Discussions in Science and Religion - Initial Questions

 

 

High Gravity Religion and Science Rundown Round-Up

 

by Jonnie Russell

September 3, 2013

Comments

 

The Rundown:

 

The next iteration of High Gravity is nearly upon us. The recipe has been altered a bit and a few new ingredients are being added in our last boil and fermentation process before we do the first tasting–week one begins Monday Sept. 9th @ 10am PST.  Sign up via missionsoulutions.com HBX Store.

 

First, as Tripp and Philip Clayton are both local in southern California, they will be engaging in person in a smart classroom in Claremont, which means 1.) hopefully a bit of the technical difficulty and occasional communication ‘lag’ that happens when people are dialoguing at a distance will be avoided, and 2.) They have nowhere to hide from each other and the tough questions that will inevitably arise.

 

Second, Tripp asked me to be a High Gravity specialist, which basically means I’ll be doing weekly posts after the initial meeting on Mondays (probably Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday) which will serve to do a bit of recap of the info covered that week, and more proactively, seek to prod us into further reflection on the week’s material.  The goal then, will be to post the info and what it stimulates in me, for the sake of stimulating response in you, the participants and general blog followers interested in the proceedings.  In this way, I’m hoping to start some comment dialogue and new questions/thoughts throughout the week after participants have had a bit of time to soak in the session.  It’ll be a time to react and Tripp will in-turn put these questions and reactions to Philip in the next session. The hope is to intensify the ability for you as respondents and processors to be heard and get true back-and-forth going.

 

Round-Up:

 

By way of trying to stir the pot a bit and get the Religion and Science conversation going here, Tripp asked me to post what I’ve found to be some of the common points of tension discussed relating to Religion and Science in my time at Fuller Theological Seminary. We’re interested to see how they relate to his context over at Claremont. It will be interesting to see where’s there’s coherence and difference. I’ve listed them as ‘themes’ because they each cover a host of questions, some of which I mention under each heading.

 

Given my context, the majority of these will pertain particularly (though I hope not exclusively) to the Christian religion. Also, these are not necessarily my tensions (some certainly are), but my best attempt to clarify some generalizable biggies.

And your job is to reply with yours…hence the “round-up!”
 
Five Recurring Themes in Religion and Science Discussions

1- Divine Action:  Scientists often speak of ”the causal closure of the physical”–physical effects are only caused, or rather, quite easily completely explained by physical processes.

• How can we have a robust conception of divine action in a world that scientists often argue is causally closed?
• Yes the complexity of levels change, perhaps new emergent causes develop, but doesn’t this challenge the idea of miracles at least on some level, or God acting in any way beyond perhaps the most fundamental levels of quantum physics?
• Is a God that can only set in motion (act on) slight variations through what scientists call quantum indeterminacy enough of a God, or one enough like the biblical one (for the Christian religion) to be likened to the narrative of the Judeo-Christian tradition?

 

2- Can Science be Postmodern?: Few progressive evangelicals (even fewer progressives) are still wary of letting science have any say or import into theological or hermeneutical questions related in theology or religion. Yes, the bible has its own outmoded scientific world that we can accept as right to be done away with, but these scientists seem to be way less postmodern and humble in their hermeneutic than we are!

• Is there a way to let science in, for lack of a better phrase, without giving it the de facto upper hand in all matters as if it’s the new queen of the disciplines? This relates to the previous divine action question but in generalized form.
• Can science be postmodern too?
• And can it be a conversation partner without being foisted upon us as the arbiter of what stays and goes in religion?

 

3- The Question of the Soul: I recently went to present a paper at a conference at Oxford University in the UK where the whole conference (a three-day affair) was devoted to the question of the soul in conversation with contemporary philosophy, theology, and science. It’s a hugely hot topic. There’s five conferences worth of questions that this raises, but here are a few:

• Are human beings composed of souls and bodies, mysteriously intertwined, or merely physical bodies–truly dust to dust? Can what appears to be a cold world of chemical and micro-physical determinations explain all the amazing features of consciousness and our dynamic experiential lives?
• If we’re just bodies, how do we persist (continue to exist) before the fervently testified to bodily resurrection in the NT? What do we do with the bevy of distinctions between body, soul, and spirit in the bible and other religious texts?
• Are these becoming passé terms suitable for Plato and the ancients but not us?

 

4- Moral Responsibility and Freedom: Science seems to be doing a pretty good job (at least they claim) at explaining a lot of actions and experiences we used to ascribe to “the mind” or “the soul” in terms of automatic actions in the body or chemical transactions between the brain and our nervous systems.  Some of these have even been shown to predate our conscious decisions to act in this or that way.

• If the world is really governed by this kind of physical determinism, how can we rightly ascribe to ourselves freedom and moral responsibility?
• Heck, can we even say we did this or that action or actually chose to act in the normal way we talk about our feelings, reasons, etc. guiding our actions?
• Ugh, are reformed people right to a degree that they wouldn’t even want to be (i.e. severe determinism)?

