Spinoza
If Hobbes is to be regarded as the first of a distinctively British philosophical tradition, the Dutch-Jewish philosopher Benedict de Spinoza (1632–77) appropriately occupies the same position in continental Europe. Unlike Hobbes, Spinoza did not provoke a long-running philosophical debate. In fact, his philosophy was neglected for a century after his death and was in any case much too self-contained a system to invite debate. Nevertheless, Spinoza held positions on crucial issues that sharply contrasted with those taken by Hobbes, and these differences were to grow over the centuries during which British and continental European philosophy followed their own paths.
The first of these contrasts with Hobbes is Spinoza’s attitude toward natural desires. As has been noted, Hobbes took self-interested desire for pleasure as an unchangeable fact about human nature and proceeded to build a moral and political system to cope with it. Spinoza did just the opposite. He saw natural desires as a form of bondage. One does not choose to have them of his own will. One’s will cannot be free if it is subject to forces outside itself. Thus, one’s real interest lies not in satisfying these desires but in transforming them by the application of reason. Spinoza thus stands in opposition not only to Hobbes but also to the position later to be taken by Hume, for Spinoza saw reason not as the slave of the passions but as their master.
The second important contrast is that, whereas individual humans and their separate interests are always assumed in Hobbes’s philosophy, this separation is simply an illusion from Spinoza’s viewpoint. Everything that exists is part of a single system, which is at the same time nature and God. (One possible interpretation of this is that Spinoza was a pantheist, believing that God exists in every aspect of the world and not apart from it.) Humans too are part of this system and are subject to its rationally necessary laws. Once this is understood, it becomes apparent how irrational it would be to desire that things should be different from the way they are. This means that it is irrational to envy, to hate, and to feel guilt, for these emotions presuppose the possibility of things being different. So one ceases to feel such emotions and finds peace, happiness, and even freedom—in Spinoza’s terms the only freedom there can be—in understanding the system of which one is a part.
A view of the world so different from everyday conceptions as that of Spinoza cannot be made to seem remotely plausible when presented in summary form. To many philosophers it remains implausible even when complete. Its value for ethics, however, lies not in its validity as a whole but in the introduction into continental European philosophy of a few key ideas: that one’s everyday nature may not be one’s true nature; that humans are part of a larger unity; and that freedom is to be found in following reason.
Leibniz
The German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), the next great figure in the tradition of rationalism, gave scant attention to ethics, perhaps because of his belief that the world is governed by a perfect God and hence must be the best of all possible worlds. As a result of Voltaire’s hilarious parody in Candide (1759), this position has achieved a certain notoriety. It is not generally recognized, however, that it does at least provide a consistent solution to a problem that has baffled Christian thinkers for many centuries: how can there be evil in a world governed by a God who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good? (See evil, problem of.) Leibniz’s solution may not be plausible, but there may be no better one if the premises above are allowed to pass unchallenged.
Rousseau
It was the French philosopher and writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) who took the next step. His A Discourse on Inequality (1755) depicted a state of nature very different from that described by Hobbes as well as from Christian conceptions of original sin. Rousseau’s “noble savages” lived isolated, trouble-free lives, supplying their simple wants from the abundance that nature provided and even going to each other’s aid in times of need. Only when someone claimed possession of a piece of land did laws have to be introduced, and with them came civilization and all its corrupting influences. This is, of course, a message that resembles one of Spinoza’s key points: the human nature that one sees in one’s fellow citizens is not the only possibility; somewhere, there is something better. If a way to reach it could be found, it would mean the solution to all ethical and social problems.
Rousseau revealed his route in The Social Contract (1762), which called for rule by the “general will.” This may sound like democracy, and, in a sense, it was democracy that Rousseau advocated; but his conception of rule by the general will is very different from the modern idea of democratic government. Today, it is taken for granted that in any society the interests of different citizens will be in conflict, and that as a result for every majority that succeeds in having its will implemented there will be a minority that fails to do so. For Rousseau, on the other hand, the general will is not the sum of all the individual wills in the community but the true common will of all the citizens. Even if a person dislikes and opposes a decision carried by the majority, that decision represents the general will, the common will in which he shares. For this to be possible, Rousseau must be assuming that there is some common good in which all human beings share and hence that their true interests coincide. As man passes from the state of nature to civil society, he has to “consult his reason rather than study his inclinations.” This is not, however, a sacrifice of his true interest, for in following reason he ceases to be a slave to “physical impulses” and so gains moral freedom.
