 2001, p. 64.

9.      Leiter 2007, p. 4: "While forms of philosophical naturalism have been dominant in Anglophone philosophy, the vast majority of authors within the Continental traditions insist on the distinctiveness of philosophical methods and their priority to those of the natural sciences."

10.  Continental philosophers usually identify such conditions with the transcendental subject or self: Solomon 1988, p. 6, "It is with Kant that philosophical claims about the self attain new and remarkable proportions. The self becomes not just the focus of attention but the entire subject-matter of philosophy. The self is not just another entity in the world, but in an important sense it creates the world, and the reflecting self does not just know itself, but in knowing itself knows all selves, and the structure of any and every possible self."

11.  Critchley 2001, p. 38.

12.  Mill, John Stuart (1950). On Bentham and Coleridge. Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper & Row. pp. 104, 133, 155.

13.  Russell, Bertrand (1959). My Philosophical Development. London: Allen & Unwin. p. 62. Hegelians had all kinds of arguments to prove this or that was not 'real'. Number, space, time, matter, were all professedly convicted of being self-contradictory. Nothing was real, so we were assured, except the Absolute, which could think only of itself since there was nothing else for it to think of and which thought eternally the sort of things that idealist philosophers thought in their books.

14.  B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, (Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 643 and 641. Russell proposes the following broad points of distinction between Continental and British types of philosophy: (1) in method, deductive system-building vs. piecemeal induction; (2) in metaphysics, rationalist theology vs. metaphysical agnosticism; (3) in ethics, non-naturalist deontology vs. naturalist hedonism; and (4) in politics, authoritarianism vs. liberalism. Ibid., pp. 643-647.

15.  See, e.g., Walter Brogan and James Risser (eds.), American Continental Philosophy: A Reader (Indiana University Press, 2000).

16.  Brian Leiter is most commonly associated with such claims.

17.  Critchley 2001 and Solomon 1988 date the origins of continental philosophy a generation earlier, to the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau

18.  E.g., the largest academic organization devoted to furthering the study of continental philosophy is the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.

19.  Kenny, Anthony (ed). The Oxford Illustrated History of Western PhilosophyISBN 0-19-285440-2

20.  Merquior, J.G. (1987). Foucault (Fontana Modern Masters series), University of California Press, ISBN 0-520-06062-8.


22.  Searle, John R. "Word Turned Upside Down." New York Times Review of Books, Volume 30, Number 16 · October 27, 1983.

23.  Barry Smith et al. Open letter against Derrida receiving an honorary doctorate from Cambridge University , The Times(London), Saturday 9 May 1992


25.  See Michel Weber, « Much Ado About Duckspeak », Balkan Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 135-142; « Whitehead's creative advance from formal to existential ontology », Logique et Analyse, 54/214, juin 2011, Special Issue on Whitehead’s Early Work, pp. 127-133.

References

·        Babich, Babette (2003). "On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, Heidegger’s Speaking Language, and Philosophy." In: C. G. Prado, ed., A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Amherst, NY: Prometheus/Humanity Books. pp. 63–103.

·        Critchley, Simon (2001). Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-285359-7.

·        Cutrofello, Andrew (2005). Continental Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. New York; Abingdon: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

·        Glendinning, Simon (2006). The idea of continental philosophy: a philosophical chronicle. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.

·        Leiter, Brian; Rosen, Michael, eds. (2007). The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

·        Schrift, Alan D. (2010). The History of Continental Philosophy. Chicago; Illinois: University of Chicago Press Press.

·        Solomon, Robert C. (1988). Continental philosophy since 1750: the rise and fall of the self. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

·        Kenny, Anthony (2007). A New History of Western Philosophy, Volume IV: Philosophy in the Modern World. New York: Oxford University Press.


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Continental philosophy


Continental philosophy, as the phrase is used today, refers to a set of traditions of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy from mainland Europe.[1] Continental philosophy includes the following movements: German idealismphenomenologyexistentialism (and its antecedents, such as the thoughts of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche), hermeneutics, structuralismpost-structuralism, French feminism, and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and some other branches of western Marxism.[2]

The term continental philosophy originated among English-speaking philosophers in the late twentieth century who found it useful for referring to a range of thinkers and traditions that had been largely ignored or neglected by the analytic movement. Conversely, philosophers in the continental tradition have largely ignored analytic philosophy, developed primarily in English speaking countries such as England and the United States.

