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| Illustration by R.E. Slater & ChatGPT |
Process is not a metaphysical option among others, but the minimal ontological condition required for intelligibility, actualization, emergence, and temporal reality to be real rather than assumed.
The first essay in this series surveyed the contemporary landscape of reality theories. It did not seek to resolve metaphysical disputes, but to clarify them. By organizing dominant accounts of reality into a small number of recurring families, and by examining how each performs under shared diagnostic pressures, it revealed a striking pattern: despite their differences, these theories repeatedly encounter the same unresolved questions.
Those questions concern becoming rather than being, actuality rather than possibility, emergence rather than mere complexity, and intelligibility rather than description alone. They arise not at the margins of inquiry, but at its core - where scientific explanation, philosophical coherence, and lived experience intersect.
This second essay takes the next step. It does not introduce a new metaphysical system, nor does it defend a particular philosophical school. Instead, it asks a more constrained and more demanding question:
Do the recurring tensions identified in contemporary accounts of reality point toward a metaphysical requirement rather than a theoretical preference?
To pose the question this way is to shift the terms of debate. The issue is no longer which ontology one finds most compelling, elegant, or familiar. The issue is whether certain ontological commitments are already being relied upon - implicitly and unavoidably - by the very practices of explanation, interpretation, and understanding that define contemporary inquiry.
Table A
Comparative Performance of Contemporary Reality Theories Across Diagnostic Criteria
| Reality Theory Family | Time / Becoming | Actualization (Possibility → Fact) | Relationality | Emergence | Experience | Value | Primary Strength | Primary Limitation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stuff-First (Physicalism) | ◐ (parametric) | ✖ (assumed) | ◐ (external) | ◐ (descriptive) | ✖ | ✖ | Predictive power; causal clarity | Cannot ground novelty, agency, or meaning |
| Structure-First (Math / OSR) | ✖ | ✖ | ✔ (formal) | ✖ | ✖ | ✖ | Explains order, symmetry, lawfulness | Lacks account of becoming and concreteness |
| Information-First | ◐ | ✖ | ✔ (formal) | ◐ | ✖ | ✖ | Models complexity and constraint | Cannot explain instantiation or lived actuality |
| Experience-First | ✔ (phenomenal) | ◐ | ✔ | ◐ | ✔ | ✔ | Restores meaning and subjectivity | Weak cosmological integration |
| Two-Tier (Supernatural) | ◐ | ◐ | ✖ | ◐ | ✔ | ✔ | Grounds transcendence and normativity | Breaks causal and ontological continuity |
| Construction-First (#6) | ◐ (historical) | ✖ | ✔ (social) | ✖ | ✔ | ◐ | Exposes power, identity, mediation | Undermines constraint and correction |
Legend:
✔ = addresses well ◐ = partial / ambiguous ✖ = weak or unresolved
Table A demonstrates that each theory family secures explanatory success by sacrificing or minimizing other dimensions of reality. No single framework satisfies all diagnostic criteria without remainder.
Introduction
Metaphysical discussions often proceed as though ontology were a matter of choice. One selects a framework - materialist, structural, informational, experiential - based on explanatory success, aesthetic appeal, or disciplinary loyalty. Yet the analysis undertaken in the previous essay suggests that this framing may be misleading.
Across physics, biology, philosophy, and theology, explanations routinely presuppose features of reality that are not fully accounted for within the ontologies that officially accompany them. The Relationality of Time is treated as real in practice and minimized in theory. Emergence is described as effective and denied causal depth. Possibility spaces are rigorously defined, while the transition to actuality is left unexplained. Experience is taken as epistemically central and ontologically marginal.
These tensions are not the result of conceptual confusion or theoretical immaturity alone. They persist even in the most refined contemporary accounts. This persistence raises a critical question:
are the tensions accidental, or do they indicate that something structurally necessary about reality has yet to be fully acknowledged?
This essay argues that the latter is the case.
