Quotes & Sayings


We, and creation itself, actualize the possibilities of the God who sustains the world, towards becoming in the world in a fuller, more deeper way. - R.E. Slater

There is urgency in coming to see the world as a web of interrelated processes of which we are integral parts, so that all of our choices and actions have [consequential effects upon] the world around us. - Process Metaphysician Alfred North Whitehead

Kurt Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem says (i) all closed systems are unprovable within themselves and, that (ii) all open systems are rightly understood as incomplete. - R.E. Slater

The most true thing about you is what God has said to you in Christ, "You are My Beloved." - Tripp Fuller

The God among us is the God who refuses to be God without us, so great is God's Love. - Tripp Fuller

According to some Christian outlooks we were made for another world. Perhaps, rather, we were made for this world to recreate, reclaim, redeem, and renew unto God's future aspiration by the power of His Spirit. - R.E. Slater

Our eschatological ethos is to love. To stand with those who are oppressed. To stand against those who are oppressing. It is that simple. Love is our only calling and Christian Hope. - R.E. Slater

Secularization theory has been massively falsified. We don't live in an age of secularity. We live in an age of explosive, pervasive religiosity... an age of religious pluralism. - Peter L. Berger

Exploring the edge of life and faith in a post-everything world. - Todd Littleton

I don't need another reason to believe, your love is all around for me to see. – Anon

Thou art our need; and in giving us more of thyself thou givest us all. - Khalil Gibran, Prayer XXIII

Be careful what you pretend to be. You become what you pretend to be. - Kurt Vonnegut

Religious beliefs, far from being primary, are often shaped and adjusted by our social goals. - Jim Forest

We become who we are by what we believe and can justify. - R.E. Slater

People, even more than things, need to be restored, renewed, revived, reclaimed, and redeemed; never throw out anyone. – Anon

Certainly, God's love has made fools of us all. - R.E. Slater

An apocalyptic Christian faith doesn't wait for Jesus to come, but for Jesus to become in our midst. - R.E. Slater

Christian belief in God begins with the cross and resurrection of Jesus, not with rational apologetics. - Eberhard Jüngel, Jürgen Moltmann

Our knowledge of God is through the 'I-Thou' encounter, not in finding God at the end of a syllogism or argument. There is a grave danger in any Christian treatment of God as an object. The God of Jesus Christ and Scripture is irreducibly subject and never made as an object, a force, a power, or a principle that can be manipulated. - Emil Brunner

“Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh” means "I will be that who I have yet to become." - God (Ex 3.14) or, conversely, “I AM who I AM Becoming.”

Our job is to love others without stopping to inquire whether or not they are worthy. - Thomas Merton

The church is God's world-changing social experiment of bringing unlikes and differents to the Eucharist/Communion table to share life with one another as a new kind of family. When this happens, we show to the world what love, justice, peace, reconciliation, and life together is designed by God to be. The church is God's show-and-tell for the world to see how God wants us to live as a blended, global, polypluralistic family united with one will, by one Lord, and baptized by one Spirit. – Anon

The cross that is planted at the heart of the history of the world cannot be uprooted. - Jacques Ellul

The Unity in whose loving presence the universe unfolds is inside each person as a call to welcome the stranger, protect animals and the earth, respect the dignity of each person, think new thoughts, and help bring about ecological civilizations. - John Cobb & Farhan A. Shah

If you board the wrong train it is of no use running along the corridors of the train in the other direction. - Dietrich Bonhoeffer

God's justice is restorative rather than punitive; His discipline is merciful rather than punishing; His power is made perfect in weakness; and His grace is sufficient for all. – Anon

Our little [biblical] systems have their day; they have their day and cease to be. They are but broken lights of Thee, and Thou, O God art more than they. - Alfred Lord Tennyson

We can’t control God; God is uncontrollable. God can’t control us; God’s love is uncontrolling! - Thomas Jay Oord

Life in perspective but always in process... as we are relational beings in process to one another, so life events are in process in relation to each event... as God is to Self, is to world, is to us... like Father, like sons and daughters, like events... life in process yet always in perspective. - R.E. Slater

To promote societal transition to sustainable ways of living and a global society founded on a shared ethical framework which includes respect and care for the community of life, ecological integrity, universal human rights, respect for diversity, economic justice, democracy, and a culture of peace. - The Earth Charter Mission Statement

Christian humanism is the belief that human freedom, individual conscience, and unencumbered rational inquiry are compatible with the practice of Christianity or even intrinsic in its doctrine. It represents a philosophical union of Christian faith and classical humanist principles. - Scott Postma

It is never wise to have a self-appointed religious institution determine a nation's moral code. The opportunities for moral compromise and failure are high; the moral codes and creeds assuredly racist, discriminatory, or subjectively and religiously defined; and the pronouncement of inhumanitarian political objectives quite predictable. - R.E. Slater

God's love must both center and define the Christian faith and all religious or human faiths seeking human and ecological balance in worlds of subtraction, harm, tragedy, and evil. - R.E. Slater

In Whitehead’s process ontology, we can think of the experiential ground of reality as an eternal pulse whereby what is objectively public in one moment becomes subjectively prehended in the next, and whereby the subject that emerges from its feelings then perishes into public expression as an object (or “superject”) aiming for novelty. There is a rhythm of Being between object and subject, not an ontological division. This rhythm powers the creative growth of the universe from one occasion of experience to the next. This is the Whiteheadian mantra: “The many become one and are increased by one.” - Matthew Segall

Without Love there is no Truth. And True Truth is always Loving. There is no dichotomy between these terms but only seamless integration. This is the premier centering focus of a Processual Theology of Love. - R.E. Slater

-----

Note: Generally I do not respond to commentary. I may read the comments but wish to reserve my time to write (or write from the comments I read). Instead, I'd like to see our community help one another and in the helping encourage and exhort each of us towards Christian love in Christ Jesus our Lord and Savior. - re slater

Monday, January 12, 2026

A Review of Greek Atheism - Abandoning the Gods (3)



A Review of Greek Atheism

ABANDONING THE GODS
Essay III

Religion as Construction, Satire,
and Tradition in Ancient Greece

by R.E. Slater & ChatGPT-5.2

Attributed to Democritus (5th century BCE, paraphrased from fragments):
“Men suppose that the gods are the cause of all things, but nature works by necessity.”

Aristotle, Physics:
“Nature does nothing in vain.”

Protagoras:
“Concerning the gods, I am unable to know whether they exist or do not exist.”

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (adapted):
“The thunderbolt is not hurled by Zeus; it follows necessity.”

Synthetic aphorism:
“What requires no intervention requires no god.”


Introduction: Abandoning the Gods

If Essay I traced the ethical collapse of the Greek gods, and Essay II followed their explanatory displacement, Essay III turns to the most destabilizing development of all: the moment when religion itself becomes intelligible as a human, and not a divine, phenomenon.