Contents


Contemporary Western philosophy, thus, has been broadly divided into two trends, continental philosophy and analytic philosophy, each with fundamentally different philosophical concerns, methodologies, styles, and approaches. Today, although the majority of Western philosophers still stand on either side of the two traditions, there is less of a separation or lack of communication between them.

General Characteristics

It is difficult to identify non-trivial claims that would be common to all the preceding philosophical movements. The term "continental philosophy," like "analytic philosophy," lacks clear definition and may mark merely a "family resemblance"[3] across disparate philosophical views. Some scholars have suggested the term may be more pejorative than descriptive, functioning as a label for types of Western philosophy rejected or disliked by analytic philosophers.[4] Nonetheless, some scholars have ventured to identify common themes that typically characterize continental philosophy.[5]

First, continental philosophers generally reject scientism, the view that the natural sciences are the best or most accurate way of understanding all phenomena. Continental philosophers often argue that science depends upon a "pre-theoretical substrate of experience," a form of the Kantianconditions of possible experience, and that scientific methods are inadequate to understand such conditions of intelligibility.[6]

Second, continental philosophy usually considers these conditions of possible experience as variable: determined at least partly by factors such as context, space and time, language, culture, or history. Where analytic philosophy tends to treat philosophy in terms of discrete problems, capable of being analyzed apart from their historical origins (much as scientists consider the history of science inessential to scientific inquiry), continental philosophy typically suggests that "philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence".[7]

Third, continental philosophy typically holds that conscious human agency can change these conditions of possible experience: "if human experience is a contingent creation, then it can be recreated in other ways".[8] Thus continental philosophers tend to take a strong interest in the unity of theory and practice, and tend to see their philosophical inquiries as closely related to personal, moral, or political transformation. This tendency is very clear in the Marxist tradition ("philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it"), but is also central in existentialism and post-structuralism.

A final characteristic trait of continental philosophy is an emphasis on metaphilosophy. In the wake of the development and success of the natural sciences, continental philosophers have often sought to redefine the method and nature of philosophy. In some cases (such as German idealism or phenomenology), this manifests as a renovation of the traditional view that philosophy is the first, foundational, a priori science. In other cases (such as hermeneutics, critical theory, or structuralism), it is held that philosophy investigates a domain that is irreducibly cultural or practical. And in some cases, continental philosophers (such as KierkegaardNietzsche, the later Heidegger, or Derrida) harbor grave doubts about the coherence of any conceptions of philosophy.

Ultimately, the foregoing distinctive traits derive from a broadly Kantian thesis that the nature of knowledge and experience is bound by conditions that are not directly accessible to empirical inquiry.[9]

History

The history of continental philosophy (taken in its narrower sense) is usually thought to begin with German idealism.[10] Led by figures like FichteSchelling, and later Hegel, German idealism developed out of the work of Immanuel Kant in the 1780s and 1790s and was closely linked with both romanticism and the revolutionary politics of the Enlightenment. Besides the central figures listed above, important contributors to German idealism also included Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.

As the institutional roots of "continental philosophy" in many cases directly descend from those of phenomenology,[11] Edmund Husserlhas always been a canonical figure in continental philosophy. Nonetheless, Husserl is also a respected subject of study in the analytic tradition.[12] Husserl's notion of a noema (a non-psychological content of thought), his correspondence with Gottlob Frege, and his investigations into the nature of logic continue to generate interest among analytic philosophers.

A particularly polemical illustration of some differences between "analytic" and "continental" styles of philosophy can be found in Rudolf Carnap's "Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language," which argues that Heidegger's lecture "What Is Metaphysics?" violates logical syntax to create nonsensical pseudo-statements.[13]

Both before and after World War II there was a growth of interest in German philosophy in France. The role of the French Communist Party in liberating France meant that it became, for a brief period, the largest political movement in the country. The attendant interest in communism translated into an interest in Marx and Hegel, who were both studied extensively for the first time in the conservative French university system. Additionally, there was a major trend towards the ideas of Husserl, and toward his former assistant Heidegger. Most important in this popularization of phenomenology was the author and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who called his philosophy existentialism.