The claim advanced here is not that process philosophy, as a historical tradition, must be adopted wholesale. Nor is it that process provides a final or complete metaphysical account. Rather, the claim is more modest and more stringent:
Any account of reality that seeks to remain intelligible, coherent, and faithful to contemporary knowledge must treat becoming, relational actualization, and temporal production as ontologically fundamental rather than derivative.
In this sense, process is not introduced as a metaphysical preference, but as a minimal ontological constraint - a requirement imposed by the phenomena themselves.
To speak of necessity here is not to invoke logical deduction or metaphysical certainty in a classical sense. It is to speak of explanatory indispensability. A concept is necessary when attempts to do without it repeatedly reintroduce it under different names, or rely upon it tacitly while denying it explicitly. The argument of this essay is that process occupies precisely this position in contemporary thought.
The sections that follow examine four domains where this necessity becomes especially clear: intelligibility, actuality, emergence, and temporality. In each case, the argument proceeds in the same manner. First, the domain is described as it appears in contemporary theory and practice. Second, the limits of static or non-processual ontologies are identified. Finally, it is shown that only an ontology that treats reality as eventful, relational, and temporally productive can account for what is already being assumed.
Only after this work is done will it be appropriate to name process explicitly and minimally - not as a completed system, but as the irreducible remainder left standing once other ontological options have spoken.
Table B
Recurring Ontological Features Across Contemporary Theories of Reality
Comparative Recursions
| Recurring Feature | How It Appears Across Theories | How It Is Minimized or Deferred | What Remains Unresolved |
|---|---|---|---|
| Becoming | Change universally acknowledged | Treated as parametric, perspectival, or illusory | How reality genuinely comes to be |
| Actualization | Possibility spaces widely defined | Selection treated as brute fact or collapse | Why this outcome occurs |
| Relational Production | Relations recognized as important | Rendered static or structural | How relations generate novelty |
| Emergence | Novelty described at higher levels | Denied causal depth | Whether emergence is ontologically real |
| Experience | Epistemically central | Ontologically displaced | How experience belongs in reality |
| Value | Normativity widely presupposed | Reduced to projection or utility | Why anything matters |
Interpretive Pattern
| Observation | Implication |
|---|---|
| Same unresolved features recur across theories | Not local failures |
| Recursions appear at explanatory limits | Ontological pressure points |
| No static ontology resolves them | Conceptual insufficiency |
| Each theory reintroduces them implicitly | Suggests deeper necessity |
- Part 1 - Intelligibility - Coherence from Within
- Part 2 - Actuality and Possibility - From Potential to Event
- Part 3 - Emergence - From Complexity to Creative Event
- Part 4 - Temporality and Becoming - Why an Unfinished World Cannot Be Reduced to a Timeless One
- Part 5 - Process as Ontological Constraint - The Minimal Remainder
I. Intelligibility as a Metaphysical Fact
Any account of reality presupposes that reality is, in some meaningful sense, intelligible. This presupposition is so deeply embedded in scientific and philosophical practice that it often goes unnoticed. Yet it is not trivial. To claim that reality is intelligible is to claim not merely that it can be described, but that it can be understood - that it exhibits coherence, regularity, and internal consistency sufficient to support inquiry from within.
Modern science depends upon this assumption at every level. Experimental repetition presumes stability across time. Mathematical modeling presumes that patterns are not accidental. Explanation itself presumes that events are connected in ways that can be traced, learned, and anticipated. Even skepticism presupposes intelligibility, insofar as it assumes that reasons can be given for doubt.
The question, then, is not whether reality appears intelligible in practice, but what kind of reality must exist for intelligibility to be possible at all.
Intelligibility Is Not Explanation
A common mistake in metaphysical discussions is to treat intelligibility as a byproduct of explanation. On this view, reality is simply there, and intelligibility emerges only when human cognition imposes conceptual order upon it. Laws, models, and theories are said to organize an otherwise indifferent world.
Yet this inversion fails to account for the success of inquiry itself. Explanations succeed only because the world already exhibits forms of order that are responsive to investigation. Mathematical description works because reality behaves consistently enough to be describable. Prediction works because patterns persist across time. Inquiry works because reality does not dissolve into randomness at each moment.