 

5- The Image of God: Given the theory of evolution and its evidence for our deep and close kinship with the rest of the animal kingdom:

• In what sense should this effect our understanding of the image of God humankind is said to bear according to the Judeo-Christian tradition?
• If our rationality, perhaps the most oft-invoked locus of the image of God, is a slowly developing evolutionary quality that our close ancestors have to a lesser degree as well, is the image of God something we can still claim exclusively as human beings? Homo sapiens but not Homo erectus or other hominins have it?
• How can we really take the human being to be so utterly distinct (and supremely important?) with a strong thorough going evolution? The Bible seems to make humans too distinct in this regard.
• What would a non-anthropocentric gospel look like?

 

Index to past discussions -

 

Index to past articles on "Science & Religion"

 

 

 

 

 

 

Discussion in Arminianism's Grundmotif: God's Goodness and Man's Free Will vs. God's Sovereignty and Middle Knowledge

Are Arminian Theology and Middle Knowledge (Molinism) Compatible?
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2013/09/are-arminian-theology-and-middle-knowledge-compatible/

 

by Roger Olson

September 4, 2013

Comments

 

One of the most basic impulses of Arminianism is that God is not the author of sin and evil—even indirectly. On this virtually everyone knowledgeable about Arminian theology agrees. Divine determinism, the belief that God directly or indirectly determines all that happens according to a predetermined plan, was rejected by Arminius and has been rejected by all Arminians since him. I have demonstrated that in Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities and Against Calvinism. Arminian theology and divine determinism are like oil and water; they cannot mix. And the reason they cannot mix is because of the Arminian Grundmotif which is God’s goodness. If divine determinism is true, the fall and all its consequences, including eternal hell, are part of God’s plan and made necessary by God even if only indirectly.

* * * * * * * *

Side Note

What is Middle Knowledge? That God knows not only what will happen but what would happen, along with all the permutations and instances of those possibilities ad naseum and ad naseum.

What is Molinism? Molinists hold that in addition to God knowing everything that does or will happen, God also knows what His creatures would freely choose if placed in any given circumstance including any resulting events and actions.

Importantly, Open Theism says this is not so and that the future of an indeterminate cosmos, and free will humanity, is always open, changeable and independent, or irrespective, of God's foreknowledge. That God and His creation react to one another based upon relationship to one another rather than upon His foreknowledge of events. That this arrangement is based upon God's divine decree when He created. That openness and freedom are the inherent structures upon which God created.

Assertion: Was Arminius a Molinist or not? If yes, did he rely on middle knowledge to reconcile God's foreknowledge with man's free will?

- R.E. Slater 

* * * * * * * *

In a now famous and much discussed article in Sixteenth Century Journal (XXVII:2 [1996]: 337-352) Dutch theologian Eef Dekker asked “Was Arminius a Molinist?” and answered in the affirmative. (Molinism is, of course, synonymous with belief in middle knowledge.) Several leading Arminius scholars have agreed. Reformed theologian Richard Muller agreed in God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Baker, 1991). (He came to the same conclusion as Dekker before him.) Dutch theologian William den Boer agrees in God’s Twofold Love: The Theology of Jacob Arminius (1559-1609) (Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2010). Now, in two recent studies of Arminius’s theology three American theologians agree. (I will be responding to their two books at a professional conference in November, so I’m going to decline to name them or address their arguments directly for now.)

 

So it would seem a consensus is developing that Arminius himself was a “Protestant Molinist” and may have actually introduced Molinism, middle knowledge, into Protestant theology. (Molina was himself a Catholic contemporary of Arminius.)

However, other Arminius scholars are not so sure. One of the most scholarly and exhaustive studies of Arminius’s theology is William G. Witt’s Notre Dame doctoral dissertation which I used extensively in Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities. Witt argued that Arminius mentioned but did not use middle knowledge. Another Arminius scholar who agrees with Witt is F. Stuart Clarke, author of The Ground of Election: Jacob Arminius’ Doctrine of the Work and Person of Christ (Paternoster, 2006).

 

Without doubt one can find references to middle knowledge in Arminius’s writings. The question is whether he relied on middle knowledge to reconcile God’s foreknowledge with free will (and there is no doubt he believed in libertarian free will) and, whether he used middle knowledge to explain God’s sovereignty in providentially governing the whole universe including creatures’ free decisions and actions.

 

Dekker argues that, in using middle knowledge, Arminius unwittingly fell into determinism. Den Boer admits that even if Arminius’s use of middle knowledge did not imply determinism, it raised some serious questions for Arminius’s consistency—especially in the practical realm. That is, even if middle knowledge does not imply determinism, it does convey the impression, at least to the untutored, that their lives are predetermined.