The Term

The term "continental philosophy," in the above sense, was first widely used by English-speaking philosophers to describe university courses in the 1970s, emerging as a collective name for the philosophies then widespread in France and Germany, such as phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, and post-structuralism.[14]

However, the term (and its approximate sense) can be found at least as early as 1840, in John Stuart Mill's 1840 essay on Coleridge, where Mill contrasts the Kantian-influenced thought of "Continental philosophy" and "Continental philosophers" with the English empiricism of Bentham and the eighteenth century generally.[15] This notion gained prominence in the early 1900s as figures such as Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore advanced a vision of philosophy closely allied with natural science, progressing through logical analysis. This tradition, which has come to be known broadly as "analytic philosophy," became dominant in Britain and America from roughly 1930 onward.[16] Russell and Moore made a dismissal of Hegelianism and its philosophical relatives a distinctive part of their new movement.[17]

Meanwhile in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century, Franz BrentanoEdmund Husserl, and Reinach were developing a new philosophical method of their own, phenomenologyHeidegger took this phenomenological approach in new directions, and, after World War II, French philosophers led by Jean Paul Sartre developed Heidegger's ideas into a movement known as existentialism. In the 1960s, structuralism became the new vogue in France, followed by poststructuralism.

In general, during the twentieth century, there was relatively limited contact between philosophers working in the Anglophone tradition and philosophers from the European continent working in the traditions of phenomenology, existentialism, and structuralism. Commenting on the history of the distinction in 1945, Russell distinguished "two schools of philosophy, which may be broadly distinguished as the Continental and the British respectively," a division he saw as operative "from the time of Locke".[18]

Since the 1970s, however, many philosophers in America and Britain have taken interest in continental philosophers since Kant, and the philosophical traditions in many European countries have similarly incorporated many aspects of the legacy of the "analytic" movement. Self-described analytic philosophy flourishes in France, including philosophers such as Jules Vuillemin, Vincent Descombes, Gilles Gaston Granger, François Recanati, and Pascal Engel. Likewise, self-described "continental philosophers" can be found in philosophy departments in the United Kingdom, North America, and Australia.[19] "Continental philosophy" is thus defined in terms of a family of philosophical traditions and influences rather than a geographic distinction. It remains relevant that "continental philosophy" is a contested designation, with many analytic philosophers laying claim to offer better "continental philosophy" than traditional continental philosophy, particularly at the level of graduate education.[20]

Continental philosophy in English speaking countries: recent developments

From the early twentieth century until the 1960s, continental philosophers were only intermittently discussed in British and American universities. However, philosophy departments began offering courses in continental philosophy in the late 1960s and 1970s. With post-modernism in the 1970s and 1980s, British and American philosophers became more vocally opposed to the methods and conclusions of continental philosophers. Derrida, for example, was the target of criticism by John Searle and, later, assorted signatories protesting an honorary degree given to Derrida by Cambridge University. Meanwhile, university departments in literature, the fine arts, film, sociology, and political theory have increasingly incorporated ideas and arguments from continental philosophers into their curricula and research. Increasingly, traditionally analytic philosophers are turning to continental themes and figures. The most prominent organization for continental philosophy in the United States is the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (known as SPEP).

See also

Notes

 "As a first approximation, we might say that philosophy in Continental Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is best understood as a connected weave of traditions, some of which overlap, but no one of which dominates all the others." Brian Leiter and Michael Rosen. The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. (Oxford University Press, 2007), 2. See also Simon Critchley and William Schroder, (eds.), A Companion to Continental Philosophy. (Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 4.

 The above list includes only those movements common to both lists compiled by Simon Critchley. Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2001), 13 and Simon Glendinning. The Idea of Continental Philosophy.(Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 58-65.

 Wittgenstein's terminology; similarity in a loose sense.