This leads to a picture of civilized human beings as divided selves. The general will represents the rational will of every member of the community. If an individual opposes the decision of the general will, his opposition must stem from his physical impulses and not from his true, autonomous will. For obvious reasons, this idea was to find favour with autocratic leaders of the French Revolution such as Robespierre. It also had a much-less-sinister influence on one of the outstanding philosophers of modern times: Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).
Kant
Interestingly, Kant acknowledged that he had despised the ignorant masses until he read Rousseau and came to appreciate the worth that exists in every human being. For other reasons too, Kant is part of the tradition deriving from both Spinoza and Rousseau. Like his predecessors, Kant insisted that actions resulting from desires cannot be free. Freedom is to be found only in rational action. Moreover, whatever is demanded by reason must be demanded of all rational beings; hence, rational action cannot be based on an individual’s personal desires but must be action in accordance with something that he can will to be a universal law. This view roughly parallels Rousseau’s idea of the general will as that which, as opposed to the individual will, a person shares with the whole community. Kant extended this community to all rational beings.
Kant’s most distinctive contribution to ethics was his insistence that one’s actions possess moral worth only when one does his duty for its own sake. Kant first introduced this idea as something accepted by the common moral consciousness of human beings and only later tried to show that it is an essential element of any rational morality. Kant’s claim that this idea is central to the common moral consciousness expressed, albeit in an explicit and extreme form, a tendency of Judeo-Christian ethics; it also revealed how much Western ethical consciousness had changed since the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
Does common moral consciousness really insist that there is no moral worth in any action done for any motive other than duty? Certainly one would be less inclined to praise the person who plunges into the surf to rescue a drowning child if one learned that he did it because he expected a handsome reward from the child’s wealthy parents. This feeling lies behind Kant’s disagreement with all those moral philosophers who argued that one should do what is right because that is the path to happiness, either on earth or in heaven. But Kant went further than this. He was equally opposed to those who regard benevolent or sympathetic feelings as the basis of morality. Here he may be reflecting the moral consciousness of 18th-century Protestant Germany, but it appears that even then the moral consciousness of Britain, as reflected in the writings of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, and Hume, was very different. The moral consciousness of Western civilization in the early 21st century also appears to be different from the one Kant was describing.
Kant’s ethics is based on his distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. He called any action based on desires a hypothetical imperative, meaning by this that it is a command of reason that applies only if one desires the goal in question. For example, “Be honest, so that people will think well of you!” is an imperative that applies only if one wishes to be thought well of. A similarly hypothetical analysis can be given of the imperatives suggested by, say, Shaftesbury’s ethics: “Help those in distress, if you sympathize with their sufferings!” In contrast to such approaches, Kant said that the commands of morality must be categorical imperatives: they must apply to all rational beings, regardless of their wants and feelings. To most philosophers this poses an insuperable problem: a moral law that applied to all rational beings, irrespective of their personal wants and desires, could have no specific goals or aims, because all such aims would have to be based on someone’s wants or desires. It took Kant’s peculiar genius to seize upon precisely this implication, which to others would have refuted his claims, and to use it to derive the nature of the moral law. Because nothing else but reason is left to determine the content of the moral law, the only form this law can take is the universal principle of reason. Thus, the supreme formal principle of Kant’s ethics is: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
Kant still faced two major problems. First, he had to explain how one can be moved by reason alone to act in accordance with this supreme moral law; and, second, he had to show that this principle is able to provide practical guidance in one’s choices. If one combines Hume’s theory that reason is always the slave of the passions with Kant’s denial of moral worth to all actions motivated by desires, the outcome would be that no actions can have moral worth. To avoid such moral skepticism, Kant maintained that reason alone can lead to action without the support of desire. Unfortunately, he was unable to explain how this is possible, beyond arguing that it is necessary if the common conception of morality is to make sense. Of course, the fact that the alternative leads to so unpalatable a conclusion may be in itself a powerful incentive to believe that somehow a categorical imperative is possible, but this consideration would not be convincing to anyone not already committed to Kant’s view of moral worth. At one point Kant appeared to take a different line. He wrote that the moral law inevitably produces a feeling of reverence or awe. If he meant to say that this feeling then becomes the motivation for obedience, however, he was conceding Hume’s point that reason alone is powerless to bring about action. It would also be difficult to accept that anything, even the moral law, can necessarily produce a certain kind of feeling in all rational beings regardless of their psychological constitution. Thus, this approach does not succeed in clarifying Kant’s position or rendering it plausible.