Intelligibility, therefore, cannot be merely epistemic. It must be, at least in part, ontological.
The Limits of Static Intelligibility
Non-processual ontologies typically ground intelligibility in static features of reality: fixed laws, timeless structures, or immutable mathematical relations. On such accounts, intelligibility is secured by what does not change.
While this approach captures important aspects of order, it introduces a difficulty. If intelligibility is grounded entirely in what is static, then change becomes secondary - something to be accommodated rather than explained. Time is reduced to a parameter. Becoming is re-described as rearrangement. Novelty is treated as apparent rather than real.
Yet scientific practice resists this reduction. The intelligibility of reality is not exhausted by invariance alone. It also depends upon continuity through change - the ability of reality to maintain coherence as it unfolds. Laws must hold across time, but they must also operate in time. Patterns must persist, but they must persist through transformation.
A purely static account can describe regularity, but it struggles to explain why regularity remains intelligible in a world that is continuously changing.
Intelligibility and Temporal Coherence
What makes reality intelligible is not simply that it is ordered, but that it is coherently ordered across time. Past states inform present conditions. Present actions shape future possibilities. Explanation traces pathways, not snapshots.
This temporal coherence is not an optional feature of understanding; it is its condition. To understand something is to situate it within a sequence - of causes, developments, or relations - that unfolds. A reality in which events were disconnected across moments would be unintelligible, regardless of how mathematically describable each moment appeared in isolation.
Thus, intelligibility requires more than static structure. It requires that reality must carry itself forward in a way that preserves coherence while allowing transformation. This requirement already presses beyond substance, structure, or information alone.
The Implicit Appeal to Process
At this point, many contemporary accounts quietly introduce process-like notions without naming them. They speak of evolution, dynamics, interactions, histories, pathways, and trajectories. They describe systems that develop, laws that govern change, and relations that unfold.
Yet these notions are often treated as secondary descriptors rather than ontological commitments. The language of process is used instrumentally, while the ontology remains officially static.
The argument here is that this division cannot be sustained. If intelligibility depends upon temporal coherence, and temporal coherence depends upon reality’s capacity to sustain order through becoming, then intelligibility itself presupposes a processual dimension of reality.
This does not yet specify what kind of process reality is. It does not require commitment to any particular metaphysical system. It establishes only this: a reality that is intelligible must be capable of ongoing, coherent becoming.
The next section turns to a more pointed pressure point - one where the insufficiency of static ontology becomes even clearer.
II. Actuality, Possibility, and the Problem of Quantum Measurement
Few issues place greater pressure on contemporary metaphysics than the question of actuality - how something becomes this rather than that, here rather than there, now rather than later. Across scientific and philosophical domains, reality is increasingly described in terms of possibility spaces rather than fixed outcomes. Yet the transition from possibility to fact (an actualized event) remains one of the least well-accounted-for features of contemporary ontology.
Quantum theory brings this issue into sharp relief whether one appeals to wavefunction collapse interpretations, Many-Worlds theories, decoherence-based approaches, or relational, QBist, and informational views. Static ontologies describe structures. Probabilistic ontologies describe possibilities. But neither explain event-production.
The present argument does not depend on any specific interpretation of quantum mechanics. What matters is that all interpretations must account, in some manner, for the transition from possibility to determinate event.
Possibility Is Not Yet Reality
Modern quantum physics does not describe the world as a set of determinate states evolving smoothly through time. Instead, it describes systems in terms of probabilistic amplitudes, superpositions of possible states, and distributions of possible outcomes. These formal structures define what may occur under given conditions, but they do not, by themselves, explain why a particular outcome is realized.
This distinction is crucial. A space of possibilities, no matter how precisely defined, is not yet an actuality. Mathematical description alone cannot account for the fact that one possibility becomes real while others do not. The question of actuality is therefore not merely technical; it is ontological.