By the late fifth century BCE, Greek thought had crossed a critical threshold. The gods had not only failed morally and become explanatorily unnecessary; they had begun to appear historically contingent, psychologically motivated, and socially functional. Religion was no longer merely questioned or sidelined - it was explained and removed of its necessity. Once that occurred, reverence could no longer be sustained by mystery alone.

This essay examines how Greek culture came to understand religion not as revelation from beyond the world, but as a product of human fear, gratitude, imagination, and political need. Sophistic thinkers offered early accounts of religion as invention; playwrights subjected the gods to ridicule before mass audiences; philosophers rendered divine agency irrelevant to human flourishing. By the *Hellenistic period, belief had settled into a residual role - preserved as custom, ritual, and governance, but no longer as conviction.

*The Hellenistic period in Greece spans from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE to the rise of the Roman Empire, typically marked by the conquest of Ptolemaic Egypt in 31 BCE (Battle of Actium) or 30 BCE. This era saw Greek culture (Hellenism) spread across vast territories from Greece to India, blending with local Near Eastern customs, and transitioning from independent (Greek) city-states to large kingdoms under Alexander's successors. 

What distinguishes this development from earlier stages of unbelief is its calm sufficiency. Religion is not overthrown in outrage, nor abandoned in despair. It is outgrown. Life continues. Ethics persist. Meaning endures. The gods simply no longer matter in the ways they once did.

Essay III therefore traces a transition from doubt to demystification → from demystification to satire → and from satire to abandonment. It follows religion as it moves from sacred explanation to cultural artifact - retained where useful, mocked where excessive, and ignored where unnecessary.*

*The reason I circled back to Greece's Axial Age from our last major series is that I intend to explore why I think 21st Christianity has come full circle to find itself in a very similar position as ancient Greek theology had found itself three millennia ago (500 BCE).
Throughout these immediate essays, I to III, I have been hinting at the reasons and consequences for today's Christian faith's failure across the marketplace, with the Nones and Dones, with Science and Academia, and generally, across metamodern technocratic (democratically-imperialized?) societies.
Consequently, Essay IV will continue this current discussion by looking at Western democracies' most recent era from the 1980s through to 2000s+, and consider how Process Philosophy and Theology may help - not only Christianity, but all global religions - reground themselves fundamentally into the lives of their followers.
This of course, must also include all religious agnostics and atheists of various faiths as well. Which is also why I am working through essays I-III via the lost of faith; the loss of certainty; and the value of doubt. And why? Because within a processual framework its philosophic structure is expansive enough to absorb all walks of life into its integral philosophy. Thus Whitehead. Thus process theology. And thus my follow up quantum essays which I started a few weeks back (sic., quantum gravity, relational time and emergent geometry, Schrodinger, Dirace and the process of quantum becoming, divine decoherence (unpublished), imagining consciousness, time, and gravity) that will follow on to this series. - re slater

This analysis therefore is not undertaken to debunk religion retroactively, but to understand how a civilization can arrive at unbelief without nihilism. The world of Greek atheism, in its mature form, is neither militant nor triumphant. It is practical, ironic, and stable. The world works without the gods, and that realization proves more powerful than any argument against them.

The significance of this development extends far beyond antiquity. Once religion can explain itself - once its origins, functions, and mechanisms are made visible (... as we have done here in the "Evolution of Worship and Religion" series) - it can no longer rely on inherited authority alone. This condition defines not only the Greek experience, but the modern one as well.

Essay III thus completes the diagnostic work of this series. It shows how religion, when subjected to:

  • ethical critique,
  • explanatory success, and
  • historical self-awareness,

may naturally dissolve without societal violence or regret. But what remains is not atheism as an ideology, but a question newly unavoidable:

If religion can be outgrown honestly, what kind of faith - if any - could remain credible afterwards?




I. Religion Explained as Human Invention

Athens and the Sophistic Milieu, c. 450 - 400 BCE

Critias, Sisyphus fragment (late 5th c. BCE)
“Some shrewd man, wise in counsel, invented fear of the gods.”

Prodicus (c. 465 - 395 BCE)
“The gods are deified benefactors.”

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (c. 50 BCE)
“Fear was the first thing that created gods.”

By the late fifth century BCE, Greek thought begins to do something unprecedented: it explains religion without reference to the divine. This is not yet mockery, nor outright denial. It is analysis. Religion becomes a phenomenon to be accounted for in human terms - psychological, political, and cultural.

The Sisyphus fragment, attributed in antiquity to Critias or Euripides, offers the clearest articulation of this shift. In a world once ruled by lawless violence, the fragment suggests, religion was invented as a mechanism of social control. Fear of unseen divine surveillance succeeded where human law could not. The gods were not discovered; they were sociologically devised.

Prodicus, another Sophist operating in democratic Athens, offered a less cynical but equally destabilizing account. In his view, early humans deified those who provided vital goods - bread, wine, agriculture. The gods emerged not from revelation, but from gratitude, memory and experience with hunger, catastrophe, and human need. Divinity is a retrospective honorific applied to human fragility and hard-won achievement.

Lucretius later sharpens both accounts, identifying fear - especially fear of death, destitution, and the ill entry of human suffering - as the psychological engines of religion. By the first century BCE, the explanation is complete: religion arises from human need, not necessarily the search-and-seeming-apprehension of cosmic truth.

What is decisive here is not disbelief - but demystification. Once religion can be explained without invoking gods, its authority changes irrevocably.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology accepts this demystification as needful and necessary. That is, any account of religion which ignores its human construction, or basis, is ethically and intellectually irresponsible. Faith traditions arise within history, language, power, and fear; they do not descend unmediated - nor ungrounded - from thin air, from immortal eternity.

Yet process thought refuses reductionism. That religion is constructed does not mean it is therefore false or empty. It means that divine-human interaction, if real, is always mediated through evolving sociological/cultural and intermediary forms. The Sophists rightly dismantle naïve supernaturalism, but they lack a framework for understanding how value, meaning, and transcendence might still emerge within constructed forms.

The question becomes not whether religion is invented, but whether invention can still be responsive to a deeper relational reality. 




II. Comedy and the Public Ridicule of the Gods

Athens, Old Comedy, c. 425 - 385 BCE

Aristophanes, The Clouds (423 BCE)
“Zeus doesn’t even exist.”

Aristophanes, The Knights (424 BCE)
“The fact that I’m cursed by them (the gods; supports their existence).”

Lucian, Zeus Refuted (2nd c. CE)
“You are too clever. I will not argue with you.”

Where Sophistic analysis intellectualizes religion... Grecian comedy de-sacralizes it. Old Comedy, performed at major civic festivals in Athens, provided a sanctioned space in which the gods could be mocked openly. Laughter does what argument often cannot: it dissolves reverence.