 

I have argued here before that believing in God’s middle knowledge, that knowledge whereby God knows not only what will happen but would happen, not only what free creatures will do but what they would do freely in any possible situation, set of circumstances, is not in-and-of itself inconsistent with Arminianism’s basic impulses which have to do with God’s goodness (his “twofold love”). However, I have argued, and continue to maintain, once one believes that God uses middle knowledge to render certain that every creature does what they do by creating them and placing them in circumstances where he knows they will “freely” do something, then determinism is at the door (if not in the living room) and that it is inconsistent with Arminianism’s basic impulses. Hence, it makes God the author of sin and evil even if only inadvertently.

 

In order to test this we must go back to the first disobedience—Adam’s and Eve’s fall. The question is not whether God knew they would disobey but whether God rendered their act of disobedience certain.

 

Advocates of middle knowledge usually rely on a distinction between “certain” or “infallible” and “necessary,” with only the latter making God the author of sin and evil. The argument is that God’s use of middle knowledge to render the fall certain, even infallibly (it could not have not happened given God’s foreknowledge of what Adam and Eve would do and his creation of them and placing them in that situation) does not render the fall necessary.

 

I tend to think that’s a distinction without a difference.

 

That use of middle knowledge, providentially to render the fall certain, necessarily implies a plan in the mind of God that makes the fall not only part of God’s consequential will but also part of his antecedent will. And, as everyone knows and agrees, the distinction between God’s consequential will and God’s antecedent will is crucial to Arminianism’s argument that God is not the author of sin and evil.

 

Why else would God use his middle knowledge providentially? And why would he use it at all if not for the purpose of meticulous providence?

 

Many Calvinists have used Molinism, middle knowledge, to “explain” predestination and reprobation in order to get God “off the hook,” so to speak, as not the author of sin and evil. I think, for example, of Millard Erickson and Bruce Ware—two evangelical Calvinists who use middle knowledge as the “key” to reconciling God’s sovereignty and human free will. However, they at least admit that their view of free will is compatibilism—that free will is compatible with determinism. In other words, if my argument is correct, they “get it”—middle knowledge used by God for providential advantage requires a compatibilist view of free will.

 

To the best of my knowledge no Arminian claims to believe in compatibilist; all embrace libertarian free will.

 

But, to me, at least, libertarian free will means “ability to do otherwise than one does.”

 

Now, admittedly, Arminian believers in middle knowledge, including those who believe God uses middle knowledge to render creatures’ decisions and actions certain according to a plan, claim to believe that creatures who sin do so with libertarian freedom. In other words, they could do otherwise. Well, at least Adam and Eve could have done otherwise than disobey God. (The picture gets more complicated for their posterity under the effects of the fall.) But could they have?

 

If middle knowledge is true and God uses it for providential advantage, as Richard Muller says, offering inducements to creatures that God knows they will follow given their dispositions and inclinations, then God is not only “in control” but “actually controlling” everything including Adam’s and Eve’s disobedience. They could not have done otherwise even if they did it “freely.” That is the very essence of compatibilism!

 

Let’s use an illustration. Suppose I know one of my students so well that I know (beyond any possibility of being wrong) that if I suggest he read a certain book he will misunderstand the subject of our course and go on to fail it. Without the book, he would pass the course. I suggest he read the book. Why? Well, perhaps because I need someone to fail the course. I don’t grade on a curve and the dean is worried that I am not upholding academic standards. All my students pass with flying colors. My career is in jeopardy as is the academic credibility of the school. So I use my middle knowledge of the student’s dispositions and inclinations to bring it about infallibly that he fails the course. Nothing I did took away his free will. He read the book voluntarily (no external coercion was used, only inducement). (Note: None of that would happen; it’s purely hypothetical.)

 

Now, who is really responsible for - or, the “author of” - the student failing the course?

 

And can it fairly be said that by rendering his failure certain, using my middle knowledge, I did not make it necessary?

 

Now, there’s no point in appealing to God’s freedom to do whatever he wants to do. This is a debate among Arminians - and Arminians, following Arminius, are not nominalists:

[Nomianlism - (in medieval philosophy) the doctrine that general or abstract words do not stand for objectively existing entities and that universals are no more than names assigned to them. Compare conceptualism, realism (def 5a).]

We all agree that God is essentially good by nature and cannot simply do anything capable of being put into words. No informed Arminian would say “Whatever God does is automatically good, just because God does it, period.” So that objection to my scenario isn’t relevant to this context—a debate among Arminians.

I tend to agree with Eef Dekker, against several leading Arminius scholars, that if Arminius used middle knowledge to explain God’s sovereignty, then he unwittingly contradicted himself. He contradicted his own most basic principle which is that God is by no means the author of sin and evil. He unwittingly fell into determinism at that point and should not have relied on middle knowledge. Why he did, if he did, is a separate question. I think reasonable answers can be imagined (having to do with his desire to build bridges between himself and his critics).

 

So what does this mean for Arminians? I’m certainly not going to say that one cannot be an Arminian and a Molinist [(a seemingly contradictory expression - R.E. Slater)]. What I will say is that, in my opinion, Molinism is a foreign body in Arminianism even if Arminius himself used it! If he did, it was a foreign body in his own theology in the sense that it conflicted with his own basic belief commitments about God’s goodness, God not being in any sense the author of sin and evil, and creatures’ free wills (especially in disobedience).