Kant gave closer attention to the problem of how his supreme formal principle of morality can provide guidance in concrete situations. One of his examples is as follows. Suppose that a person plans to get some money by promising to pay it back, though he has no intention of keeping his promise. The maxim of such an action might be: “Make false promises when it suits you to do so.” Could such a maxim be a universal law? Of course not. The maxim is self-defeating, because if promises were so easily broken, no one would rely on them, and the practice of making promises would cease. For this reason, the moral law would not allow one to carry out such a plan.
Not all situations are so easily decided, however. Another of Kant’s examples deals with aiding those in distress. Suppose a person sees someone in distress, whom he could easily help, but refuses to do so. Could such a person will as a universal law the maxim that one should refuse assistance to those in distress? Unlike the case of promising, there is no strict inconsistency in this maxim’s being a universal law. Kant, however, says that one cannot will it to be such, because one may someday be in distress oneself, and in that case one would want assistance from others. This type of example is less convincing than the previous one. If the person in question values self-sufficiency so highly that he would rather remain in distress than escape from it through the intervention of another, then Kant’s principle would not require him to assist those in distress. In effect, Kant’s supreme principle of practical reason can tell one what to do only in those special cases in which willing the maxim of one’s action to be a universal law yields a contradiction. Outside this limited range, the moral law that was to apply to all rational beings regardless of their wants and desires cannot provide guidance except by appealing to wants and desires.
Kant does offer alternative formulations of the categorical imperative, one of which appears to provide more substantial guidance than the formulation considered thus far. This formulation is: “So act that you treat humanity in your own person and in the person of everyone else always at the same time as an end and never merely as means.” The connection between this formulation and the first one is not entirely clear, but the idea seems to be that, in choosing for oneself, one treats oneself as an end; if, therefore, in accordance with the principle of universal law, one must choose so that all could choose similarly, one must treat everyone else as an end as well. Even if this is valid, however, the application of the principle raises further questions. What is it to treat someone merely as a means? Using a person as a slave is an obvious example; Kant, like Bentham, was making a stand against this kind of inequality while it still flourished as an institution in some parts of the world. But to condemn slavery one needs only to give equal weight to the interests of slaves, as utilitarians such as Bentham explicitly did. One may wonder, then, whether Kant’s principle offers any advantage over utilitarianism. Modern Kantians hold that it does, because they interpret it as denying the legitimacy of sacrificing the rights of one human being in order to benefit others.
One thing that can be said confidently is that Kant was firmly opposed to the utilitarian principle of judging every action by its consequences. His ethics is a deontology (see deontological ethics). In other words, the rightness of an action, according to Kant, depends not on its consequences but on whether it accords with a moral rule, one that can be willed to be a universal law. In one essay Kant went so far as to say that it would be wrong for a person to tell a lie even to a would-be murderer who came to his house seeking to kill an innocent person hidden inside. This kind of situation illustrates how difficult it is to remain a strict deontologist when principles may clash. Apparently Kant believed that his principle of universal law required that one never tell lies, but it could also be argued that his principle of treating everyone as an end would necessitate doing everything possible to save the life of an innocent person. Another possibility would be to formulate the maxim of the action with sufficient precision to define the circumstances under which it would be permissible to tell lies—e.g., perhaps there could be a universal law that permitted lying to people who intend to commit murder. Kant did not explore such solutions, however.
Hegel
Although Kant’s philosophy was profoundly influential, there were several aspects of it that troubled later thinkers. One of these problematic aspects was his conception of human nature as irreconcilably split between reason and emotion. In Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795), the dramatist and literary theorist Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805) suggested that, whereas this division might apply to modern human beings, it was not the case in ancient Greece, where reason and feeling seem to have been in harmony. (There is, as suggested earlier, some basis for this claim, insofar as the Greek moral consciousness did not make the modern distinction between morality and self-interest.) Schiller’s suggestion may have been the spark that led Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) to develop the first philosophical system based on the notion of historical change.