In The Clouds, Aristophanes places outright atheistic declarations in the mouth of Socrates - unfairly, but effectively. Zeus is dismissed as nonexistent; clouds replace gods as explanatory agents. The audience laughs, but the damage is done. A god who can be ridiculed in public is no longer feared. 

*It has been my argument from the outset of Relevancy22 that the Christian God was never one to be feared - but to reverenced for this God's divine love.... But not for his supposed wrath and anger, judgment and calamities - as placed upon El, Yahweh, Messiah, etc, by both the ancient Hebrews and later, Christians, in their distilling (condensing) tribal / cultic beliefs.
Stated more simply, "God is Love. God is not Wrath nor Judgment". If this is so, then the doctrines of Christianity altogether must be rearranged, restructured, reread, and rethought. Thus, process and thus, process theology. - re slater

In Aristophanes, The Knights, belief is reduced to irony. A slave’s “proof” of the gods is not blessing, but curse. Suffering becomes evidence - not of divine care, but of divine indifference. Faith collapses into gallows humor.

Lucian, writing centuries later in Roman Syria, completes the arc. His dialogues portray Zeus as rhetorically helpless before philosophical critique. The god does not refute arguments; he ends conversations in frustration. Divine authority has evaporated.

Comedy marks a crucial threshold: when gods become laughable, belief no longer commands emotional allegiance.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology recognizes humor as a theological solvent. Static, authoritarian divinity cannot survive sustained irony. Laughter exposes the gap between claimed power and lived reality.

Yet humor also performs a clearing function. By stripping away fear-based reverence, it opens space for forms of the sacred grounded not in domination but in relational depth, empathy, and shared vulnerability. Comedy does not destroy meaning; it dislodges false ultimacies.

A divinity that cannot survive laughter is not worthy of trust.




III. Functional Atheism and the Gods Who "No Longer Matter"

Hellenistic Schools, c. 300 - 100 BCE

Epicurus (Athens, c. 300 BCE)
“The gods exist, but they are not as the many believe them to be.”

Epicurus
“Death is nothing to us.”

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura
“Religion now lies trampled beneath our feet.”

Epicureanism (... to live a happy life through enjoyment of simple pleasures, friendships, and freedom from pain, suffering, and fear) - represents the most stable form of Greek unbelief: functional atheism without denial. Epicurus does not deny the gods; he renders them irrelevant. The gods exist, but they neither create the world nor intervene in human affairs. They are models of tranquility, not agents of providence.

This move is crucial. By removing fear of divine punishment and abolishing the afterlife, Epicurus dissolves the psychological foundation of religion. If death is nothing, and gods do not judge, then religion loses its grip on human anxiety.

Lucretius’ poetic celebration of Epicurus, frames this as spiritual liberation. Religion is not merely false; it is oppressive. Once understood, it can be overcome - not violently, but calmly.

Here Greek unbelief reaches equilibrium. Life, ethics, and joy persist without gods. Belief survives only as cultural residue.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology agrees with Epicurus that fear-based religion must be dismantled. A God who rules through threat or postmortem punishment is incompatible with moral freedom and relational trust.

Where process thought diverges is in its refusal to evacuate transcendence entirely. Epicurus empties the cosmos of divine concern; in contrast, process theology seeks a non-coercive, immanent sacred presence - one that invites rather than compels, participates rather than governs.

Epicureanism answers fear by withdrawal. Process theology will later attempt a more difficult task: to affirm value and hope without reintroducing domination.




IV. Religion After Belief: Disenchantment as Cultural Equilibrium without Nihilism

Hellenistic Mediterranean, c. 300 - 100 BCE

Epicurus
“The gods exist, but they are not as the many believe them to be.”

Lucretius
“So powerful was religion in persuading to evil deeds.”

Polybius
“There is no way to restrain the multitude except by fear of the gods.”

By the Hellenistic period, religion has settled into a residual role. It persists as custom, law, and cultural memory, but not as conviction. Polybius’ frank admission reveals the final stage: religion survives as instrument, not truth.

This is not crisis; it is normalization. The gods remain, but they no longer govern life.

Consequently, the ancient Greek world had entered what can best be described as a post-belief religious equilibrium. The gods were neither actively contested nor deeply trusted. They persisted as inherited forms - embedded in festivals, civic oaths, domestic rites, and public architectures - but no longer as living sources of explanation, justice, or hope.

This transformation was accelerated by the political conditions of the age. Following the conquests of Alexander the Great (late 4th century BCE), Greek culture became cosmopolitan, plural, and administratively vast. Local gods lost their territorial intimacy. Religion became increasingly formalized, portable, and instrumental. The sacred was no longer encountered; it was managed.

Epicurean philosophy articulates the psychological interior of this moment. The gods exist, per Epicurus - but they do not care. They neither reward nor punish, neither create nor redeem. This is not atheism by denial, but atheism by irrelevance. Divine concern is removed from the structure of reality.

Lucretius radicalizes this insight by reframing religion itself as a historical liability. Religion, in his account, does not merely fail to help - it actively harms by amplifying fear, guilt, and submission. The gods persist only insofar as they are misunderstood.

Polybius, writing as a historian and political realist, reveals the final functional role of religion. Belief is no longer assumed; fear must be cultivated. The gods remain useful - not because they are true, but because they discipline the masses. Religion survives as social technology, not sacred encounter.

What emerges is not nihilism, but normalization. Life continues. Ethics endure. Meaning persists - now grounded in philosophy, friendship, civic order, and personal tranquility - rather than by divine supervision.

Religion has not vanished. It has been domesticated.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology recognizes this equilibrium as a historical achievement - but also as an incomplete impasse. Greek culture successfully dismantled static divinity, but lacked a metaphysical account of why value, creativity, and moral responsiveness persist. Hence, the gods deserved abandonment.

The gods were abandoned because they could not evolve. What remained was a world awaiting a re-conception, or re-imagination, of The Sacred capable of processually becoming with it.

Yet what Greek thought, religion, and philosophy lacked was a metaphysical account of why value continues to matter once divine command dissolves. Meaning persists, but it becomes anthropocentric by default. Creativity, moral responsiveness, and relational depth are affirmed pragmatically, but not cosmologically grounded.

Process thought later enters precisely here. It affirms the Greek rejection of coercive divinity while refusing to reduce value to mere human convention. In a process framework, value is intrinsic to reality’s becoming; it is not imposed from above nor invented from below, but emerges through relational interaction at every level of existence.

The failure of Greek religion was not disbelief, but immobility. The gods could not grow with the world. Process theology begins where the Greek gods stopped - by asking how the sacred might remain credible within a world that is in the process of continually evolving.