 

No one should be surprised if a theologian falls into contradiction with himself at times—especially if he (or she) writes much over a very long period of time. I’m a historical theologian and have studied the theologies of virtually every major Christian theologian from Irenaeus to Pannenberg (and beyond). In every case I find some tension, some element of conflict within the theologian’s own system.

 

Besides, being Arminian does not require absolute agreement with Arminius. If that were the case, he would have been the only Arminian (and maybe not even he would be!).

- Roger

 

[My personal take: If Arminius were alive today he would be an Open Theist and in complete agreement with today's discussion by Dr. Olson. - R.E. Slater]

 

 

* * * * * * * * *

 

 

He Said It Better Than I Did: A Guest’s Comment about Molinism

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/rogereolson/2013/09/he-said-it-better-than-i-did-a-guests-comment-about-molinism/

 

by Roger Olson

September 6, 2013

Comments

 

Very nice essay, Roger. You’ve put your finger on a key internal tension within Molinism.

 

While Molinism is *officially* committed to a libertarian view of creaturely freedom (and thus soft determinists like Ware are *not* Molinists, even if they co-opt the label), such a view of freedom requires that middle knowledge counterfactuals of actual creatures be explanatorily *posterior* to actual creaturely free choices.

Thus, if Adam and Eve are free (in the libertarian sense) to eat or not eat the forbidden fruit, then it must not be fixed *independently* of their actual choices that IF they were to be placed in such-and-such circumstances that they would eat the forbidden fruit. For if the truth of that conditional were independently fixed, then they would have no say about whether it is true, and thus couldn’t act as to bring about its falsity.

This means that they couldn’t do otherwise than eat the fruit in those circumstances, which in turn means that they weren’t free in a libertarian sense, contrary to hypothesis. Hence, the truth values of middle knowledge counterfactuals must be explanatorily *posterior* to actual creaturely free choices.

But this is a huge problem for Molinism because the providential usefulness of middle knowledge is predicated on its being explanatorily *prior* to actual creaturely choices. That’s the only way it can inform God’s creative decree. So Molinism is internally inconsistent. Its alleged reconciliation of creaturely libertarian freedom with meticulous divine providence depends on both affirming and denying that the truth values of middle knowledge counterfactuals are explanatorily *posterior* to actual creaturely free choices.

 

 

Amazon link here

 

In this book, Roger Olson sets forth classical Arminian theology and addresses the myriad misunderstandings and misrepresentations of it through the ages. Irenic yet incisive, Olson argues that classical Arminian theology has a rightful place in the evangelical church because it maintains deep roots within Reformational theology, even though it maintains important differences from Calvinism.

 

Myths addressed include:

 

Myth 1: Arminian Theology Is the Opposite of Calvinist/Reformed Theology

 

Myth 2: A Hybrid of Calvinism and Arminianism Is Possible

 

Myth 3: Arminianism Is Not an Orthodox Evangelical Option

 

Myth 4: The Heart of Arminianism Is Belief in Free Will

 

Myth 5: Arminian Theology Denies the Sovereignty of God

 

Myth 6: Arminianism Is a Human-Centered Theology

 

Myth 7: Arminianism Is Not a Theology of Grace

 

Myth 8: Arminians Do Not Believe in Predestination

 

Myth 9: Arminian Theology Denies Justification by Grace Alone Through Faith

 

Alone Myth 10: All Arminians Believe in the Governmental Theory of the Atonement

 

 

 

continue to -

 

Index to past articles on "Calvinism v. Arminianism"

 

 




 

2014 Wesleyan Philosophical Societal Conference Information

 

 

Catherine Keller is the keynote speaker at the

Wesleyan Philosophical Society meeting

in March of 2014, Nampa, Idaho.

 

Paper proposals are due October 1, 2013.

 

Wiki Info - here

 

Net Info - here 

 

 

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Call for Papers, Wesleyan Philosophical Society
Annual Meeting: March 6, 2014,
Northwest Nazarene University, Nampa, ID
Keynote Speaker: Catherine Keller, Drew University

 

 

Historically speaking, Western philosophy has focused intently upon the mind. Consistently if not absolutely, philosophy from Plato onward has spent its time dwelling upon ideation, perception, cognition, and recollection, and has pursued, again de facto if not de jure, a duality of mind and body that continues to this day.

Likewise, if perhaps more ironically, some branches of Christianity have understood faith to be a mental assent to certain propositional statements, a mind-oriented decision that involves ideas and beliefs. Even in the Holiness movements of the 19th and 20th century, which emphasize the emotional as well as the rational, the seat of the emotions is still the mind. In spite of the body of Jesus Christ, we have managed oftentimes to advocate for disembodied faith centered upon the soul.