Many contemporary accounts attempt to minimize this gap. Some reinterpret probabilities epistemically, as reflections of incomplete knowledge. Others posit branching realities in which all possibilities are realized. Still others appeal to decoherence or environmental interaction as explanatory closure. Yet in each case, the core question remains: what makes an event occur as an event?
Measurement as an Ontological Pressure Point
The so-called measurement problem is often treated as a specialized concern within quantum foundations. In fact, it functions as a diagnostic site for broader metaphysical assumptions.
Measurement marks the moment when an indeterminate range of outcomes yields a determinate fact. Regardless of interpretation, something decisive occurs. An event happens. A record is produced. A history branches or collapses. The system is no longer merely describable in terms of potentialities.
What matters for present purposes is not which interpretation of quantum mechanics is preferred, but that no interpretation can avoid the actuality problem. Whether actuality is said to emerge through collapse, branching, interaction, or contextualization, it must emerge somehow. Theories that deny this do so only by redefining actuality out of existence.
Static Ontologies and the Brute Fact of Actualization
Non-processual ontologies tend to treat actualization as either illusory or brute. If reality is fundamentally static - composed of timeless laws, fixed structures, or complete mathematical objects - then the occurrence of a particular event is either fully determined from the outset or inexplicable.
In deterministic accounts, actuality is merely the unfolding of what was already built-in, or implicit. In indeterministic accounts, actuality is a selection without cause. In both cases, becoming is reduced to description rather than explanation.
The difficulty is not that these accounts fail mathematically. It is that they lack ontological resources to explain why actuality happens at all, rather than remaining indefinitely suspended in possibility.
Actuality as Event
The pressure exerted by quantum measurement suggests that actuality cannot be treated as a static property. It must be understood as something that occurs. An event is not simply the instantiation of a pre-existing state, but a moment of resolution in which relational conditions yield a determinate outcome.
This language of eventhood already pervades scientific practice. Physicists speak of interactions, detections, transitions, and decays. What is often left implicit is that these terms describe ontologically productive moments, not merely observational conveniences.
To acknowledge this is not to abandon realism, but to deepen it. Actualization is not less real because it is eventful; it is more so.
The Quiet Return of Process
Here again, process reenters the discussion not as a doctrine, but as a necessity. If actuality is not simply given, but achieved - if events are moments in which possibilities become actualized events/facts through relational interaction - then reality cannot be adequately described as a completed structure.
Actuality requires becoming. It requires a reality capable of producing determinate outcomes from indeterminate conditions. It requires time not merely as a coordinate, but as the medium in which events occur.
This conclusion does not yet specify the nature of process, nor does it resolve the interpretive debates within quantum theory. It establishes something more basic:
any ontology that treats actuality as derivative, illusory, or as brute fact, fails to account for what scientific practice already presupposes - intelligible becoming.
The next section turns to a related pressure point - one that extends beyond physics into biology, cognition, and culture - the problem of emergence.
III. Emergence - Why Novelty Cannot Be Epiphenomenal
From Complexity to Creative Advance
Emergence marks one of the most widely acknowledged and least comfortably explained features of contemporary reality. Across the sciences, it is increasingly clear that complex systems give rise to behaviors, capacities, and organizations that are not readily predictable from their constituent parts alone. Life emerges from chemistry, consciousness from biology, and culture from social interaction. These developments are not rare anomalies; they are pervasive (processual) features of the world we inhabit.
The metaphysical question is not whether emergence occurs, but what kind of occurrence it is.
Weak Emergence and Its Limits
Many contemporary frameworks accept what is often called weak emergence. On this view, emergent phenomena are real in a descriptive or explanatory sense, but not in an ontologically robust one. Higher-level properties are said to supervene entirely on lower-level processes, adding no new causal powers of their own. Emergence becomes a matter of epistemic limitation rather than ontological novelty.
This approach has practical advantages. It preserves continuity with physical explanation and avoids invoking mysterious forces or exceptions to natural law. Yet it does so at a cost. If emergent properties possess no causal efficacy, then they are explanatorily idle. Life, mind, and agency become names for patterns that do no real work.