Conclusion: When Religion Explains Itself Away

Across Essays I–III, the Greek gods do not disappear through assault, prohibition, or denial. They disappear through exposure - ethical, explanatory, epistemic, and finally anthropological. Once religion becomes intelligible as a human construction responding to fear, power, gratitude, and social need, its authority shifts irreversibly.

  • First, the gods fail ethically. They cannot bear the moral weight of suffering, injustice, and human responsibility. Trust withdraws.
  • Second, they fail explanatorily. Nature operates coherently without intervention. Need evaporates.
  • Third, religion itself becomes transparent. Its origins, functions, and mechanisms are laid bare. Reverence thins into habit.
By the Hellenistic period, belief is no longer compulsory. The gods remain as names, rituals, and cultural memory - but not as governing realities. Religion survives only where it can be useful, ornamental, or pedagogical.

This is not collapse. It is maturation.

Greek unbelief, in its most developed form, is calm, stable, and sufficient. The world works. Meaning persists. Life does not require divine supervision. What ends is not the sacred, but a static conception of it.

Religion has explained itself away.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology receives this history not as an enemy, but as a necessary prelude. Any faith that depends on cosmic/divine intervention, certainty, or fear would not have survived the Greek awakening - and should not survive even now today. The gods that fell in antiquity are the same gods that are still failing today, in modernity.

Yet process thought refuses the final Greek settlement. It does not accept that value must float ungrounded once command dissolves, nor that meaning must retreat into human subjectivity alone. Instead, it proposes that becoming itself (broadly stated) is sacred - that creativity, relation, responsiveness, and novelty are not accidental features of reality, but its deepest truth.

In this view, God, or the Sacred, is not the ruler above process nor a religious remnant within culture, but the very relational depth of the world itself - the persuasive presence that lures each moment toward greater intensity, harmony, and care. Divinity is no longer external to history, but participant within it.

Greek unbelief clears the ground. It removes gods who cannot grow, suffer, or respond (refer to essay 13: "The Way of Cruciformity: When God Refused Power"). What remains is not atheism as finality, but an open horizon:

If reality is process all the way down,
then faith - if it is to survive at all -
must also become a processual faith.

That horizon now opens fully toward the modern “Age of Unbelief,” where the Greek questions return with renewed urgency - and where any credible (processual) faith must answer them without retreat.



After the Gods

No thunder fell
when the gods were understood.

They did not die.
They were translated -
  through fear,
  and gratitude,
  into habit,
  and religious law.


Once the gods were named,
  they lost their teeth.

Once laughed at,
  they lost their throne.

Once explained,
  they learned to linger
as custom,
as story,
as warning

  told to children
  when certainty was needed.

The world did not mourn them.
It learned to speak
in other grammars:
  friendship,
  reason,
  quiet joy.


And where the gods once stood,
nothing rushed in -
  only space enough
  to ask
  what might yet become of the sacred.


R.E. Slater
January 8, 2026
@copyright R.E. Slater Publications
all rights reserved



BIBLIOGRAPHY
Religion as Construction, Satire,
and Tradition in Ancient Greece

I. Primary Ancient Sources (Accessible Translations)

Sophists & Religion as Construction

  • Critias. Sisyphus Fragment. In Greek Lyric Poetry, ed. M.L. West.

  • Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Trans. Pamela Mensch. Oxford.

  • Plato. Protagoras. Trans. Stanley Lombardo. Hackett.

Comedy & Satire

  • Aristophanes. The Clouds, The Knights, Thesmophoriazusae. Trans. Jeffrey Henderson. Loeb.

  • Lucian. Dialogues of the Gods, Zeus Refuted, Zeus the Tragedian. Trans. A.M. Harmon. Loeb.

Epicurean Thought

  • Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus. In The Epicurus Reader, ed. Brad Inwood.

  • Lucretius. De Rerum Natura. Trans. A.E. Stallings. Penguin Classics.

Historiography

  • Polybius. The Histories. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford University Press.


II. Core Secondary Scholarship (Graduate Level)
  • Burkert, Walter. Greek Religion. Harvard University Press.

  • Dodds, E.R. The Greeks and the Irrational. University of California Press.

  • Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. III. Cambridge University Press.

  • Parker, Robert. On Greek Religion. Cornell University Press.

  • Sedley, David. Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom. Cambridge.

  • Mikalson, Jon D. Religion in Hellenistic Athens. University of California Press.


III. Advanced & Scholarly Studies (Post-Graduate / Research)
  • Bremmer, Jan N. Greek Religion and Culture, the Bible, and the Ancient Near East. Brill.

  • Henrichs, Albert. “What Is a Greek God?” in Greek Mythology and Poetics. Cornell.

  • Versnel, H.S. Coping with the Gods. Brill.

  • Vernant, Jean-Pierre. Myth and Thought among the Greeks. Zone Books.

  • Osborne, Robin. The Transformation of Athens. Princeton University Press.

  • Kindt, Julia. Rethinking Greek Religion. Cambridge University Press.


IV. Religion as Social Technology & Psychological Construct
  • Boyer, Pascal. Religion Explained. Basic Books.

  • Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy. Anchor.

  • Freud, Sigmund. The Future of an Illusion. Norton. (For contrast, not endorsement.)


V. Bridges to Modern Unbelief & Philosophy of Religion
  • Grayling, A.C. The God Argument. Bloomsbury.

  • Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Harvard University Press.

  • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.


VI. Process-Theological & Constructive Trajectories (For What Comes Next)

(These should feel earned now—not imposed)

  • Whitehead, Alfred North. Religion in the Making. Cambridge University Press.

  • Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge University Press.

  • Cobb, John B. A Christian Natural Theology. Westminster Press.

  • Griffin, David Ray. Reenchantment without Supernaturalism. Cornell University Press.

  • Keller, Catherine. On the Mystery. Fortress Press.

  • Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. God, Christ, Church. Fortress Press.


Saturday, January 10, 2026

A Review of Greek Atheism - A World Without Gods (2)



A Review of Greek Atheism

A WORLD WITHOUT GODS
Essay II

Nature, Knowledge, and Religious
Disenchantment in Ancient Greece

by R.E. Slater & ChatGPT-5.2

Attributed to Democritus (5th century BCE, paraphrased from fragments):
“Men suppose that the gods are the cause of all things, but nature works by necessity.”

Aristotle, Physics:
“Nature does nothing in vain.”

Protagoras:
“Concerning the gods, I am unable to know whether they exist or do not exist.”

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (adapted):
“The thunderbolt is not hurled by Zeus; it follows necessity.”

Synthetic aphorism:
“What requires no intervention requires no god.”


Introduction: A World Without Gods

If Essay I examined the ethical collapse of the Greek gods, Essay II turns to a quieter but more consequential development: the discovery that the world could be understood without reference to the gods at all. They were unneeded. Unnecessary. A past that slowly ebbed away.