Some orienting questions to consider exploring include:

- What would a philosophy of the body look like from a Christian, and/or Wesleyan context?

- How do we privilege or disenfranchise our bodies as we engage God and the church?

- What do Christian ethics tell us -- via subtext -- about sin and the body?

- How do we account for the body of Christ Jesus in our thinking?

- What can we learn about God, faith, sin, and suffering via the body?

- Do both philosophy and theology need a corrective with regard to mind/body dualism?

- How does contemporary philosophy deal with the legacy of Descartes’s mind/body dualism?

- How does philosophy of mind help identify and explore the relationship between body & mind?

- Do ancient or eastern philosophical traditions offer insight to the issues surrounding bodies?

- In what way does John Wesley appropriate or challenge the Western tradition on these matters?

- How do contemporary neurological studies inform philosophy regarding the mind and body?

Papers that examine the role of the body in philosophy, Christianity, and ethics are welcomed; papers exploring other themes will also be considered.

 

 

 

3 Christian Perspectives on War: Just War Theory, Christian Pacificism, and Active Peacemaking, Part 2

The ethics of a Syrian military intervention:

The experts respond

http://www.religionnews.com/2013/08/29/the-ethics-of-a-syrian-military-intervention-the-experts-respond/

 

Yonat Shimron

August 29, 2013

 

WASHINGTON (RNS) As the Obama administration readies for a probable military strike against Syria, Religion News Service asked a panel of theologians and policy experts whether the U.S. should intervene in Syria in light of the regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians. Would the “Just War” doctrine justify U.S. military action, and what is America’s moral responsibility? Here are their responses, which have been edited for clarity.

 

 

Duke University Divinity School emeritus theologian Stanley Hauerwas is often considered America’s most important Protestant theologian. Photo courtesy Duke University

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This image available for Web and print publication. For questions, contact Sally Morrow.

 

Stanley Hauerwas

Professor emeritus of theological ethics at Duke Divinity School

 

What possible grounds does the United States have for intervention? The language of the world’s policeman comes up again. You want to know, ‘Who appointed you the world’s policeman?’

 

You could say the U.S. can justify the intervention because stability is part of our foreign policy in order to maintain ourselves as the premier country in the world. So it’s smart to intervene. But there’s no moral justification.

 

Of course (nerve) gas is a terrible weapon. You hear echoes of weapons of mass destruction. And with gas you can’t control it in terms of its indiscriminate effects. But again, I just don’t know how intervention fits under “just war” categories. Syria isn’t attacking the United States.

 

The U.S. ought to ask the Arab League to do something. Near neighbors have more responsibility in these situations. If the U.S. intervenes, we just reinforce the presumption, which is true, that we’re an imperial power.

 

The language of intervention and no-intervention is meaningless. America has hundreds of military bases around the world. We’ve intervened. The question is what are the limits of American intervention? Right now there doesn’t seem to be any. President Obama is clearly worried about being involved in an intervention in Syria you can’t get out of. I appreciate that. But America is everywhere.

 

The just war tradition is based on a series of arguments to be tested before using force against another population. Legitimate and competent authorities must logically argue that the use of force will end or limit the suffering of a people and these forceful actions are the last options after all diplomatic, social, political, and economic measures have been exhausted.

 

 

William Galston is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. Religion News Service photo courtesy Brookings Institution

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This image available for Web and print publication. For questions, contact Sally Morrow.

 

William Galston

Senior fellow, Brookings Institution

 

In principle, just war theory does justify military intervention to protect innocent human life — as long as the proposed action meets the tests of effectiveness and proportionality. But nations may undertake military action only after every other possible means of ending the bloodshed has been exhausted.

 

Although we can argue about whether that condition has been met in the case of Syria, prospects for diplomatic progress appear slim, and the Syrian government’s recent use of poison gas against a rebel stronghold probably derailed diplomacy indefinitely. For the Assad regime, there’s no middle ground; if it doesn’t prevail militarily, it will disappear. So it’s reasonable to conclude that if we do nothing, nothing will change, and the slaughter of civilians will continue indefinitely.

 

If we can act effectively to protect innocent human life, we have an obligation do so — unless the costs to us are prohibitive (and there’s no reason to suppose they must be). We failed that test in Rwanda but met it in the Balkans. We do not know whether the options we now have will prove effective, but that uncertainty does not justify doing nothing.

 

 

Qamar-ul Huda, senior program officer in the Religion & Peacemaking Center of the United States Institute of Peace. Photo courtesy United States Institute of Peace

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This image available for Web and print publication. For questions, contact Sally Morrow.

 

Qamar-ul Huda

Senior program officer in the Religion & Peacemaking Center of the U.S. Institute of Peace

 

The just war tradition, in religious or secular traditions, emphasizes the principle of proportionality, that is to say that an attack on any population shouldn’t target noncombatants, the environment or natural resources; the attack shouldn’t annihilate the opponent’s military if it is clear they are in a position of surrendering or losing.