The difficulty is not merely philosophical. Scientific practice routinely treats emergent phenomena as causally significant. Biological regulation, neural integration, and social coordination are not epiphenomenal glosses; they are operative realities. Weak emergence explains complexity, but it does not explain why higher-level organization matters.
Strong Emergence and Ontological Anxiety
In response, some accounts posit strong emergence - the claim that genuinely new causal powers arise at higher levels of organization. This view acknowledges novelty as real, but often does so reluctantly. Strong emergence is frequently treated as metaphysically suspect, a last resort invoked only when reduction fails.
The hesitation is understandable. If emergence introduces new causal powers, how are they related to lower-level processes? Do they violate physical closure? Do they introduce ontological discontinuities?
These concerns reveal a deeper problem. They assume that causation must be exhaustively bottom-up, and that novelty is incompatible with continuity. Under such assumptions, emergence can only appear as an anomaly.
Emergence as Productive Organization
A processual perspective reframes the issue. Rather than asking whether emergence violates lower-level causation, it asks whether organization itself can be causally productive. On this view, higher-level patterns are not additions to reality, but structured modes of activity that shape how lower-level processes are taken up, coordinated, and constrained.
Emergent phenomena do not float above their components; they arise through relational integration of experiential interaction over time. What is new is not the material substrate, but the pattern of activity it sustains. Novelty, in this sense, is not ex nihilo creation, but genuine creative/novel advance - the generation of new forms of order within continuity (creatio continua)
This understanding aligns more closely with scientific practice than either strict reductionism or metaphysical dualism. Systems biology, neuroscience, and ecological theory increasingly emphasize feedback, regulation, and multi-level interaction. These are not reducible to simple aggregation. They describe how systems become more than the sum of their parts through sustained relational dynamics.
Downward Influence Without Violation
One of the most persistent objections to strong emergence concerns downward causation - the idea that higher-level structures can influence lower-level processes. Within a static ontology, this appears incoherent or threatening. Within a processual framework, it is expected.
If reality is composed of events rather than inert substances, then causation is not a one-directional push from fundamental units upward. It is a network of influences unfolding across levels of organization. Higher-level patterns constrain possibilities, guide interactions, and shape outcomes without overriding physical laws. They do so by modulating relational contexts, not by injecting new forces.
Downward influence, on this account, is not an exception to causation but an expression of it.
Emergence and the Reality of Novelty
The persistence of emergence across domains suggests that novelty is not an illusion generated by complexity, but a real feature of the world. A reality in which nothing genuinely new can arise would be a reality in which explanation ultimately collapses into repetition. Yet the world we observe is not static repetition; it is an unfolding history marked by increasing differentiation, organization, and value. It's evolving, creational unfolding, is novel.
To account for this, ontology must do more than catalogue entities and laws. It must account for how new forms come to matter. Emergence, understood as productive organization over time, cannot be accommodated within a framework that treats reality as fundamentally complete.
Here again, process appears not as an optional metaphysical embellishment, but as an explanatory requirement. A world capable of genuine emergence must be a world in which becoming is real, novelty is operative, and organization has causal depth.
The next section turns to the most pervasive expression of this requirement - the nature of time itself.
IV. Temporality and Becoming - Time as Constitutive
Why an Unfinished World Cannot Be Reduced to a Timeless One
Time occupies an ambiguous position in contemporary accounts of reality. It is indispensable in practice and frequently minimized in theory. Scientific models rely on temporal ordering, causal sequence, and irreversible processes, yet many ontological frameworks treat time as secondary - a coordinate, an illusion, or a subjective projection.
This tension is not accidental. It reflects a deeper uncertainty about whether reality is fundamentally finished or unfinished.
Time as Parameter and Its Limits
In many physical theories, time functions as a parameter within mathematical formalisms. Equations describe how systems evolve relative to time without committing to time as an ontologically active feature of reality. On this view, all events are equally real, and temporal distinctions such as past, present, and future are perspectival rather than fundamental.
