Thomas Oord makes some excellent observations on Dodds' book reviewing God/Creation as Primary/Secondary Cause... basically, the answer isn't found in returning to the classical depictions of God, sin, man, and world, made under Aristotle and Aquinas. But in piecing together Relational-Process Thought with today's quantum/evolutionary sciences that put the word "M-O-R-E" into mechanistic scientism (e.g., God or world or creation as "efficient cause").
And what might that word "more" include? Words like "indeterminacy, free will, open, emergence, synchronicity, sovereignty, postmodern, epistemic humility, partnering, love, faith, weakness, teleology, mystery, renewal, incarnation, etc." Which may not be new concepts but when reconfigured away from classical theism into the lights of postmodern relational and open theism find enlivenment and hopeful approach.
Conceptual ideas that we have painstakingly been crafting within a framework of Emergence Theology and a Postmodern Christian faith these past two years since beginning this blog and become dissatisfied with arguments and theologies on both sides of the aisles. And what are those aisles? That of classic/enlightenment/modernism as conceived by fundamental and evangelical Christianity on the one side. As well as the sometimes irreverent cynicisms and shock theologies of progressive-evangelical / emergent Christianity on the other side (though we have ever leaned to this latter reawakening of the Jesus faith to our global world communities and responsibilities).
R.E. Slater
June 10, 2013
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Unsatisfactory Mystery of Divine Action
Unsatisfactory Mystery of Divine Action
http://thomasjayoord.com/index.php/blog/archives/the_unsatisfactory_mystery_of_classic_theologys_theory_of_divine_action/#.UbTunZ-x4gE.facebook
by Thomas Jay Oord
June 9, 2013
by Thomas Jay Oord
June 9, 2013
I just finished a wonderfully accessible and clear book on God's activity in
the world. It was written from an advocate of Thomas Aquinas's theology, and it
addresses recent scientific theory and scholarship. I'll be recommending that
serious scholars of science and theology read this book... even though I
strongly disagree with its proposals!
I know of no finer, more accurate, or more accessible explanation of a
Thomistic view of divine action than Michael Dodds’s recently published book,
Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science and Thomas Aquinas. This
is an immensely important book, and those who care about issues of divine action
would do well to read it. But this book only deepened my belief that the
Thomistic approach to divine causation is unsatisfactory. We need
alternatives.
Causal Categories
Dodds begins by rightly arguing that divine causation – the notion that God
acts as a causal force in the world -- is a central concern for our time.
Contemporary philosophy of science, however, has reduced the number of causal
categories to just one: the category of efficient causes. We think today about
causation in terms of the impact of one entity upon another.
Dodds uses Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to argue for additional categories of
causation. Early chapters in the book explain accessibly Aristotle’s four
causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. Aquinas employed these four
causes for his own theological work, believing them to give a full account of
causality. We should use these four causes, says Dodds, to talk about causation
amongst creatures and God’s own causal activity. The major contribution Thomas
Aquinas makes to Aristotle’s scheme, however, is to argue that a result or
outcome in the world can come through both a primary cause – associated with God
– and a secondary cause – associated with creatures.
Because only efficient causality has remained in the contemporary scientific
world, says Dodds, “the very success that science enjoyed by omitting causes
that could not be measured eventually led to the conviction that such causes
should not only be ignored methodologically but denied metaphysically” (50).
This denial of additional causes led to philosophical reductionism: the basic
parts of the world, which apparently persist via efficient causation, are the
most real. Efficient causation consequently led to many scholars framing
causality in terms of mechanism. The result of a mechanistic world led to
scientism, says Dodds, which is the view that only science can give us truth
about the world.
Causality and Recent Science
In recent years, however, change has been taking place in philosophy of
science. The theory of emergence now plays an important explanatory role, for
instance. Emergence says that we should think of the natural world as comprised
of multiple levels, and new features can arise at one level. These features
cannot be explained simply by their parts or by what occurs at less complex
levels. In addition, quantum mechanics suggests indeterminacy exists at the
least complex levels of existence. This indeterminacy means not only that
variance occurs at these levels of existence, but that we cannot be entirely
certain about our observations. Dodds notes that evolutionary theory is becoming
more influenced by notions of purpose and direction. This development places
into question the rigid mechanism assumed by some philosophies of science.