 

“Just war” arguments for a military intervention in Syria need to consider the problem of no action by the international community, which can increase civilian suffering and validate the actions of an abusive government. These discussions need to study the problems of intervening and limiting the force against military institutions and how civilians will be protected in the midst of the intervention and post intervention.

 

Also, we need to examine, when the intervention is over, how efforts can limit or mitigate sectarian violence and the possibilities of a civil war. We need to ask: Ultimately what new responsibilities do the interveners have in rebuilding, reconstructing and restoring peace in Syrian society?

 

 

 The Rev. Drew Christiansen, a Jesuit priest and visiting scholar at Boston College who has been a longtime adviser to the U.S. Catholic bishops on international affairs and the Middle East. Photo courtesy Caitlin Cunnihgham, Boston College

 

 

The Rev. Drew Christiansen

Jesuit priest and visiting scholar at Boston College and longtime adviser to the U.S. Catholic Bishops on international affairs

 

My problem is that I don’t see why this kind of chemical attack matters so mightily when 100,000 civilians have been killed in Syria already. It seems to me that you’ve had massive attacks on civilians — with the world standing aside — that should have been the reason for intervention. But there’s also a question of proportionality and success, and I think that there are good reasons to think you might make things worse by a military attack.

 

There’s no objective for success right now. They’d do much better to try to work long-term for support of the elements of the rebellion that the U.S. wants to support, and we should work strenuously to build up the capacity to respond and build up the responsibility to protect (vulnerable populations), which we can’t do now.

 

I just don’t see why the particular (chemical weapons) attack should justify intervention at this point, especially if it’s just a rap on the knuckles to remind Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Now if the chemical attacks were to become a pattern there would be good reason to intervene. But for one occasion, it seems to me that it doesn’t weigh up compared to those who should have been protected and haven’t been, and those who still need protection. I just don’t understand. It seems to me you need a strategic objective, which doesn’t exist, and therefore just war norms don’t apply.

 

 

Tyler Wigg-Stevenson,

founder and director of the Two Futures Project and the author of the forthcoming “The World Is Not Ours To Save: Finding the Freedom to Do Good.” Photo courtesy Tyler Wigg-Stevenson

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This image available for Web publication. For questions, contact Sally Morrow.

Tyler Wigg-Stevenson

Chair of the World Evangelical Alliance’s Global Task Force on Nuclear Weapons and author of “The World Is Not Ours To Save: Finding the Freedom to Do Good”

 

As Christians we know precisely and unambiguously what we are for, in Syria as everywhere: peace, justice, and reconciliation. We also stand absolutely in opposition to all weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, because they weaponize the tactic of indiscriminate killing, categorically forbidden by every Christian tradition of ethics on war and peace.

 

This clarity regarding moral ends, however, does not carry an automatic prescription of means to achieve them. This is what complicates our thinking about the American response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons. The one who takes innocent life, in any situation, calls down the wrath of the Lord upon his or her head. But the United States is not the sword of God. Its response to Assad’s atrocities must be contextualized by prudential wisdom about the extended consequences of different actions. In such matters no “expert” can really know the future.

 

This is why our moral certitude actually leaves us in a place of profound tension regarding proposals for tactical intervention: We know what is right, but not the course of action to bring about the right. All we have is a set of convictions against which we can weigh a host of imperfect proposals.

 

 

Rabbi Michael Broyde, professor of law and senior fellow, Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion. Photo courtesy Rabbi Michael Broyde

 

Rabbi Michael Broyde

Professor of law and senior fellow, Emory University’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion

 

Jewish traditional just war theory can certainly be used to justify military intervention in Syria both to topple a dictator and to save the lives of those without guilt. But even more needs to be noted. The Jewish tradition avers that it is wrong to stand by while one’s neighbors blood is shed (and while that biblical verse does not directly apply for a variety of technical reasons), its ideals certainly ought to guide us. When the lives of innocent people are at stake, all people should do whatever they can to save those lives, even if this means that the lives of the guilty will be lost.

 

Of course, if there is any lesson in modern times, it is that the theory of just war in any religious or legal tradition can not only be evaluated based on the theory, but also based on the likelihood of success. A proper application of just war theory can produce a situation in which good people apply just and lawful force to a bad situation and make it much worse, both in theory and in practice.

 

In the real world, just war theory has to actually work, and not just theoretically work. Doing nothing is a moral option when doing anything makes a bad situation worse. Options that bring peace and protect the innocent are to be favored when reasonable people think that they are likely to work in fact.

 

 

Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University. Photo courtesy Andrew Bacevich

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This image available for Web publication. For questions, contact Sally Morrow.

 

Andrew J. Bacevich

Professor of international relations at Boston University

 

From a moral perspective, it appears that observers see killing civilians with chemical weapons as somehow different from killing civilians with conventional weapons. I don’t know why there would be any distinction. Egyptians who are killed are just as dead as the Syrians who were killed, and though it appears that dying of a chemical weapons attack is an awful experience, frankly bleeding to death from a gunshot wound to your chest or stepping on a mine that blows off your leg is equally awful. So anyone who makes an argument that there’s a moral obligation to act has to address that question: Why here and not there?