In ancient Greece, unbelief did not arise solely because the gods behaved badly. It arose because the cosmos itself began to speak in a different language. From the sixth century BCE onward, Greek thinkers increasingly described the world not as a theater of divine intention, but as a field of intelligible processes - governed by necessity, proportion, material interaction, and pattern. Thunder no longer required a Zeus; disease no longer came as divine punishment; the heavens no longer required a mythic genealogy. Nature, it seemed, was sufficient unto itself for many of these explanations. Wonder had arrived, but in a differing context than what it once was.

This shift did not immediately negate the gods. Early natural philosophers often retained them as signifiers of a now distant, material, or non-interventionist beings. Yet decisive changes lay abundantly elsewhere when they looked to nature: explanation no longer needed divine agency. Once causal accounts could proceed without appeal to divine will. Religion was quietly being displaced as the explanatory center of cosmic reality. The cosmos itself was slowly becoming the new center of reason and understanding. Ancient humanity was growing up. Learning to think. Testing experience with a different form of reality. That of nature itself.

This essay traces that displacement.

From the Presocratic cosmologists through the Sophists, Atomists, and early scientific thinkers, Greek culture developed a mode of understanding in which the world was no longer interpreted as the expression of divine will, but as the outcome of impersonal, natural forces. The earth floated in space not because a god held it, but because of a form of cosmic balance; life emerged not because it was divinely designed, but because matter had organized itself; the soul endured not eternally, but only as long as its fleshly elements cohered, per the atomists.

Crucially, this enlightened revolution (sic, epistemic revelation) was not driven by hostility toward religion. It was being driven by the growing success of human reason. Naturalistic accounts seemed to work. They could be predicted, clarified, unified, and rendered within the felt world in intelligible ways that myth could not. Over time, this revelatory success produced a cultural realization far more destabilizing than any direct denial of the gods - it was the gathering realization that even if the gods existed, their assorted pantheon was becoming naturalistically irrelevant.

What emerged was not atheism in the modern ideological sense, but a new intellectual posture - one in which belief became optional, provisional, and increasingly private. Divine agency was no longer required to understand the world, and once that threshold was crossed, the authority of the gods could no longer be sustained by tradition alone.

---

Essay II therefore explores Greek unbelief not as rebellion, but as unneeded, unnecessary redundancy. The gods were not argued out of existence; they were explained out of necessity when examining in nature what sacred tradition once held as providence of the gods.

This development would prove irreversible. Once the cosmos could be described without divine intention, later religions - including Christianity - would be forced to reimagine divinity not as an explanatory cause among teachings, but as something qualitatively different: relational, moral, persuasive, or symbolic. The explanatory vacuum left by Greek naturalism would become the revelatory conceptual space into which new forms of faith - and new forms of unbelief - would emerge.

The question guiding this essay is thus simple but profound:

"What happens to belief when the world no longer requires gods to carry the world's functions?"



Note: "Ouranos" (Uranus) is the Greek primordial god of the sky; he is also the personification
of the heavens, born from Gaea (Gaia/Earth). He was the first ruler before being overthrown
by his son Kronos (Cronus), and the father of Zeus, who was likewise overthrown by his son.

I. Nature Without Intention

Ionia and the Birth of Explanation Without Myth
Ionia, Southern Italy, and Athens, c. 600 - 450 BCE

Anaxagoras (Athens, c. 500 - 428 BCE):
“The sun is a red-hot stone.”
Democritus (Abdera, c. 460 - 370 BCE):
“Nothing exists except atoms and void.”

Aristotle, Physics (c. 350 BCE):
“Nature does nothing in vain.”

The most decisive pressure against the Greek gods did not arise from disbelief, but from the success of Greek ingenuity - the rising success of natural explanation. Beginning with the Milesian philosophers of the sixth century BCE (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes), Greek thinkers increasingly sought causes that were immanent rather than mythic. The cosmos was no longer narrated; it was investigated.

The displacement of the Greek gods begins not in Athens but in Ionia, a network of maritime city-states on the western coast of Asia Minor. These cities - Miletus, Ephesus, Colophon - were commercial crossroads, exposed to Babylonian astronomy, Egyptian mathematics, and Near Eastern cosmologies. Unlike the insular aristocratic cultures of mainland Greece, Ionian society was pragmatic, experimental, and outward-facing.

It is here, in the sixth century BCE, that Greek thinkers first attempt to explain the cosmos without recourse to divine narrative. Thales explains earthquakes by water; Anaximander by natural balance; Anaximenes by air and condensation. These explanations do not deny the gods explicitly - but they make them unnecessary.

By the fifth century BCE, this theological shift had matured into fully naturalistic ontologies. Democritus' atomism proposed a universe infinite in extent, governed by necessity rather than intention. In such a universe, divine agency was neither required nor explanatory. The gods might exist, but they no longer did anything.

Anaxagoras’ career in Athens illustrates the religious consequence of this turn. His claim that the sun was a material body - rather than the god Helios - was not merely scientific; it was theologically destabilizing. For this, he was charged with impiety and forced into exile. The reaction itself is revealing: religion recognized, correctly, that explanatory displacement threatened ritual authority.

Aristotle later stabilized and systematized this development: while rejecting atomism, he preserves its core insight - explanation belongs to nature itself. By introducing purpose (telos) he crucially locates it within nature itself - not in divine will. Natural processes had ends without requiring divine intention. Meaning had become internal to the world.

The gods had lost their explanatory monopoly.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology recognizes this moment as decisive and largely justified. A god conceived as an intermittent causal agent - intervening here, suspending laws there - cannot survive a world that demonstrates coherent, continuous process. Divine intervention collapses as a credible category once nature exhibits intelligibility. Once naturalistic causal coherence is demonstrated, interruption becomes either arbitrary or incoherent.

What Greek philosophy lacked was an alternative model of divine action. The choice appeared binary: either the gods interrupt nature, or they are unnecessary. Process theology rejects this binary axiom by proposing relational causality - divine influence operates not by overriding processes, but by shaping possibilities within them.

Hence, what Greek thought lacked was not courage, but metaphysical imagination. The choice appeared stark: either gods interfere with nature, or nature renders gods obsolete. Process theology later reframed this paradigm by distinguishing divine coercive causation from persuasive influenceDivine action need not violate process to be real; it may operate as the ordering of possibilities within becoming.

Greek naturalism cleared the metaphysical ground by its work in naturalistic process. But it did not yet know how to move from there to process thought. This distinction will become crucial. Greek thought rightly eliminated (transcendent) divine interference; but it had no conceptual tools for divine immanence as ground for divine persuasive influence.