Perhaps most important to Dodds’s project is his claim that many now seek causal
explanations that go beyond efficient causation. According to Dodds, science
itself now cries out for causal explanations beyond efficient causality
alone.
The reduction of causality to one category – efficient causation – led to the
reduction of our ability to speak about God’s causal activity. Put simply: the
scientific worldview seemed to allow no room for God to act. Many engaging
science-and-religion scholarship today are searching for a theoretical and
empirical space -- “a causal joint” -- at which God may work in the world. Dodd
regards this search as the quest for a univocal cause, in which God actions are
similar in kind to creaturely actions but do not interfere the laws of nature or
creaturely causality.
Many theologians in the modern period, says Dodds, responded to science by
accepting the philosophical limitation that causation comes only through
efficient causes. Here, process theology and theologies espousing divine
self-limitation come under Dodds’s scrutiny. Unfortunately, however, this
section is one of the weakest in the book. The author misrepresents what the
majority of process theologians have said (and the footnotes reveal a lack of
research in this area). Perhaps more unfortunate, Dodds never addresses in this
section the crucial question driving much of modern theology: Does or can God
completely control others (act as sufficient cause)? This question not only
drives quests to solve the problem of evil, it also plays an important role in
philosophy of science questions about causal explanations.
A major segment of Unlocking Divine Action addresses new theories of
contemporary science and how those engaging in science-and-theology research use
these theories to speculate about how God acts in the world. For instance,
Dodds looks at how some scholars speculate that God might input information into
the natural world to exert causal influence. He looks at the possibilities open
to the science-and-religion scholars by the apparent phenomenon of quantum
indeterminacy. Dodds explores the possibility of God’s influencing the emergence
of new structures in the natural world. All of the proposals Dodds explores
suggest non-interventionist types of divine action: God exerts causal influence
without circumventing creaturely influence.
God is Not Like Us (at all!)
Dodds is not convinced, however, by recent science-and-religion proposals on
non-interventionist divine action. His primary criticism is that most
science-and-religion scholars think God’s activity is of the same general kind
as creaturely activity. In other words, these theories presuppose a univocal
understanding of divine and creaturely causality. Those who presuppose a theory
of causality based on univocity, Dodds contends, inevitably wrestle with the
question of God’s interference. “When divine action is conceived univocally with
the action of creatures, divine being tends to be viewed univocally as well. A
univocal God, however, is quite different than the God of the Christian
tradition” (158).
Not only does Dodd think God’s being is altogether different from creaturely
being, but by thinking of them as on the same metaphysical kind leads to
worrying that God and creatures compete as causes. “When two men carry a table,”
Dodds says by way of illustration, “the more weight one lifts, the less there is
for the other to lift” (153). But “God is unlike all other things,” he Dodds.
“Recognizing this, we should be cautious about trying to say anything about how
God acts. God is totally other” (161). For this reason, Dodds says, “the mode or
manner of divine activity will ever escape us” (169).
The alternative Dodds presents is a return to the past: the proposals of
Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas, there are no real relations or mutual
dependency between God and creation. Creatures depend upon God and are related
to God. But God has no corresponding relation to creatures, and God is not
dependent in any way. With Aquinas, Dodds believes that “God’s action is
fundamentally different from that of creatures” (171). “To predicate such a
relation of God,” says Dodds, “would be to reduce God to the level of one
creature existing beside another” (172). Instead, it is impossible to speak of
divine action in any positive way: “our verbal and conceptual abilities should
be utterly defeated if we try to speak of God, since God is utterly beyond the
being of creatures” (174).
Primary and Secondary Causation
But if it’s impossible for us to speak of God, where does this leave the one
who seeks to talk about God’s action in relation to science?
Dodds believes the primary/secondary theory of causation offers the best way
to talk about divine action and creaturely causation. According to this view,
every instance of creaturely causality necessarily requires God’s influence. But
God acts as a primary cause and does not conflict with the secondary causes.
After all, argues Dodds, “these causes do not belong to the same order” (191).