 

The second aspect it seems to me is: What do we expect to achieve? Even if there is a moral case for intervention, how does the use of force remedy the situation? It appears to me that this is going to be a very limited attack with a very limited target set. There’s no intention of overthrowing the regime and no intention of limiting the chemical weapons capability of the Syrian Army.

 

So beyond allowing ourselves to feel virtuous because we have done something in response to a reprehensible act, what has been gained? If indeed the episode in Syria rises to the level where it is different from Egypt and we really are morally obligated to do something, then it ought to be something more than just a gesture. And of course as a practical matter, [frankly] nobody’s got the appetite to do anything more than make gestures.

 

 

Robert Parham

Executive editor of EthicsDaily.com and executive director of the Baptist Center for Ethics.

 

As President Obama campaigns for military action against Syria, Christians would do well to remember the eight rules of “Just War.”

 

First is the just cause of protecting innocent human life.

 

Second is securing the authorization for war from Congress.

 

Third is last resort, the exhaustion of efforts at conflict resolution before launching a war.

 

Fourth is just intent. Restoring U.S. honor or punishing Syria after it has crossed the “red line” of chemical weapons hardly passes just intent.

 

Fifth is probability of success–a high chance to achieve war’s stated purpose.

 

Sixth is proportionality of cost. War must do more good than harm. Do U.S. strikes prolong the civil war and create more refugees?

 

Seventh is just means. Targeting non-combatant civilians is immoral, which makes strikes in urban areas problematic.

 

Eighth is clear announcement. The U.S. must state clearly why and when Syria will be struck.

 

These are high moral hurdles to cross. Yet it is better to cross them than to rush into war – war is always more costly with more negative unforeseen consequences than war-makers project.

 

 

(This article was reported by Yonat Shimron, Sarah Pulliam Bailey, David Gibson and Lauren Markoe.)

 

KRE/AMB END RNS

 

 

continued -

3 Christian Perspectives on War: Just War Theory, Christian Pacificism, and Active Peacemaking,
Part 1

http://relevancy22.blogspot.com/2013/09/3-christian-perspectives-on-war-just.html

 

 

 

 

 

Dallas Willard: The Protoevangelical Faith of Evangelicalism, Part 2

 

 

The Many Beating Hearts of Evangelicalism

Part 2

http://www.patheos.com/blogs/jesuscreed/2013/09/05/dallas-willard-proto-evangelical/

 

by Scot McKnight

Sep 5, 2013

Comments

 

Let us agree that one way of talking about evangelicalism is to speak to five themes:

• Bible,
• Conversion,
• Cross,
• Evangelistic and Social Activism, and its
• Focus on Salvation.

 

How does Dallas Willard fit into these major themes? This is the question Gary Black Jr asks in The Theology of Dallas Willard: Discovering Protoevangelical Faith.

 

I cannot emphasize the value of this book enough: Dallas Willard was way ahead of the curve on many issues.

 

Dallas left an imprint on each of these themes. That, in many ways, was his genius, but even more he set theology in the context of Christlikeness, or he set theology in the context of formation. Any theology that is not in the context of formation needs to be recontextualized.

 

What area of Willard’s theology was the most challenging for you?

Where do you think his impact was/is?

 

To begin with, Dallas Willard ordered these themes so that Bible and conversion generated cross-and-activism in the context of a robust view of salvation. If you listen to the Word, you will be converted into those other themes.

 

Scripture: it is the human and divine in concert. He’s not into either inerrancy or plenary inspiration theologies. Infallibility is “for the purposes of guiding us into a life-saving relationship with God in his kingdom” (58). The Bible is comprised of “witness testimony” and as such has “the limitations of individual perspectives” (59). God can be trusted to communicate what God wants us to know. Once again, his view emphasizes the divine infallible ability to accomplish divine purposes. Many defenses of Scripture result in rationalism and dogmatism.

 

Black says Willard removes his view of Scripture from so much of what evangelicals fight about. Scripture is a “physical, written manifestation of God’s revealed presence” (60). Here he sketches Logos, which is “present in the Scriptures, in history, in nature, and also discovered in the lives of individuals” (60). Scriptures are an objective presence of the Logos in the world, but not an all-inclusive representation of the Logos. The living Logos transcends language (62). Straightforward readings are its design. Methodology does not necessarily lead to encounter into transformation. Let the Bible be the Bible, and listen to it. The highest view of Scripture listens and applies Scripture.

 

Also, Willard believes in a “conversational revelation”: that God speaks and we hear God’s voice. We are called to live our life “with God.” God still communicates; cessationism is contra the Bible. God still uses the “still small voice.” God is a person; we are persons; person-to-person communication follows.

 

Willard on “conversion”: his focus is transformation, not the term “conversion.” Thus, he connects justification and sanctification, and conversion is thus a life-long event. It is progressive adaptation to ontological status. It is holistic conversion of the whole self into Christlikeness.