Aristarchus of Samos (c. 310 - 230 BCE), Pioneer of Heliocentrism

II. Knowledge, Limits, and the Turn to Agnosticism

Athens and the Crisis of Knowing the Gods
Democratic Athens, c. 450 - 400 BCE

Xenophanes (Colophon, c. 570 - 475 BCE):
“No man has known nor will anyone ever know the truth about the gods.”
Heraclitus (Ephesus, c. 500 BCE):
“Nature loves to hide.”
Protagoras (Athens, c. 490 - 420 BCE):
“Concerning the gods, I cannot know whether they exist or do not exist.”

As explanation advanced, confidence in knowledge itself came under scrutiny. The Sophists, operating in democratic Athens during the mid-fifth century BCE, redirected attention from cosmic speculation to human limitation. Protagoras’ agnostic declaration does not reject divinity; it suspends theological knowledge altogether.

This suspension was scandalous precisely because it removed religion from the domain of certainty. If the gods could not be known, then belief could no longer claim epistemic privilege over skepticism. Ritual persisted, but conviction weakened.

Xenophanes’ critique of anthropomorphism sharpened this development. His famous observation—that Ethiopians imagine black gods and Thracians imagine red-haired ones—undermined not only theology, but revelation itself. If divine images vary culturally, certainty dissolves.

Heraclitus’ insight that reality “loves to hide” expresses the philosophical consequence: the world is structured, but opaque. Mystery remains, yet it is no longer populated by knowable gods.

Agnosticism thus emerges as an ethical stance toward knowledge—a refusal to claim more than human limits allow.

---

If Ionian philosophy destabilized divine causality, Athenian intellectual culture destabilized divine knowledge. The Sophists, operating within democratic Athens, were less interested in cosmology than in human limitation. Protagoras’ agnostic declaration, written in the context of public instruction and rhetorical education, strikes at the heart of religious authority: if the gods cannot be known, they cannot command epistemic loyalty.

The reaction was severe. Protagoras’ book was publicly burned; he was expelled from Athens. The offense was not atheism, but epistemic demotion—the removal of the gods from the domain of knowable truth.

Xenophanes, writing earlier but read widely in Athens, provides the deeper critique. His attack on anthropomorphism reveals theology as culturally contingent. If gods resemble their worshipers, then revelation collapses into projection. Certainty dissolves.

Heraclitus’ fragment captures the philosophical residue: reality is intelligible, but never transparent. The world has order (logos), but it resists final disclosure.

Agnosticism emerges here not as disbelief, but as intellectual ethics—a refusal to claim what cannot be responsibly known.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology affirms epistemic humility not as a failure of reason, but as an accurate response to a reality understood as dynamically (processually) unfolding. If reality itself is processual - historical, relational, and teleologically incomplete - then knowledge cannot be final, exhaustive, or preferentially detached. It must remain epistemically responsive, situated, and provisional to whatever continues to emerge.

Within such a framework, divinity - if it is spoken of at all - cannot function as an object of total comprehension or metaphysical certainty. Any account of God that presumes completed omniscience or non-processual sovereignty would stand in tension with the very reality it seeks to explain. An evolving, becoming universe cannot be exhaustively known in advance, for its future is not fully given.

A processual universe may possess direction or telos, but it unfolds through open-ended concrescence rather than the execution of a fixed blueprint. What remains possible, therefore, is not certainty but relationship: a mode of divine-world interaction marked by encounter rather than possession, persuasion rather than control, and responsiveness rather than domination.

At the same time, a processual understanding of reality does not require belief in divinity. Greek agnosticism and even atheism remain fully viable, intelligible responses within such a processual framework of cosmic-and-metaphysical reality. If meaning, value, and coherence arise through relational processes rather than imposed absolutes, then one may reasonably suspend judgment about divine presence - or even deny it altogether - without rejecting the intelligibility or significance of a processual world.

Greek agnosticism thus performs an indispensable clearing function. It dismantles false confidence and refuses premature (fixed) cosmic closure. What it leaves unresolved is not a failure of courage or imagination, but an open question: whether relational depth, moral responsiveness, and emergent value require a divine dimension, or whether they are sufficient unto themselves.

Process theology does not answer this question in advance. It describes the conditions under which the question must remain open. In a processual universe, trust - whether directed toward God, toward the world, or toward processual meaning in its own right - cannot be grounded in certainty. It can only arise through processual participation in an unfinished reality whose future is not yet given nor can be known.

That unresolved openness is not a defect. It is the shared ground upon which i) belief, ii) agnosticism, and iii) unbelief alike may stand together in solidarity. Such is the quizzical nature of process philosophy and theology.

Pyrrho of Elis introduces Skeptic philosophy to Athens challenging Stoic beliefs

III. Skepticism and the Suspension of Belief

The Academy and the Institutionalization of Doubt
Athens and the Hellenistic World, c. 350 - 200 BCE

PlatoApology (399 BCE):
“I know that I do not know.”
Carneades (Athens, c. 214 - 129 BCE):
“Nothing can be grasped with certainty.”

Sextus Empiricus (preserving earlier traditions, c. 2nd century CE):
“To every argument an equal argument is opposed.”

Following Plato’s death in 347 BCE, skepticism ceased to be merely a personal confession of intellectual humility and became an institutional philosophical posture. Under Academic skeptics such as Arcesilaus (c. 316–241 BCE) and later Carneades (c. 214–129 BCE), Plato’s Academy formally abandoned claims to epistemic certainty altogether. Knowledge, they argued, was unattainable; the most reason could offer was probability. This suspension of assent (epochē) was not a lapse into nihilism but a disciplined method of inquiry - an acknowledgment of the limits of human cognition in a world too complex and contingent to yield final truths.

Theology was not singled out for special critique. It simply could not escape the broader epistemic verdict. Claims about the gods were subject to the same standards as claims about nature, ethics, or metaphysics - and they failed to secure demonstrative certainty.

Carneades made this implication explicit. During a diplomatic mission to Rome in 155 BCE, he famously delivered paired speeches - one defending the existence and justice of the gods, the other dismantling those same arguments with equal force. The exercise was not meant to deny divinity, but to demonstrate that no theological claim could compel rational assent. For every argument affirming divine providence, an equally persuasive counterargument could be constructed. The result was not disbelief, but equipoise (the balance, or counterbalance, of something)

Several centuries later, Sextus Empiricus (2nd century CE) preserved and systematized this skeptical inheritance. In works such as Against the Mathematicians, he applied skeptical method explicitly to theology, concluding that belief and disbelief regarding the gods are equally unprovable. Since arguments on both sides carry comparable weight, reason is justified in withholding commitment altogether.

The religious consequence of this development is subtle but decisive. When belief is no longer compelled (whether inwardly or outwardly) - when no claim achieves epistemic dominance - worship loses its urgency. The gods neither command assent nor demand rejection. Ritual may persist as custom, habit, or civic duty, but conviction thins. Religion continues, yet increasingly without existential necessity.