This approach has undeniable explanatory power. It allows for precise prediction and elegant representation. Yet it also introduces a metaphysical difficulty. If time is merely a coordinate, then becoming is not real. Change is reduced to difference across a dimension, not the coming-into-being of new states of affairs.
Such a picture struggles to account for irreversibility, historical contingency, and the felt asymmetry of time. More importantly, it conflicts with the way explanation itself operates. Explanations trace sequences. Causes precede effects. Understanding unfolds. A timeless ontology can describe order, but it cannot explain why order persists through change.
The Block Universe and Its Discontents
The block universe model provides a clear example of this tension. By treating spacetime as a complete four-dimensional structure, it renders all events equally existent. From this perspective, becoming is an illusion generated by local consciousness moving along a worldline.
While internally coherent, this model carries a significant cost. It renders novelty illusory, undermines agency, and collapses the distinction between what has happened and what has not yet occurred. Ethical responsibility becomes difficult to ground, and historical development loses its ontological force.
The problem is not that the block universe is mathematically incoherent. It is that it fails to account for the reality of temporal production - the fact that the future is not merely unknown, but genuinely open.
Irreversibility and Temporal Asymmetry
One of the strongest indicators that time is more than a parameter is the pervasive presence of irreversibility. Entropy increases. Systems age. Records accumulate. Decisions foreclose possibilities. These are not artifacts of perspective; they are structural features of physical, biological, and social systems.
Irreversibility indicates that time does work. It is not simply a dimension along which events are arrayed, but a condition under which events occur and transform reality. A world in which nothing is lost, gained, or altered would be a world without history.
The accumulation of structure over time - whether in the formation of galaxies, the evolution of life, or the development of cultures - points toward a reality that is not fully given at once. Explanation, once again, presupposes an unfinished world.
Becoming as Ontological Commitment
To affirm becoming is to make a substantive ontological claim. It is to say that reality is not exhausted by what already exists, but includes the production of what does not yet exist. This claim does not deny stability, lawfulness, or structure. It situates them within a temporal process that sustains and transforms them.
Becoming, in this sense, is not opposed to being. It is the mode through which being is achieved.
This view aligns with scientific practice more closely than static alternatives. Experimental results occur. Measurements happen. Organisms develop. Societies change. These are not merely different descriptions of a fixed totality; they are events that alter the state of the world.
The Return of Process Through Time
Once time is acknowledged as constitutive rather than incidental, the need for a processual ontology becomes difficult to avoid. A reality that genuinely unfolds must be capable of carrying itself forward, integrating past conditions into present actuality while opening toward future possibilities.
This does not yet specify the metaphysical details of process. It establishes only that any ontology which denies the reality of becoming undermines the very practices of explanation, responsibility, and meaning it seeks to support.
With intelligibility, actuality, emergence, and temporality now considered, the argument has reached a point of convergence. The final section draws these strands together and names explicitly what has thus far appeared only as a recurring requirement.
V. Process as Ontological Constraint
The Minimal Remainder
The preceding sections have approached the question of process indirectly, by following the pressure points that emerge within contemporary accounts of reality themselves:
- Intelligibility requires coherence through change.
- Actuality requires the resolution of possibility into event.
- Emergence requires novelty with causal depth.
- Temporality requires a world that is not yet finished.
In each case, static ontologies strain to accommodate what scientific practice and lived experience already presuppose.
At this point, the question is no longer whether process is useful, but whether it is avoidable.
Constraint, Not Completion
To describe process as an ontological constraint is to make a deliberately modest claim. It does not specify the ultimate nature of reality, nor does it dictate a comprehensive metaphysical system. It names only what any adequate ontology must allow for if it is to remain coherent with contemporary knowledge.
A constraint differs from a theory. Theories propose explanatory frameworks. Constraints identify conditions without which explanation fails. The argument of this essay has been that becoming, relational actualization, and temporal production function as such conditions. Attempts to exclude them repeatedly reintroduce them implicitly, under alternative descriptions.
Process, in this minimal sense, is not a rival to matter, structure, information, or experience. It is the mode through which these become actual.