 

Black sketches Willard’s VIM theory: vision, intention and means. Christlikeness met with intention to be Christlike and the spiritual disciplines are the means. It is more than correct belief and it cannot happen all at once. God’s Spirit transforms.

 

On activism: Willard thinks evangelicalism’s activism (in evangelism) is rooted in an unhealthy and unbiblical understanding of salvation. In other words, discipleship has left salvation’s house. He advocates “discipleship evangelism.” If the aim is Christlikeness, then activism must be entirely devoted to that — not to forgiveness or guilt or status.

 

Only in light of the above can we see what Willard is onto when it comes to crucicentrism. Justification is a restored relationship with God. “Just as if I’d never sinned” is unhelpful. Atonement is God giving his Son for us and our salvation. The cross is one dimension of that giving. New life is atonement. How it happens is a mystery. Salvation is about deliverance — from sin and sins. Not just imputation of a meritorious condition but a new relationship — again showing how relational theology is at its core. Traditional evangelical atonement theories — penal substitution —  then can miss the whole point. It is all about a state of being. Thus it is not so much believing in the cross but entering into the cross.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Past Series Links:

 

Dallas Willard: The Protoevangelical Faith of Evangelicalism, Part 1

http://relevancy22.blogspot.com/2013/09/dallas-willard-protoevangelical-faith.html

 

 

 

 

"Yes, I'm the Mechanic" ... Contentedness in Public Service ...

"Yes, I'm the Mechanic"

 

http://vimeo.com/73684887

 

 

Auto-repair shop owner George Zaloom says there's no reason

why every Christian shouldn't find joy at work.

 

 

 

"I love this video profile of George the mechanic and his sense of purpose in the honest work he does for the citizens of his community. We spend at least a third of our adult lives in the workplace (at least in the developed world) so it is a wonder to me that we don't have a more robust theology on God in the workplace and the high calling of the ordinary working life. Not all of us can be Bono or Oprah and change the world from a stage. Most of us are working hard to change our little corner of the globe. Like in George's case, one driver at a time. I look forward to more video profiles like this one!! "- Vimeo viewer Pam H.

 

 

 15 Bible verses about serving God
and others out of love (NIV)

http://voices.yahoo.com/15-bible-verses-serving-god-others-5172029.html

 

 

Romans 12:11 (#1 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

11 Never be lacking in zeal, but keep your spiritual fervor, serving the Lord.

 

Deuteronomy 13:4 (#2 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

4 It is the LORD your God you must follow, and him you must revere. Keep his commands and obey him; serve him and hold fast to him.

 

Galatians 5:13 (#3 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

13 You, my brothers, were called to be free. But do not use your freedom to indulge the sinful nature; rather, serve one another in love.

 

1 Peter 4:10 (#4 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

10 Each one should use whatever gift he has received to serve others, faithfully administering God's grace in its various forms.

 

Joshua 22:5 (#5 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

5 But be very careful to keep the commandment and the law that Moses the servant of the LORD gave you: to love the LORD your God, to walk in all his ways, to obey his commands, to hold fast to him and to serve him with all your heart and all your soul."

 

 

1 Samuel 12:24 (#6 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

 24 But be sure to fear the LORD and serve him faithfully with all your heart; consider what great things he has done for you.

 

Mark 10:45 (#7 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

45 For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many."

 

1 Chronicles 28:9 (#8 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

9 "And you, my son Solomon, acknowledge the God of your father, and serve him with wholehearted devotion and with a willing mind, for the LORD searches every heart and understands every motive behind the thoughts. If you seek him, he will be found by you; but if you forsake him, he will reject you forever.

 

Malachi 3:18 (#9 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

18 And you will again see the distinction between the righteous and the wicked, between those who serve God and those who do not.

 

Matthew 6:24 (#10 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

24 "No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and Money.

 

Luke 22:26-27 (#11 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

26 But you are not to be like that. Instead, the greatest among you should be like the youngest, and the one who rules like the one who serves. 27 For who is greater, the one who is at the table or the one who serves? Is it not the one who is at the table? But I am among you as one who serves.

 

John 12:26 (#12 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

26 Whoever serves me must follow me; and where I am, my servant also will be. My Father will honor the one who serves me.

 

Romans 7:6 (#13 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

6 But now, by dying to what once bound us, we have been released from the law so that we serve in the new way of the Spirit, and not in the old way of the written code.

 

Hebrews 9:14 (#14 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

14 How much more, then, will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself unblemished to God, cleanse our consciences from acts that lead to death, so that we may serve the living God!

 

1 Peter 4:11 (#15 of 15 Bible Verses about Serving God and Others)

 

11 If anyone speaks, he should do it as one speaking the very words of God. If anyone serves, he should do it with the strength God provides, so that in all things God may be praised through Jesus Christ. To him be the glory and the power for ever and ever. Amen.