What emerges is not militant atheism, but religious optionality: belief becomes a matter of temperament, tradition, or convenience rather than truth. In such a climate, the gods are not overthrown - they were quietly set aside.

Process-Theological Coda

Process theology departs from Academic skepticism without rejecting its central insight. It agrees that certainty cannot serve as the foundation of faith, but it denies that faith requires certainty at all. Skepticism correctly exposes the fragility of belief systems grounded in epistemic domination - systems that demand assent through proof, authority, or fear. What it does not explore is whether commitment might arise from another source altogether.

Within a processual framework, faith is not assent to metaphysical propositions but a mode of responsive participation in an unknown and unfolding, open and processual, reality. It emerges not from demonstrative knowledge but from engagement with value, possibility, and relational depth as they present themselves within actualized experience. In this sense, faith becomes less about what can be proven and more about how one responds to what is encountered.

Greek skepticism performs a decisive cultural function by dissolving coercive (or necessitated) belief. By rendering both belief and disbelief equally unprovable, it frees human beings from the demand to justify commitment through certainty. Yet skepticism stops short of asking what might grow in the space it clears. It suspends judgment, but it does not articulate a constructive account of trust, meaning, or hope within an open world.

Process theology takes up that unfinished task. It does not close the skeptical door, nor does it retreat behind it. Instead, it asks whether an open, relational, universe - one characterized by processual becoming rather than completion - might invite forms of commitment that are provisional yet sincere, grounded in relation rather than proof. What becomes imaginable is trust without domination, meaning without finality, and hope without metaphysical closure.

In this way, Greek skepticism closes one door while unintentionally opening another. It ends the reign of compulsory belief, but it leaves untouched the possibility that faith, reimagined as relational responsiveness rather than epistemic certainty, might still remain credible in a world that refuses final answers.




IV. Disenchantment as Cultural Equilibrium without Nihilism

Life, Meaning, and Order After the Gods Cease to Govern
Hellenistic Mediterranean, c. 300 -100 BCE
Epicurus (Athens, c. 300 BCE)
“The gods exist, but they are not as many believe them to be.”
Polybius (c. 150 BCE)
“Since the multitude is ever fickled, full of lawless desires and irrational passions, there is no way to restrain them except by fear of the gods.”
 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (c. 50 BCE)
“So powerful was religion in persuading to evil deeds.”
 

By the Hellenistic period, Greek culture had largely settled into a disenchanted cosmological posture. The gods endured, but their role had been decisively transformed. They remained as cultural symbols, poetic metaphors, civic ideals, and ethically-inversed exemplars - but no longer as explanatory agents governing nature or history. The cosmos was understood to function autonomously. Natural phenomena unfolded according to intelligible processes. Knowledge advanced without appeal to revelation, and ethical life persisted without dependence on divine command.

This transformation did not occur abruptly, nor was it experienced as a cultural crisis. Rather, it represented a gradual adjustment to conditions already prepared by earlier developments: 

  • the ethical unreliability of the gods exposed by tragedy,
  • the explanatory sufficiency of naturalistic accounts, and
  • the epistemic restraint institutionalized by skepticism.

By the time of Epicurean, Stoic, and skeptical dominance, disbelief no longer needed to announce itself. It had become structurally ordinary.

Crucially, this disenchantment did not culminate in despair. The absence of divine intervention did not render the world meaningless or unlivable. On the contrary, Greek thought increasingly demonstrated that coherence, purpose, and moral seriousness could persist independently of the gods. Communities continued. Philosophical schools flourished. Art, science, and ethics advanced. Life went on.

What emerges here is a stable equilibrium rather than a rupture. Greek unbelief reaches a point of cultural maturity in which the world works, meaning persists, and human responsibility deepens - without recourse to divine agency. Greek religion, where it remained, functioned as tradition rather than truth-claim, as inheritance rather than necessity. The gods are neither violently rejected nor anxiously defended. They are simply no longer required.

This equilibrium marks a decisive moment in intellectual history. It demonstrates that a civilization can sustain itself ethically, intellectually, and imaginatively after the withdrawal of belief. A disenchanted world, at least in this Greek form, proves livable.

Process-Theological Coda: After Disenchantment

Process theology later recognizes this moment not as a failure of reason, but as an incomplete achievement. Greek thought successfully dismantled static, interventionist conceptions of divinity - such as envisioned in gods who ruled by decree, disrupted nature (natural processes) at will, and stood apart from the world they governed. In doing so, it cleared intellectual space for a coherent, intelligible, and ethically serious cosmos.

What Greek philosophy lacked was not courage or honesty, but a metaphysics capable of articulating value-within-a-processual world. While it affirmed becoming at the level of nature and knowledge, it struggled to conceive how meaning, novelty, and relational depth might be intrinsic to reality itself rather than imposed upon it by human convention alone.

The unresolved question left by Greek disenchantment is therefore not whether gods exist, but whether divinity - if it is to be spoken of at all - could be reimagined as internal to process rather than external to it; as persuasive rather than coercive; as emerging with the world rather than interrupting it. Greek unbelief eliminated divine intervention, but it did not yet possess the conceptual tools to explore divine participation.

From a process perspective, this moment represents not an endpoint, but a threshold. Disenchantment removes false gods. What it does not decide is whether-and-how reality itself might still be oriented toward value, relation, and creative advance - without reverting to myth or abandoning intellectual integrity.

That question remains open. And it is precisely the openness preserved here that later (21st century) process-oriented approaches will seek to inhabit rather than resolve.



Genealogy of the Greek gods according to Hesiod’s Theogony. Click here to download the image in HD. Source: TheCollector.com

Conclusion

When Explanation Replaces Intervention

In Essay II, Greek unbelief deepens not through rebellion, but through interior coherence. As the world becomes intelligible without divine interruption, the gods recede into irrelevance. Knowledge matures, skepticism disciplines belief, and explanation replaces intervention. The gods are not refuted; they are displaced.

  • This displacement unfolds unevenly across centuries and regions. In Ionia, explanation migrates from myth to nature as early cosmologists describe the world in terms of material processes rather than divine will.
  • In Athens, knowledge itself becomes an object of scrutiny, and the gods lose epistemic authority under the pressure of agnosticism and philosophical inquiry.
  • In the Academy, doubt is formalized as method: certainty is abandoned, belief rendered provisional, and theology subjected to the same epistemic restraint as every other domain of thought.

By the Hellenistic period, these pressures settle into a durable cultural equilibrium. The gods remain as inherited forms, but no longer as governing realities.

Crucially, this transformation does not culminate in nihilism. Greek culture continues to generate ethics, meaning, art, and social order but without divine supervision. Life proceeds. Institutions endure. Philosophical schools flourish. The absence of divine governance proves not only survivable, but stable.