God’s causality infinitely transcends creaturely causality. And this means that
“when a primary and secondary cause act together, the effect belongs entirely to
both. The influence of the primary cause does not diminish the action of the
secondary cause, but enables it” (192).
It’s important for Dodds, however, to insist that “the use of secondary
causes does not bespeak any divine limitation” (192). In fact, “God’s causality
does not constitute a miraculous intervention; nor does it negate the real
causality of all the natural agents involved in the evolutionary process” (202).
Whenever an event occurs in the world, we can say both that God caused it and
that creatures caused it.
Dodds admits that this proposal borders on incomprehensibility: “the notion
of secondary causation is not an easy one to grasp” (207). But he agrees with
Etienne Gilson that “we must hold firmly to two apparently contradictory truths.
God does whatever creatures do; and that creatures themselves do whatever they
do” (208). This double agency of the primary/secondary theory is a paradox. Both
God and creatures can be the causes of what occurs in reality, because as the
primary cause, God transcends all categories of creaturely causation.
The Mystery Card
This is where my dissatisfaction for the Dodds/Thomas Aquinas proposal comes
out strongly. In essence, Dodds is proposing what Ian Barbour called the
“independence” model for thinking about science and theology: science and
theology are independent explanations, and the two have no overlapping
commonalities. God’s action is independent from creaturely actions, and God’s
action is in no way analogous to creaturely action. In fact, we cannot say
anything positive about God’s causal activity or God’s being, because God is
utterly beyond our language and categories of being.
In the end, then, it’s all about mystery for Dodds. It’s mystery in the
unsatisfactory sense of our not even being able to offer any meaningful
explanation for God’s causal activity in relation to creaturely causation. The
primary/secondary theory of Dodds and Thomas Aquinas strikes me as an elaborate
mystery card played to retain a role for both divine and creaturely causation –
theology and science – without having to make difficult decisions about ancient
questions – e.g., why does a loving and powerful God not prevent evil? – or
contemporary scientific issues – e.g., how does God act as an efficient
cause?
And as the book winds down, Dodds explores what his primary/secondary theme
entails for providence, miracles, and theodicy [(vindication of the divine attributes, particularly holiness and justice, in establishing or allowing the existence of physical and moral evil) - dictionary]. He quickly appeals to mystery
when confronted with the problem of evil: It is a problem “no theology can
answer or ‘solve’” (240). Dodds is not willing to entertain any notion of divine
limitations [sic, "process theology"], because he believes such limitations result in even greater
theological difficulties. Dodds ultimately offers the unsatisfactory proposal
that God allows evil without directly intending it [this is a very unsatisfying proposing and I address this here under several articles in the sidebars "Sin," "Suffering and Evil," and Sovereignty" - res]. He explores prayer and
miracles near the end of the book as well, using the primary/secondary scheme [again, I address these here under the concept of "synchronicity" by tying it into our ideas of "Miracle" and the "Holy Spirit". - res].
Important questions about God’s ability to act as a sufficient cause to answer
prayer or act miraculously are not addressed to this reviewer’s satisfaction.
But this is expected after the previous and longer section on evil and Dodds’s
repeated appeals to mystery.
The Causality of Love?
Dodds concludes the book with a short section he titles, “The Causality of
Love.” As one who has published a great deal on the metaphysics of love, I was
especially keen to see what he would write in this very brief segment. Dodds
believes his primary/secondary approach allows us to say God acts lovingly and
creatures can partner with God. But after reading earlier in the book that God’s
causality and being are altogether different from creaturely causality and
being, I wondered how words like “partnership” or “cooperation” or even
“participation” make any sense when used in relation to God and creation. And
what does “love” even mean when our language about God, according to Dodds,
offers nothing positive about God’s being or relations. In short, the appeal to
love fell flat.
Despite my strong criticism of Unlocking Divine Action, I think this
is an important book. I will be recommending it often. To my mind, it
illustrates why many today are seeking ways to talk about divine action other
than what we find in Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Michael Dodds, and those who
think similarly.
Sometimes I need a lucid book - and carefully argued thesis - to see clearly the
need for something better. [AMEN and AMEN! - res]