The Irreducible Remainder
Once all static accounts have spoken, something remains. That remainder is not an object, a law, a structure, or a symbol. It is the fact that reality happens.
Events occur. Possibilities resolve. Relations generate outcomes. Systems organize themselves into new forms. Time carries the world forward. None of these features can be reduced to a timeless inventory without distortion. They are not optional metaphysical add-ons; they are what make explanation, agency, and meaning possible at all.
This is why process continues to recur across disciplines, even where it is officially denied. It appears as dynamics in physics, development in biology, learning in cognition, history in culture, and responsibility in ethics. Each instance names a different aspect of the same underlying requirement - that reality be capable of producing itself over time.
Process Without System
It is important to emphasize what has not yet been claimed. This essay has not argued for any particular historical form of process philosophy, nor has it introduced a detailed account of how process operates at the deepest levels of reality. Those tasks belong to later stages of the project.
What has been established here is prior to such elaboration. If reality is intelligible, if events are real, if novelty matters, and if time is constitutive, then reality must be processual at least in this minimal sense.
This conclusion does not end metaphysical inquiry. It disciplines it.
Conclusion - From Necessity to Construction
Essay I established that contemporary theories of reality, despite their diversity, repeatedly circle the same unresolved questions. Essay II has shown that these questions are not accidental. They arise because static ontologies cannot carry the explanatory load demanded by contemporary science, philosophy, and lived experience.
Process emerges here not as a speculative preference, but as a condition of coherence. It names the minimal remainder that must be acknowledged if reality is to be understood as something that unfolds rather than merely exists.
The task that remains is constructive. If reality is processual, what kind of process is it? How are events related? How does value arise? How might such an ontology reframe questions of meaning, responsibility, and transcendence?
Those questions guide what follows in Essay III.
Not things alone,
outside the world they govern.
Not time frozen,
into a picture that never arrives.
to be discovered whole.
It forms.
It selects.
It becomes.
Possibility leans forward,
and something answers.
Events gather relationships,
take up the past,
opens what is not yet,
and holds -
for a moment -
before yielding again.
What cannot be removed
is not matter or mind,
nor structure or sign,
but the happening itself:
the quiet insistence
that the world is still underway
Process Philosophy & Metaphysics
-
Whitehead, Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Corrected ed. New York: Free Press, 1978.
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Whitehead, Alfred North Whitehead. Science and the Modern World. New York: Free Press, 1967.
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Rescher, Nicholas Rescher. Process Metaphysics. Albany: SUNY Press, 1996.
Intelligibility, Explanation, and Ontology
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Ladyman, James Ladyman, and Don Ross. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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Nagel, Thomas Nagel. Mind and Cosmos. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
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Cartwright, Nancy Cartwright. The Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Quantum Theory, Measurement, and Actuality
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Heisenberg, Werner Heisenberg. Physics and Philosophy. New York: Harper & Row, 1958.
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Bohr, Niels Bohr. Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. New York: Wiley, 1958.
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Zurek, Wojciech Zurek. “Decoherence, Einselection, and the Quantum Origins of the Classical.” Reviews of Modern Physics 75, no. 3 (2003): 715–775.
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Kastner, Ruth E. Kastner. The Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Emergence, Systems, and Novelty
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Anderson, Philip W. Anderson. “More Is Different.” Science 177, no. 4047 (1972): 393–396.
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Kauffman, Stuart Kauffman. Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
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Noble, Denis Noble. Dance to the Tune of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Time, Becoming, and Temporality
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Smolin, Lee Smolin. Time Reborn. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013.
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Rovelli, Carlo Rovelli. The Order of Time. New York: Riverhead Books, 2018.
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Prigogine, Ilya Prigogine. The End of Certainty. New York: Free Press, 1997.
Theological & Philosophical Extensions (Without Commitment)
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Cobb, John B. Cobb Jr.. A Christian Natural Theology. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007.
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Keller, Catherine Keller. The Cloud of the Impossible. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
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Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. The Phenomenon of Man. New York: Harper & Row, 1959.