As Hegel presents it, all of history is the progress of mind, or spirit, along a logically necessary path that leads to freedom. Human beings are manifestations of this universal mind, though at first they do not realize it. Freedom cannot be achieved until human beings do realize it and so feel at home in the universe. There are echoes of Spinoza in Hegel’s idea of mind as something universal and also in his conception of freedom as based on knowledge. What is original, however, is the way in which all of history is presented as leading to the goal of freedom. Thus, Hegel accepts Schiller’s view that for the ancient Greeks, reason and feeling were in harmony, but he sees this as a naive harmony that could exist only as long as the Greeks did not see themselves as free individuals with a conscience independent of the views of the community. For freedom to develop, it was necessary for this harmony to break down. This occurred as a result of the Reformation, with its insistence on the right of individual conscience. But the rise of individual conscience left human beings divided between conscience and self-interest, between reason and feeling. As noted above, many philosophers tried unsuccessfully to bridge this gulf until Kant’s insistence on duty for duty’s sake made the division an apparently inevitable part of moral life. For Hegel, however, the division can be overcome by a synthesis of the harmonious communal nature of Greek life with the modern freedom of individual conscience.
In The Philosophy of Right (1821), Hegel described how this synthesis could be achieved in an organic community. The key to his solution is the recognition that human nature is not fixed but is shaped by the society in which one lives. The organic community would foster those desires by which it would be most benefited. It would imbue its members with the sense that their own identity consists in being a part of the community, so that they would no more think of going off in pursuit of their own private interests than one’s left arm would think of going off without the rest of the body. Nor should it be forgotten that such organic relationships are reciprocal: the organic community would no more disregard the interests of its members than an individual would disregard an injury to his or her arm. Harmony would thus prevail, but not the naive harmony of ancient Greece. The citizens of Hegel’s organic community do not obey its laws and customs simply because they are there. With the independence of mind characteristic of modern times, they can give their allegiance only to institutions that they recognize as conforming to rational principles. The modern organic state, unlike the ancient Greek city-state, is self-consciously based on principles that are rationally justified.
Hegel provided a new approach to the ancient problem of reconciling morality and self-interest. Whereas others had accepted the problem as part of the inevitable nature of things and looked for ways around it, Hegel looked at it historically, seeing it as a problem only in a certain type of society. Instead of attempting to solve the problem as it had existed up to his time, he contemplated the emergence of a new form of society in which it would disappear. In this way, Hegel claimed to have overcome one great problem that was insoluble for Kant.
Hegel also believed that he had rectified another key weakness in Kant’s ethics—namely, the difficulty of giving content to the supreme formal moral principle. In Hegel’s organic community, the content of one’s moral duty would be determined by one’s position in society. One would know that his duty was to be a good parent, a good citizen, a good teacher, merchant, or soldier, as the case might be. This ethics has been characterized as “my station and its duties,” after the title of a well-known essay by the British Hegelian F.H. Bradley (1846–1924). It might be thought that this is a limited, conservative conception of what one ought to do, especially when compared with Kant’s principle of universal law. Hegel would have replied that because the organic community is based on universally valid principles of reason, it complies with Kant’s principle of universal law. Moreover, without the specific content provided by the concrete institutions and practices of a society, Kant’s principle would remain an empty formula.
Hegel’s philosophy has both a conservative and a radical side. The conservative aspect is reflected in the ethics of “my station and its duties” and even more strongly in the significant resemblance between Hegel’s detailed description of the organic society and the actual institutions of the Prussian state in which he lived and taught for the last decade of his life. This resemblance, however, was in no way a necessary implication of Hegel’s philosophy as a whole. After Hegel’s death, a group of his more radical followers known as the Young Hegelians hailed the manner in which he had demonstrated the need for a new form of society to overcome the separation between self and community, but they scorned the implication that the state in which they were living could be this society. Among them was a young student named Karl Marx (1818–83).
Marx was often portrayed by his followers as a scientist rather than a moralist. He did not deal directly with the ethical issues that occupied the philosophers so far discussed. His materialist conception of history is, rather, an attempt to explain all ideas, whether political, religious, or ethical, as the product of the particular economic stage that society has reached (see materialism). Thus, in feudal societies loyalty and obedience to one’s lord were regarded as the chief virtues. In capitalist societies, on the other hand, the need for a mobile labour force and expanding markets ensures that the most important value will be freedom—especially the freedom to sell one’s labour. Because Marx regarded ethics as a mere by-product of the economic basis of society, he frequently took a dismissive attitude toward it. Echoing the Sophist Thrasymachus, Marx said that the “ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” In The Communist Manifesto (1848), written with Friedrich Engels (1820–95), he was even more scornful, insisting that morality, law, and religion are “so many bourgeois prejudices behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.”