 Glendinning, 12.

 The following list of four traits is adapted from Michael Rosen, "Continental Philosophy from Hegel," in A.C. Grayling, (ed.), Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 665.

 Simon Critchley. Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. 115.

 Critchley, 57
 Critchley, 64.

 As Robert Solomon notes, continental philosophers usually identify such conditions with the transcendental subject or self: "It is with Kant that philosophical claims about the self attain new and remarkable proportions. The self becomes not just the focus of attention but the entire subject-matter of philosophy. The self is not just another entity in the world, but in an important sense it creates the world, and the reflecting self does not just know itself, but in knowing itself knows all selves, and the structure of any and every possible self." (R. Solomon. Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self. (Oxford University Press, 1988), 6)

 Critchley, 2001; Solomon, 1988, dates the origins of continental philosophy a generation earlier, to the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

 E.g., the largest academic organization devoted to furthering the study of continental philosophy is the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.

 Anthony Kenny, (ed). The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy. ISBN 0192854402


 Critchley. Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction., 38.

 John Stuart Mill. On Bentham and Coleridge. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1950), 104, 133, and 155.

 See, e.g., Michael Dummett. The Origins of Analytical Philosophy. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); or C. Prado, (ed.), A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy. (New York: Prometheus/Humanity Books, 2003).

 E.g., Russell's comments in My Philosophical Development. (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1959), 62: "Hegelians had all kinds of arguments to prove this or that was not 'real'. Number, space, time, matter, were all professedly convicted of being self-contradictory. Nothing was real, so we were assured, except the Absolute, which could think only of itself since there was nothing else for it to think of and which thought eternally the sort of things that idealist philosophers thought in their books."

 Bertrand Russell. A History of Western Philosophy. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), 643, 641. Russell proposes the following broad points of distinction between Continental and British types of philosophy: (1) in method, deductive system-building vs. piecemeal induction; (2) in metaphysics, rationalist theology vs. metaphysical agnosticism; (3) in ethics, non-naturalist deontology vs. naturalist hedonism; and (4) in politics, authoritarianism vs. liberalism. Russell, 1945, 643-647.

 See, e.g., Walter Brogan and James Risser, (eds.), American Continental Philosophy: A Reader. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).

 Brian Leiter is most commonly associated with such claims and compiles the “Philosophical Gourmet Report: A Ranking of Graduate Programs in the English-speaking World” published online by Blackwell Publishers. Note the American Philosophical Association's censuring of the "Gourmet Report" and the controversy associated with that censuring. See, for a history of the analytic continental divide in the context of professional philosophy in the United States, Bruce Wilshire. Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), as well as the first chapter by Richard Rorty in Prado, ed., A House Divided.

References

Books and journals

Brogan, Walter, and James Risser. American Continental Philosophy: A Reader. Studies in Continental thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. ISBN 9780253213761

Critchley, Simon, and William Ralph Schroeder. A Companion to Continental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998. ISBN 9780631190134

Critchley, Simon. Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. (Very short introductions), 43. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. ISBN 9780192853592

Cutrofello, Andrew. Continental Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2005. ISBN 9780415242097

Dummett, Michael A. E. Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. ISBN 9780674644724

Glendinning, Simon. The Idea of Continental Philosophy A Philosophical Chronicle. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006. ISBN 9780748627097

Grayling, A. C. Philosophy 2: Further Through the Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. ISBN 9780198751786

Kenny, Anthony, ed. The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press. ISBN 0192854402

Leiter, Brian,, and Michael Rosen. The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2007. ISBN 9780199234097

John Stuart Mill. On Bentham and Coleridge. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1950.

Prado, C. G. A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003. ISBN 9781591021056

Prado, C. G. A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003. ISBN 1591021057

Richard Rorty in C.G. Prado, ed., A House Divided.

Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972. ISBN 9780671201586

Russell, Bertrand. My Philosophical Development. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959.

Solomon, Robert C. Continental philosophy since 1750: the rise and fall of the self. Oxford Univ. Press, 1988. ISBN 9780192892027

Wilshire, Bruce W. Fashionable Nihilism: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002. ISBN 9780791454305

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