What disappears is not meaning, but necessity. Belief is no longer required to explain the world, ground morality, or secure knowledge. Divine intervention ceases to function as a credible category, not because it is disproven, but because it is no longer needed. The world operates. Nature coheres. Human responsibility deepens.

The gods do not vanish; they fade.

What remains is a world fully operative yet metaphysically unfinished - an open reality that functions without divine interruption, yet leaves unresolved whether meaning, value, and relational depth are merely human constructions or intrinsic features of becoming-reality itself. Greek thought successfully eliminates interventionist divinity, but it does not yet articulate a conception of divinity capable of inhabiting process rather than interrupting it.

This normalization marks a decisive transition. Where Essay I documented the ethical withdrawal of trust, Essay II reveals the explanatory and epistemic withdrawal of need. Together, they establish the conditions under which religion itself will soon be subjected to direct analysis - not as revelation, but as invention, custom, and function.

The gods have not been overthrown.
They have been outpaced. Outdated. Unnecessay.


Process-Theological Coda to the Conclusion

From a process-theological perspective, the achievement of Greek disenchantment must be taken seriously rather than resisted. The elimination of interventionist divinity, epistemic certainty, and coercive belief represents not a loss of the sacred, but a necessary clearing of conceptual ground. Any theology that cannot survive this clearing is not merely challenged by modernity; it is already undone by antiquity.

Process thought affirms the Greek insight that reality is coherent, continuous, and intelligible without supernatural interruption. It also affirms the skeptical recognition that certainty cannot philosophically ground faith, and the ethical realization that morality cannot depend upon arbitrary, and often, unethical, divine power. In this sense, Greek disenchantment performs a genuine purification of the religious imagination, stripping away images of divinity that rely upon control, exemption, amorality, or fear.

Yet Greek thought stops short of a constructive synthesis. Having removed the gods from causation, knowledge, and necessity, it lacks a metaphysical grammar for understanding value, creativity, and moral responsiveness as intrinsic to process itself. Meaning persists, but it remains exposed - carried by human practices, traditions, and preferences without a deeper account of why novelty, relation, or responsibility should matter beyond their pragmatic and social utility.

Process theology does not close this gap; it names it. It does not reverse disenchantment, nor does it seek to restore the gods by other means. Instead, it asks whether a fully processual reality might allow for forms of sacred participation that do not interrupt natural coherence or violate epistemic humility. Divine presence, in such a frame, is no longer conceived as intervention from outside the world, but as persuasive involvement within becomingness - an orientation toward relational intensity, aesthetic depth, and moral possibility that arises with the world rather than over against it.

In this light, Greek unbelief is not the enemy of faith but one of its historical preconditions. It removes images of divinity that cannot grow, suffer, or respond, and leaves behind a question sharpened rather than silenced. What remains is not atheism as negation, but an open inquiry shared by belief, agnosticism, and unbelief alike:
If reality is process all the way down,
can the sacred - if it is to be spoken of at all -
be understood as participating in that process
rather than ruling over it?

That question now presses our discussion forward. And it is precisely this question that Essay III must confront, as religion itself comes under scrutiny not as truth revealed, but as meaning constructed, maintained, mocked, and, in some cases, finally abandoned.



After the Gods Faded

The world did not collapse
when the gods fell silent.

The sun still rose -
as a stone of fire,
astronomically measured -
but no longer prayed to.

The sea obeyed no named god,
yet ships still crossed its depths.
And seeds,still broke the soils,
naturally, without permission.

Humanity learned that processual causes
do not kneel, do not need divine permission,
nor truth require divine revelation,
that meaning survives without command.

The heavens no longer watch us,
yet the world does always remain,
unfinished, intelligible,
asking nothing -
except we attend
to what it unfolds before us.


R.E. Slater
January 8, 2026
@copyright R.E. Slater Publications
all rights reserved



BIBLIOGRAPHY
Nature, Knowledge, and Religious
Disenchantment in Ancient Greece

I. Primary Ancient Sources (Authoritative Translations)

Presocratic & Classical Philosophy

  • Aristotle. Physics. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford University Press.

  • Aristotle. Metaphysics. Trans. Hugh Tredennick and G.C. Armstrong. Harvard University Press.

  • Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E., and Schofield, M. The Presocratic Philosophers. Cambridge University Press.

  • Plato. Apology. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Hackett.

  • Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve. Hackett.

Sophists & Skepticism

  • Sextus Empiricus. Against the Mathematicians. Trans. R.G. Bury. Harvard University Press.

  • Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Trans. Pamela Mensch. Oxford University Press.

Epicurean & Hellenistic Thought

  • Epicurus. Letter to Menoeceus. In The Epicurus Reader, ed. Brad Inwood. Hackett.

  • Lucretius. De Rerum Natura. Trans. A.E. Stallings. Penguin Classics.

  • Polybius. The Histories. Trans. Robin Waterfield. Oxford University Press.


II. Core Secondary Scholarship (Graduate Level)
  • Guthrie, W.K.C. A History of Greek Philosophy, Vols. I–III. Cambridge University Press.

  • Burkert, Walter. Greek Religion. Harvard University Press.

  • Dodds, E.R. The Greeks and the Irrational. University of California Press.

  • Sedley, David. Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity. University of California Press.

  • Barnes, Jonathan. Early Greek Philosophy. Penguin.

  • Long, A.A. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. University of California Press.

  • Parker, Robert. On Greek Religion. Cornell University Press.


III. Advanced / Post-Graduate & Scholarly Studies
  • Bremmer, Jan N. Greek Religion and Culture, the Bible, and the Ancient Near East. Brill.

  • Frede, Michael. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

  • Henrichs, Albert. “What Is a Greek God?” in Greek Mythology and Poetics. Cornell University Press.

  • Mikalson, Jon D. Ancient Greek Religion. Wiley-Blackwell.

  • Versnel, H.S. Coping with the Gods. Brill.

  • Osborne, Robin. Greece in the Making, 1200–479 BC. Routledge.

  • Kahn, Charles H. The Art and Thought of Heraclitus. Cambridge University Press.


IV. Philosophy of Science, Knowledge, and Disenchantment (Bridging Context)
  • Lloyd, G.E.R. Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle. Norton.

  • Burnyeat, M.F. The Skeptical Tradition. University of California Press.

  • Vernant, Jean-Pierre. Myth and Thought among the Greeks. Zone Books.


V. Process-Theological and Constructive Resources (For Later Essays)

(Not foregrounded in Essay II, but conceptually preparatory)

  • Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge University Press.

  • Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality (Corrected Edition). Free Press.

  • Cobb, John B. A Christian Natural Theology. Westminster Press.

  • Griffin, David Ray. Reenchantment without Supernaturalism. Cornell University Press.

  • Keller, Catherine. Face of the Deep. Routledge.

  • Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. The End of Evil. SUNY Press.