A sweeping rejection of ethics, however, is difficult to reconcile with the highly moralistic tone of Marx’s condemnation of the miseries that the capitalist system inflicts upon the working class and with his obvious commitment to hastening the arrival of the communism that will end such inequities. After Marx died, Engels tried to explain this apparent inconsistency by saying that as long as society was divided into classes, morality would serve the interest of the ruling class. A classless society, on the other hand, would be based on a truly human morality that served the interests of all human beings. This does make Marx’s position consistent by setting him up as a critic, not of ethics as such but rather of the class-based moralities that would prevail until the communist revolution.
Marx’s earlier writings—those produced when he was a Young Hegelian—convey a slightly different, though not incompatible, impression of the place of ethics in his thought. There seems no doubt that the young Marx, like Hegel, regarded human freedom as the ultimate goal. He also held, as did Hegel, that freedom could be realized only in a society in which the dichotomy between private interest and the general interest had disappeared. Under the influence of socialism, however, he formed the view that merely knowing what was wrong with the world would not achieve anything. Only the abolition of private property could lead to the transformation of human nature and so bring about the reconciliation of the individual and the community. Theory, Marx concluded, had gone as far as it could; even the theoretical problems of ethics, as illustrated in Kant’s division between reason and feeling, would remain insoluble unless one moved from theory to practice. This is what Marx meant in the famous thesis that is engraved on his tombstone: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.” The goal of changing the world stemmed from Marx’s attempt to overcome one of the central problems of ethics. The means now passed beyond philosophy.
Nietzsche
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was a literary and social critic, not a systematic philosopher. In ethics, the chief target of his criticism was the Judeo-Christian tradition. He described Jewish ethics as a “slave morality” based on envy. Christian ethics, in his opinion, is even worse, because it makes a virtue of meekness, poverty, and humility and requires one to turn the other cheek rather than struggle. It is an ethics of the weak, who hate and fear strength, pride, and self-affirmation. Such an ethics, Nietzsche asserted, undermines the human drives that have led to the greatest and most noble human achievements.
Nietzsche thought that the era of traditional religion was over. (His paradoxical way of expressing this point, “God is dead,” is perhaps his most widely repeated aphorism.) Yet, what was to take religion’s place? Nietzsche adopted Aristotle’s concept of greatness of soul, the unchristian virtue that included nobility and a justified pride in one’s achievements. He suggested a “reevaluation of all values” that would lead to a new ideal: the Übermensch, a term usually translated as “superman” and given connotations that suggest that Nietzsche would have approved of fascism and particularly German Nazism (National Socialism). Nietzsche’s praise of “the will to power” is taken as further evidence of his proto-Nazi views. This interpretation, however, owes much to Nietzsche’s racist sister, who after his death compiled a volume of his unpublished writings, arranging them to make it appear that Nietzsche would have endorsed Nazi ideals. In fact, Nietzsche was almost as contemptuous of pan-German racism and anti-Semitism as he was of the ethics of Judaism and Christianity. What Nietzsche meant by Übermensch was a person who could rise above the limitations of ordinary morality, and by “the will to power” it seems that Nietzsche had in mind self-affirmation and not necessarily the use of power to oppress others.
Nevertheless, it must be said that Nietzsche left himself wide open to those who wanted his philosophical imprimatur for their crimes against humanity. His belief in the importance of the Übermensch made him talk of ordinary people as “the herd,” who did not really matter. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), he wrote with approval of “the distinguished type of morality,” according to which “one has duties only toward one’s equals; toward beings of a lower rank, toward everything foreign to one, one may act as one sees fit, ‘as one’s heart dictates’”—in any event, beyond good and evil. The point is that the Übermensch is above ordinary moral standards: “The distinguished type of human being feels himself as value-determining; he does not need to be ratified; he judges ‘that which is harmful to me is harmful as such’; he knows that he is the something which gives value to objects; he creates values.” In this Nietzsche was a forerunner of existentialism rather than of Nazism—but then existentialism, precisely because it gives no basis for choosing other than authenticity, is itself compatible with Nazism (see below Existentialism).
Nietzsche’s position on ethical matters contrasts starkly with that of Sidgwick, the last major figure of 19th-century British ethics treated in this article. Sidgwick believed in objective standards of moral judgment and thought that the subject of ethics had over the centuries made progress toward these standards. He regarded his own work as building carefully on that progress. Nietzsche, on the other hand, wished to sweep away everything since Greek ethics—and not keep much of that either. The superior types would then be free to create their own values as they saw fit.
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